Canada-China Relations Committee on May 3rd, 2021

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Geoff Regan]

We are continuing with questions and answers.

Now we'll go on to Mr. Harris for two and a half minutes.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

Thank you, Chair.

Mr. Fadden, I will go back to you, please, for a moment.

We were talking briefly about academic activities involving Chinese researchers. You said at one point that you can't go down the rabbit hole of suspecting every Chinese student coming to Canada. However, you go further than most people in saying that there are 10 or so areas of study with national security implications, suggesting that Chinese students would not then be able to study in Canada and that there should not be any research collaboration with them.

Could you identify those 10 areas, or some of them, if they come to mind quickly, and tell us how is it that you have such a hard line on that? How do you justify that, or how would Canada justify that?

[Richard Fadden]

I think it's a more generalized practice within the Five Eyes and within NATO countries in general.

I honestly agree with Ms. Ong's view that we need to have as many exchanges with the Chinese as we can possibly generate. However, I think that there are some sectors of activity—I happened to pick 10 or 12, but I don't remember the exact number—where I think that our national security, and the national security of our allies, is put at risk if we have exchanges.

No matter how well intentioned a university professor or team might be in Canada, if they receive a Chinese grant, whatever he or she discovers is going to go back to China. On most items, if you think of the breadth of our economy, I think it's absolutely fine. Do I think it's fine in the area of high-level optics, nuclear affairs and a bunch of other areas like that? I think the risk is too great.

If you accept my basic premise that China is indeed an adversary, I don't think we should be making it easy for them to acquire intelligence in areas that are pretty critical to the national security of the west.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

How do you enforce that?

[Richard Fadden]

I think you have a debate among your committee. You propose legislation, and you simply say that no foreign power, as indicated by the Governor in Council, may provide grants or contributions of any sort to a Canadian academic institution for the purposes of working in these very limited number of fields.

I think it's doable. I think it would be painful, and I think we need a debate about it. I'm articulating my view. I am not so delusional as to think everybody would agree with me, but I think it's worth talking about.

[The Chair, Liberal, Geoff Regan]

Thank you very much, Mr. Harris.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

Thank you, sir.

[The Chair, Liberal, Geoff Regan]

Since we have a few minutes left, Mr. Paul-Hus and Mr. Dubourg will have three minutes.

Mr. Paul-Hus, go ahead for three minutes.

[Pierre Paul-Hus, Conservative, Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Fadden, we are talking about political influence today.

In 2016, the media reported on Chinese donations to Mr. Trudeau. Gifts were given to Mr. Trudeau, and 45 cheques of $1,500 were sent to his Papineau riding association. Two Chinese individuals also donated $1 million to the University of Montreal and $250,000 to the Pierre Elliot Trudeau Foundation, respectively.

Do you consider this to be some form of political influence, especially since the donations were intended for a prime minister?

[Richard Fadden]

There are fairly specific rules on what government members can and cannot accept.

I am admittedly not an expert. However, even if we are not talking about a violation or abuse, I think it is ill perceived for a foreign country or one of its representatives to give money to a riding association. The Pierre Elliott Trudeau Foundation's situation is a bit different. After all, that foundation was created under a Canadian piece of legislation and has very positive objectives.

I don't think a politician who is part of a government should accept donations from a foreign country or from one of its representatives.

[Pierre Paul-Hus, Conservative, Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC]

Thank you very much.

I will ask one last question, which will be about Huawei.

Everyone says that we are still waiting for agencies' confirmations on Huawei. You understand very well how this works. Do you think that reports have already been tabled and that the government already has the necessary recommendations concerning Huawei's 5G technology file?

[Richard Fadden]

I will probably be more honest than I should be, but, if I were an agent with one of those two agencies and I was hearing politicians say that they were still waiting for reports, I would be very insulted.

[Pierre Paul-Hus, Conservative, Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC]

Thank you.

Mr. Fadden, what is the best advice you could give the committee in its study on the Canada–China relations?

[Richard Fadden]

On some points, I agree with Professor Ong. We should be discussing these issues a lot more than we currently do in Canada.

If Canadians do not accept that Canada has a problem with China or other countries, you and your fellow parliamentarians will have a very hard time changing legislation. It will be even harder for national security agencies to be proactive. The issue has to be talked about in order to arrive at something of a national consensus.

As I was saying to Mr. Harris, whether you agree with me or not is irrelevant. What matters is having exposure to a wide range of perspectives in order for that consensus to emerge.

[Pierre Paul-Hus, Conservative, Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Geoff Regan]

Thank you, Mr. Paul-Hus.

Mr. Dubourg, we now go to you for three minutes.

[Emmanuel Dubourg, Liberal, Bourassa, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I, too, want to welcome Ms. Ong and Mr. Fadden, and thank them for participating in our study. Their presentations are also appreciated.

My first questions are for Ms. Ong, the university professor.

Ms. Ong, in October 2020, you said that the Chinese Communist Party had been unsuccessful in bolstering its legitimacy and popularity through Confucius institutes. Can you tell us the extent to which China uses Confucius institutes as public relations tools?

[Lynette H. Ong]

Thank you for the question.

I think the Confucius Institute is funded by the Chinese government to promote Chinese languages and Chinese culture overseas. Its actual operation and its consequences on host countries vary from one locality to another.

Sometimes with Confucius Institutes within a certain university or education institution, people in charge may self-censor. They may not invite people to speak about Uighur issues, Taiwan issues, for the fear of offending people, people who actually fund them. I'm also aware of circumstances of Confucius Institutes actually teaching Chinese languages and cultures. Their operations differ a great deal.

