Thank you for the opportunity to present today on a trade agreement that is important to the success of Canada's agriculture community and industry.
Agriculture is an essential part of the economic, political and social fabric of Canada and is critical to the well-being of all Canadians. It plays a strategic role in and is the backbone of rural communities. Agriculture and agri-food make a significant contribution to the Canadian economy, directly providing one in eight jobs, employing 2.1 million people in rural and urban Canada and accounting for 6.7% of total GDP.
A significant part of Canadian agriculture and agri-food's growth and success is due to international trade agreements and subsequent export market development and sales. Canada's market is just too small to accommodate the growth potential of what has become a world-renowned, efficient and low-cost agriculture industry.
Currently, the industry relies on export markets for at least 60% of its output. Consequently, the industry is always on the lookout for additional profitable markets and eagerly awaits the outcome and potential opportunities of any and every bilateral or multilateral trade negotiation.
That said, it's equally important to recognize that our supply-managed sectors have built stable and viable industries without reliance on export markets and to ensure that they are not undermined and destabilized in any trade agreements Canada negotiates.
NAFTA has underpinned growth in agriculture production and processing not only in Canada but also in Mexico and the U.S. It creates a market of 449 million consumers and generates agri-food and seafood trade of $289 billion Canadian. The benefits of NAFTA are undisputed and have been since its implementation. Agricultural trade between Canada and its two North American partners has increased significantly since NAFTA, growing to about $66 billion Canadian in reciprocal trade with the U.S. alone and about $5 billion with Mexico.
Nearly 80% of Canada's total processed food exports go to Mexico and the U.S. Canada is the number one supplier of agricultural goods to the U.S., at 19.3%. With the current supply gap of $121.9 billion—the difference between world ag exports to the U.S. and Canadian exports to the U.S.—and Canada's importance as a supplier in at least six of the top 10 U.S. agriculture imports—beef, pork, baked goods, vegetables, canola oil and animal feed—we have considerable potential to increase agriculture trade with the Americans.
The same goes for Mexico, with its growing middle class. There, Canada is the second most important supplier of agricultural goods, with $2.3 billion in exports out of a total of $5 billion Canadian in reciprocal trade.
Furthermore, integration between Canada and the U.S. is such that our respective industries have grown to rely on open borders to strengthen and feed each other.
A state-specific example points us to the $2 billion in trade we do with Iowa. It exports close to $300 million in animal feed to Canada, imports around $170 million in live hogs from Canada, and then turns around and sends us $180 million in fresh and frozen pork. Trade and investment with Canada creates 100,000 jobs in Iowa alone.
From the beginning, CFA has maintained that NAFTA did not need renegotiation, that changes and improvements could well have been made with the agreement already in place. The priority, of course, was to maintain the benefits Canadian agriculture was already enjoying, to ensure that supply-managed sectors would not be undermined through market access concessions, to achieve improved market access for our sugar beet producers and to advance regulatory alignment and domestic support equity.
In reviewing the new CUSMA, it is evident that the open borders and subsequent market benefits from NAFTA remain largely intact. In fact, some additional benefits were achieved, but they came with a very heavy price—too heavy, some may say. It's clear that the Alberta sugar beet producers came away with the biggest gain in this new agreement. Ever since the original CUSFTA, in which the requirement to institutionalize TRQs at historical import levels was ignored by the U.S., our sugar industry has dealt with a very restrictive U.S. TRQ. In CUSMA, our access for sugar beet sugar was more than doubled, with an increase to 20,000 tonnes.
Central to the success of any trade agreement is the ability to reduce non-tariff trade barriers. This includes a process for regulatory transparency, co-operation and alignment.
CFA applauds the efforts made by our government to include the provisions set out in chapter 28 of the agreement, which calls for transparency and a process for communication and co-operation among North American regulatory authorities.
The establishment of a committee on good regulatory practices, composed of government representatives, including from central regulatory agencies, will enhance collaboration with a view to facilitating trade among all parties. Canada tried hard to have the U.S. remove its requirement for Canadian meat imports to be reinspected when they cross the border, but to no avail. That issue should be one of the priorities to go before the committee on good regulatory practices.
Canadian farmers continue to compete against a very high level of supports offered to U.S. producers, and while these domestic subsidies fall within international trade rules, they provide U.S. farmers with an artificial and unfair comparative advantage, even though domestic support is an issue regulated to WTO jurisdiction. It is positive to note that article 3.6 in CUSMA talks about the need to make sure any forms of support are non- or minimally trade-distorting, and if a party has a concern, there is a process to discuss and work toward mitigating trade impact.
Canadian agriculture has built and developed a successful export industry, but its success is contingent on operating within a robust rules-based trading system. An important component to such a system is an effective trade dispute settlement mechanism. For that reason, maintaining chapter 19 was critical and will be an important element in creating a level playing field.
Despite the fact that the open border in agriculture between the U.S. and Canada was never in jeopardy, Canada paid a very high price for the conclusion of the renegotiations by conceding significant dairy, turkey, chicken and table egg market access to the U.S. It's another economic hit in the wake of CPTPP and CETA. With the accumulation of access concessions devastating supply-managed industries, by 2024, for example, the combined market access concessions made by Canada under WTO, CETA, CPTPP and CUSMA will represent 18% of our dairy market.
Supply-managed industries are anxiously waiting for government to fulfill its commitment to quickly and fully mitigate the impacts of these agreements.
As well, every effort needs to be made to eliminate all forms of TRQ circumventions that escalate the volume of imports far beyond the negotiated TRQs.
Two other issues in addition to market access concessions that are a cause for alarm in our industry are the concessions Canada made with respect to policy development and export controls. First, Canada has agreed to consult with the U.S. before making changes to Canadian dairy policies. This is clearly a loss of sovereignty in Canadian policy development, and one that should never, ever have been surrendered.
Second, Canada agrees, in chapter 3, article 3.A.3, to cap dairy sector exports of milk protein concentrate, skim milk and infant formula to CUSMA and non-CUSMA countries, with an applied export charge on exports over the cap. This is disturbing on several fronts. Canada has long argued against the use of export tariffs to regulate trade. It may well be challenged by other WTO countries under GATT, and it sets a dangerous precedent by allowing a regional trade agreement and a party in that agreement to control trade of another party to countries outside of the agreement.
Finally, it's a precedent that may have implications for Canadian export-reliant agricultural sectors. For example, if Canadian exports to other countries out-compete U.S. products, the U.S may try to use CUSMA or some other mechanism to manage or restrict Canadian trade to the rest of the world.
In conclusion, CFA applauds government for its part in consummating an agreement. The importance of profitable markets around the world for Canadian agriculture cannot be overstated. However, CFA would implore government to negotiate successful trade agreements in agriculture without paying the heavy price we have in the past with access concessions in supply-managed domestic markets.
Thank you.