Thank you, Chair and honourable members. I am appearing in an individual capacity and not as a representative of the University of Alberta.
Altering China's behaviour, especially within China, is challenging. This does not mean that we should not try, but rather that we need to be modest in our expectations.
I'll focus instead, however, on China's activities in Canada. Here there are greater prospects of modifying Chinese behaviour or at least responding to China's conduct. As a sovereign state, we have a responsibility to protect our democratic institutions, our citizens, our economy and the results of Canadian ingenuity, but care must also be taken to ensure that Canada remains open to the world, and that includes the 20% of humanity who are Chinese.
I would include in those Chinese actions that have a direct impact on Canada the treatment of Canadian citizens in China, including the egregious cases of Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor. China's interest in the Chinese diaspora does not necessarily end when Chinese nationals obtain foreign citizenship. We need to differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate contacts between national governments and their citizens abroad. It is normal and acceptable for governments to contact their citizens overseas and for diplomatic and consular representatives to meet with their nationals when the individual is willing to do so. This allows Canada to access our citizens when they may be experiencing difficulties, including arrest. China maintains similar contacts with their own nationals, and that will include the large number of Chinese nationals studying in Canadian educational institutions, some 200,000 pre-COVID.
However, when there is pressure on Canadian citizens, landed immigrants and even PRC nationals extending to tracking their political views, pressuring any of these persons to change their behaviour or taking actions that are illegitimate, this must be countered by Canada where detected. In some instances, a simple warning to desist conveyed by Global Affairs Canada to Chinese officials may suffice. That was part of my government experience.
However, in egregious instances more vigorous action may be required. In extreme cases it could mean that individuals in Chinese missions might be expelled or prosecution undertaken against individuals who engaged in threats or other illegal acts and who do not have diplomatic or consular status. A further complication is that knowledge of such coercion may be available only to Canadian intelligence services, who are often unwilling to openly use information gathered because of the risk that it would expose intelligence methods or sources.
I would add that maybe it would be more useful to examine some of these issues in the closed-door meetings of the House security and intelligence committee, where Government of Canada information can be more freely available.
Intelligence organizations, particularly those of large and powerful states like China, will continue to collect intelligence and carry out their mandates even if these activities may damage bilateral relations with foreign states. This does not mean that actions to curb such activities by governments cannot have any effect; it rather means that such intelligence functions will tend to reoccur and require repeated action.
China is now graduating roughly eight times the number of STEM graduates—science, technology, engineering and medicine—as the United States, while having only four times the U.S. population. While the flow of S and T has been largely from the west to China, it will be increasingly important for the west to track and absorb advances achieved in Chinese universities and its expansive network of state laboratories, although this will not be easily achieved.
A further challenge is the commercialization of scientific discoveries. A joint team of Canadian medical researchers, working with Chinese partners, is far more likely to put into production a medical device in Suzhou than in Halifax, given China's vast industrial capacity. Changing that calculus is desirable but difficult.
Effort must also be made to safeguard intellectual property, especially, but not only, when there are national security concerns. The formation of the Government of Canada-Universities Working Group that allows Canadian universities to meet regularly with federal departments and agencies is an important step. I look forward to their report later this year.
Universities and science must be cognizant of security risks in the protection of intellectual property. I'm still, however, not entirely comfortable with upending the long tradition of academic freedom and university autonomy without a strong rationale. Government intrusion into key Canadian institutions, such as universities, must be carefully calibrated and justified.
We are not in a cold war with China, at least not yet. The flow of U.S. capital to China, both foreign direct investment as well as portfolio investment, accelerated in 2020. Apple, Tesla, Microsoft, Google, Volkswagen, Toyota, Samsung and most other high-tech companies maintain extensive research laboratories in China, drawing on local talent.
While national security and political interference by China will continue to pose challenges to Canadian sovereignty, there also needs to be a sophisticated Canadian strategy to balance risk and opportunity.
My recommendations are, very briefly, that the Government of Canada provide greater clarity to Canadian universities regarding the federal assessment of what is and what is not problematic co-operation with Chinese universities and scientists, including dual-use technologies; that a comparative—