When I said that the Chinese government hasn't been that successful in projecting soft power, it's because there has been so much push-back against it. We don't hear of successful cases of them educating people about Chinese language; we hear the push-back from the United States, Australia, the U.K., Africa. I think that in that sense, the negative news overwhelms the positive news.

[Emmanuel Dubourg, Liberal, Bourassa, QC]

Thank you.

We have seen the number of Confucius institutes rise in the past few years. Does that worry you?

[Lynette H. Ong]

As I said at the beginning, I think there is potential risk of undue influence, and that this may become foreign interference. I think we also need to understand why there is a demand for Confucius Institute programs. People want to learn the Chinese language and take Chinese programs. There is a lack of funding for these programs. If the government could increase funding, if the demand was actually met, people wouldn't go to Confucius Institutes anymore.

[Emmanuel Dubourg, Liberal, Bourassa, QC]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Geoff Regan]

Thank you, Mr. Dubourg.

Thank you very much to our witnesses. We really appreciate your being with us this evening.

We'll now excuse you to prepare for the next panel.

We'll suspend for two minutes as we arrange the microphones and so forth with the panellists.

Thank you so much.

[The Chair, Liberal, Geoff Regan]

I call this meeting back to order.

For our second panel, I would now like to welcome, as individuals, Gordon Houlden, director emeritus of the China Institute, University of Alberta, and Paul Evans, professor, school of public policy and global affairs, University of British Columbia. Thank you for being here.

Mr. Houlden, let's start with you for the opening remarks. Please proceed. You have five minutes.

[Professor Gordon Houlden, Director Emeritus, China Institute, University of Alberta, As an Individual]

Thank you, Chair and honourable members. I am appearing in an individual capacity and not as a representative of the University of Alberta.

Altering China's behaviour, especially within China, is challenging. This does not mean that we should not try, but rather that we need to be modest in our expectations.

I'll focus instead, however, on China's activities in Canada. Here there are greater prospects of modifying Chinese behaviour or at least responding to China's conduct. As a sovereign state, we have a responsibility to protect our democratic institutions, our citizens, our economy and the results of Canadian ingenuity, but care must also be taken to ensure that Canada remains open to the world, and that includes the 20% of humanity who are Chinese.

I would include in those Chinese actions that have a direct impact on Canada the treatment of Canadian citizens in China, including the egregious cases of Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor. China's interest in the Chinese diaspora does not necessarily end when Chinese nationals obtain foreign citizenship. We need to differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate contacts between national governments and their citizens abroad. It is normal and acceptable for governments to contact their citizens overseas and for diplomatic and consular representatives to meet with their nationals when the individual is willing to do so. This allows Canada to access our citizens when they may be experiencing difficulties, including arrest. China maintains similar contacts with their own nationals, and that will include the large number of Chinese nationals studying in Canadian educational institutions, some 200,000 pre-COVID.

However, when there is pressure on Canadian citizens, landed immigrants and even PRC nationals extending to tracking their political views, pressuring any of these persons to change their behaviour or taking actions that are illegitimate, this must be countered by Canada where detected. In some instances, a simple warning to desist conveyed by Global Affairs Canada to Chinese officials may suffice. That was part of my government experience.

However, in egregious instances more vigorous action may be required. In extreme cases it could mean that individuals in Chinese missions might be expelled or prosecution undertaken against individuals who engaged in threats or other illegal acts and who do not have diplomatic or consular status. A further complication is that knowledge of such coercion may be available only to Canadian intelligence services, who are often unwilling to openly use information gathered because of the risk that it would expose intelligence methods or sources.

I would add that maybe it would be more useful to examine some of these issues in the closed-door meetings of the House security and intelligence committee, where Government of Canada information can be more freely available.

Intelligence organizations, particularly those of large and powerful states like China, will continue to collect intelligence and carry out their mandates even if these activities may damage bilateral relations with foreign states. This does not mean that actions to curb such activities by governments cannot have any effect; it rather means that such intelligence functions will tend to reoccur and require repeated action.

China is now graduating roughly eight times the number of STEM graduates—science, technology, engineering and medicine—as the United States, while having only four times the U.S. population. While the flow of S and T has been largely from the west to China, it will be increasingly important for the west to track and absorb advances achieved in Chinese universities and its expansive network of state laboratories, although this will not be easily achieved.

A further challenge is the commercialization of scientific discoveries. A joint team of Canadian medical researchers, working with Chinese partners, is far more likely to put into production a medical device in Suzhou than in Halifax, given China's vast industrial capacity. Changing that calculus is desirable but difficult.

Effort must also be made to safeguard intellectual property, especially, but not only, when there are national security concerns. The formation of the Government of Canada-Universities Working Group that allows Canadian universities to meet regularly with federal departments and agencies is an important step. I look forward to their report later this year.

Universities and science must be cognizant of security risks in the protection of intellectual property. I'm still, however, not entirely comfortable with upending the long tradition of academic freedom and university autonomy without a strong rationale. Government intrusion into key Canadian institutions, such as universities, must be carefully calibrated and justified.

We are not in a cold war with China, at least not yet. The flow of U.S. capital to China, both foreign direct investment as well as portfolio investment, accelerated in 2020. Apple, Tesla, Microsoft, Google, Volkswagen, Toyota, Samsung and most other high-tech companies maintain extensive research laboratories in China, drawing on local talent.

While national security and political interference by China will continue to pose challenges to Canadian sovereignty, there also needs to be a sophisticated Canadian strategy to balance risk and opportunity.

My recommendations are, very briefly, that the Government of Canada provide greater clarity to Canadian universities regarding the federal assessment of what is and what is not problematic co-operation with Chinese universities and scientists, including dual-use technologies; that a comparative—