Canada-China Relations Committee on May 3rd, 2021

[The Chair, Liberal, Geoff Regan]

Mr. Houlden, I'm sorry to interrupt, but your five minutes have concluded. I suspect and hope that one of my colleagues will ask you to give the rest of your recommendations when they are posing questions, but I am required now to go to Mr. Evans for five minutes.

[Prof. Gordon Houlden]

Of course, and that's fine. Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Geoff Regan]

Thank you so much.

Go ahead, Mr. Evans, please.

[Professor Paul Evans, Professor, School of Public Policy and Global Affairs, University of British Columbia, As an Individual]

Thank you, Chairman.

Thank you for a second opportunity to appear before the committee. Today I will focus on Canadian universities, their importance as the foundation of engagement between Canada and China, and their responses to rising concerns about new national security and safety threats.

I speak as an individual professor, not as a representative of the University of British Columbia.

The involvement of Canadian universities in and with China has expanded dramatically in the past 40 years. It is now a huge enterprise with multiple layers. Roughly 140,000 students from the PRC are registered at post-secondary institutions across Canada. Canadian universities have hundreds of MOUs with Chinese partners for faculty and student exchanges and training programs.

There are hundreds of research collaborations funded from a combination of Canadian and Chinese sources. These have shifted from capacity building to, in many cases, advanced collaborations doing cutting-edge research and work. At UBC, for example, there are about 6,500 People's Republic of China students. More than 300 professors have a significant professional interest in China. Faculty have partnerships with more than 100 different Chinese institutions.

Beyond economic impact, China connections are widely valued as integral to the global mission of our institutions, enriching the learning environment for our students, facilitating advanced research and training, and providing a meeting place for exchange.

These connections are under increasing scrutiny in Canada but in even more intense ways in the United States and Australia, as geopolitical competition and confrontation with China have intensified. Security and intelligence agencies in Ottawa have identified concerns related to cybersecurity, leakage of intellectual property, and transfer of technology and ideas that are seen as benefiting the Chinese military and other state institutions involved in violation of human rights. The media have identified risks to academic integrity and freedom generated by too heavy a reliance on Chinese tuition revenues and Chinese funding from sources, including Huawei.

Other concerns focus on instances of improper surveillance and harassment of individuals and on confrontations between student groups on contentious issues such as Hong Kong, Xianjiang and Tibet that affect student well-being and our general academic atmosphere.

Ottawa, our universities and funding agencies have established collaborative mechanisms, as Mr. Houlden just stated, that focus on sensitizing universities to risks that they face, particularly in the domains of cybersecurity and protection of intellectual property. They have produced guidelines on research hygiene and safeguarding scientific integrity that are now being rolled out across the country.

What action is needed? What we have just mentioned are necessary first steps, but much more is needed at the level of individual institutions and at the national level. For the universities, key priorities are improving awareness of risks, building mechanisms for vigilance and instituting proactive measures to monitor and maintain a respectful atmosphere on our campuses. We need to revisit and revise many existing agreements with Chinese partners, when warranted, to maximize transparency and our academic values.

One of the biggest challenges is how we make these adjustments without fanning anti-Chinese racism and stigmatizing professors and students of Chinese descent who already feel targeted by anti-China sentiment and unwarranted suspicion about their connections with China.

Nationally, the key issues are defining exactly what areas of research are considered sensitive and exactly the criteria for determining what partners are sensitive or inappropriate, which is very difficult indeed. More broadly, we need a policy statement from the government on how and why academic, business and other people-to-people engagements matter.

Academic connections with China are valued and deeply rooted, but to keep the doors open to a dynamic range of interactions and collaborations with China, we need to install some new screens and close some windows.

[The Chair, Liberal, Geoff Regan]

Thank you, Professor.

[Prof. Paul Evans]

I look forward to your questions.

[The Chair, Liberal, Geoff Regan]

Thank you very much. That was pretty good timing.

We will now begin our first round of questions.

Mr. Chong, go ahead for six minutes, please.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Welcome, Professor Evans and Professor Houlden, to our committee.

I have a question about what both of you mentioned in your opening statement, which was that universities have been telling us that they've received no directives, no advice from the federal government regarding partnerships with companies like Huawei.

Recently the University of Toronto entered into a partnership with Huawei, and the university said that the Canadian government had not advised them against collaborating with that Chinese company. They were quoted as saying, “We look to the federal government for actionable direction and guidance. There has been no change in the actions of the government with respect to Huawei Canada and its operations in this country.”

Today in the Globe, an article quotes the University of Alberta, saying that the university has “ 'received no directives related to China' from the federal government to stop its engagement with Chinese institutions”, and we know that the minister is looking to come forward with new risk guidelines for research projects.

My first question to you is this: Would you be comfortable if the federal government said to universities, “We are advising you against partnerships with the following companies”—such as Huawei—“and here is what we define as a partnership”? That still respects academic freedom, but it's clear advice to universities, professors and the academic community about the federal government's position. Would you be comfortable if that was what the federal government was to do?

[Prof. Paul Evans]

Is that directed to one of us in particular?

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

It's directed to both of you. Yes.

[Prof. Paul Evans]

Perhaps if Professor Houlden will allow me, I'll take a first crack at that fundamental question.

I think that universities—not just our administrations, but our professors—don't want to see directives from the top if they are not part of the discussion. Now, if the Government of Canada decides that China is the kind of adversary that some witnesses have described, that's a blanket.... That's what the Americans have thrown over many of the collaborations that universities maintain. An example is Huawei. However, if we are going to be more selective and say that there are certain kinds of activities in certain fields—after discussion about what those are—I think there would be a great deal of acceptance. We need general political guidelines.

Once we get into the fine tuning, Mr. Chong, as we've seen in the United States and in Australia, these are very tricky domains. With no disrespect to Ottawa, the scientific knowledge that is necessary to put up a high fence around a small plot in those 11 or 12 areas that are being discussed now is not yet seen as persuasive. It might be, but we need a deep collaborative process very quickly over the next six months.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

Thank you.

[Prof. Gordon Houlden]

I could just jump in to add a few words. I don't want to repeat anything that Paul has said and I'm not speaking on behalf of the University of Alberta.

Universities have asked for advice, or at least have indicated that they haven't received it, so the straightforward answer to your question would be that, yes, advice would be welcome. However, that advice, I would hope, would be sophisticated. It would be technically advanced, and there would be a rationale behind it. In other words, I'm a jealous defender of the autonomy of Canadian institutions. I welcome government interference where it's warranted, but it should be soundly based. Yes, dialogue is a must.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

Okay.

I have a very different question that's been rattling around in my head for a while now.

To me, this wolf warrior diplomacy doesn't seem to be a very effective way for China to advance its diplomacy. Recently, one of their diplomats in Brazil referred to our Prime Minister as “a running dog” of the United States. Why are they using this type of diplomacy? Do they view this as effective, or is this intended for a domestic audience back in China? What is the rationale behind it? To me, it looks counterproductive.

[Prof. Gordon Houlden]

Could I take a first crack at that one?

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

Sure.

[Prof. Gordon Houlden]

Okay, good.

I think China is still feeling its way as a great power. I couldn't agree more that random tweets from third countries, as in the case of the tweet from the consul general in Rio de Janeiro, are counterproductive. China will have to deal with the Government of Canada and the people within it. Criticizing the government and the opposition directly and unfairly is counterproductive.

I think there is no shortage of people in the foreign ministry and government who understand that, but there is a nationalist streak in China right now, and those kinds of replies are very popular with many Chinese.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

Professor Houlden, you mentioned in earlier testimony at another committee—the industry, science and technology committee—that China's foreign direct investment in Canada is much more than we realize, because investment arrives via third countries.

[The Chair, Liberal, Geoff Regan]

Mr. Chong, I'm sorry to tell you that your six minutes has concluded—

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

Okay.

[The Chair, Liberal, Geoff Regan]

—and hopefully there will be another chance.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

Quickly, I'll just put my question out there, Mr. Chair, so he can answer in another round. Through what other third countries does China invest in Canada?

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Geoff Regan]

Thank you, Mr. Chong.

We'll go on now to Mr. Fragiskatos for six minutes.

[Peter Fragiskatos, Liberal, London North Centre, ON]

Thank you, Chair, and thank you to our witnesses.

Mr. Evans, I am going to quote you. You recently said in the media that “We need to engage our China discussion in a new and more active way—even if it's dangerous and risky to be labeled as pro-China—”.

What did you mean by that? Could you elaborate?

[Prof. Paul Evans]

The atmosphere of discussion about China now in a number of countries—the United States, Australia, and increasingly Canada—is polarized and angry. We are all reflecting the difficulties of our current bilateral problems with the People's Republic. We're angry about a number of behaviours, but the atmosphere, the vindictiveness of it, the attacks on social media on individuals, particularly those who are coming out in favour of an engagement strategy, is somewhat intense. It is an era that occasionally has elements of a McCarthy period at an earlier phase.

When the discussion is about one's views on one side of the issue or the other—engagement or adversary—that's an intellectual and policy debate, but when we get into matters of integrity and in fact the loyalty of individuals who are taking positions that try for nuance in understanding situations from a Chinese perspective even if we don't agree with that perspective, I think we are in a phase of our discussion on China that I haven't seen since we established diplomatic recognition in 1970.