Evidence of meeting #25 for Canada-China Relations in the 43rd Parliament, 2nd Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was universities.
A video is available from Parliament.
6:45 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Geoff Regan
Thank you, Mr. Paul-Hus.
Mr. Lightbound, you now have the floor for six minutes.
6:45 p.m.
Liberal
Joël Lightbound Liberal Louis-Hébert, QC
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I want to thank the two witnesses who are here today.
My first questions are mainly for Mr. Fadden.
Mr. Fadden, thank you for your testimony and for your service to the country.
Mr. Fadden, I'll delve into the past a bit. In 2010, you said that foreign powers were influencing a number of politicians, ministers and public servants through espionage activities in Canada, and that foreign powers were infiltrating political circles in Canada. At the time, a number of people legitimately concluded that you were talking about China. However, the government of the day and its public safety minister found your comments regrettable.
A few weeks ago, Michel Juneau-Katsuya, a former Canadian Security Intelligence Service, or CSIS, officer, said that you were severely reprimanded by the government of the day. In addition, Wesley Wark said that Prime Minister Harper's office threw you under the bus as a result of those comments.
Has the situation changed in this area? Has the government taken this threat seriously and improved its response to the threat of interference by the Chinese Communist Party, a threat that you had identified?
6:50 p.m.
As an Individual
The opinions of the people in government and the views of the general public have changed.
I used the following English expression.
“They had a certain measure of influence”.
My comments were somewhat overblown. It was inferred that I was saying that foreign powers were controlling public servants and politicians, but that was not the case.
It has generally been recognized that my comments were truthful and that the situation must be taken seriously. Over the past few years, a number of your colleagues, both former and current, have told me that I was right and that more honesty should have been shown at the time.
Agencies like CSIS are now allocating more resources to that type of threat. However, it is more difficult to detect it, contrary to terrorist activities. There is no clear evidence in this kind of a situation. So I sympathize somewhat with my former CSIS colleagues. With the help of our allies, we can do something to counter that kind of foreign influence, whether it is coming from China or from another country.
The problem in Canada is that the general public has trouble accepting that our country is under threat. In North America, we feel well protected by the three oceans and by the United States. A crisis sometimes needs to occur for people to admit that there really is a problem. In this kind of a context, the scope of public security agencies' actions is somewhat limited.
6:50 p.m.
Liberal
Joël Lightbound Liberal Louis-Hébert, QC
I would like to talk about the evolution of thinking and the increased awareness in Canada concerning the threat China poses in terms of foreign interference.
You published a report in 2010-11, while you were director of CSIS. In it, you talked about the economic and strategic competitiveness among nations, and you said that it created a threat level similar to the one that existed during the Cold War.
You talked about this 10 years ago without, however, naming China. Is there a reason you did not name it? We are seeing a change in the more recent reports, produced by Mr. Vigneault. For example, China is directly named in those reports.
Is there a reason you did not name China at the time? Was it indeed China you had in mind? I assume that was the case.
6:50 p.m.
As an Individual
That was mainly because there was not really consensus yet within the Five Eyes and among our close allies.
It is a bit difficult for a country to formally say that a specific country poses a problem. At the time, we decided not to name China, but I think it was implied and most people who read the report understood that.
It is difficult to name a country in particular when we cannot bring up specific incidents. That can constitute a difficulty in this area.
6:50 p.m.
Liberal
Joël Lightbound Liberal Louis-Hébert, QC
You were talking about the Five Eyes alliance. In your remarks, you said it was important to use multilateral tools, such as the Five Eyes, the G7 or perhaps other activities in the margin of meetings of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or NATO.
What degree of cooperation do you think is necessary to deal with this situation brought on by China?
6:50 p.m.
As an Individual
Cooperation is very extensive within the Five Eyes alliance. As for the G7, its member countries are discussing the situation and know that it is serious. However, there are currently so many other issues to consider on a global scale that it is difficult to ask G7 leaders to look beyond a certain point.
As for NATO, we should take advantage of the fact that our major allies are its members and, although the situation involving China is discussed only in the margin of big meetings, it would be worthwhile to talk about it a bit more.
6:50 p.m.
Liberal
Joël Lightbound Liberal Louis-Hébert, QC
Thank you, Mr. Fadden.
Mr. Chair, I don't think I have enough time left to ask a question and get a relevant answer.
6:50 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Geoff Regan
Thank you very much, Mr. Lightbound.
Mr. Bergeron, go ahead for six minutes.
6:50 p.m.
Bloc
Stéphane Bergeron Bloc Montarville, QC
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I want to begin by thanking our witnesses for joining us this evening. I also thank them for their testimony, which is highly relevant to our study.
I will go further on the question Mr. Paul-Hus put to Mr. Fadden on the high number of Chinese diplomats on mission in Canada.
Beyond the number, it is important to know what each of those diplomats is doing. However, are you not worried that it would be difficult for us to identify those carrying out duties related to security, be it based on their title or based on their unofficial duties?
6:55 p.m.
As an Individual
It is indeed sometimes very difficult to know who is doing what. There are methods for doing that type of research. However, one of the things I was taught during my time at CSIS is that methods should never be discussed. So I deeply regret not being able to answer your question in detail. That could undermine our efforts against the Chinese authorities.
6:55 p.m.
Bloc
Stéphane Bergeron Bloc Montarville, QC
I completely understand.
However, I feel it is important to point out that it is not enough to consult the employee list and to read their title to find out how many of them are specifically in charge of security. Some people's title is purely consular, but we know very well that they perform functions that far exceed the consular aspect.
The committee was totally shocked to learn that VFS Global, a company in charge of visa applications in China, is not only receiving upstream Chinese funding, but that it also deals with a subcontractor downstream on the ground. You even went as far as to say that the company was an entry point for Chinese cyber spies.
The committee was also shocked to learn, after questioning various Canadian security agencies about Nuctech and VFS Global, that no security screening on those two companies had been carried out. The federal government seems to have gotten mixed up. The left hand does not seem to know what the right hand is doing. There appears to be no political will to carry out this kind of screening. As a result, no screening was done.
Is that kind of an outcome not very concerning and should it not make us tighten up the screening measures for businesses we deal with?
6:55 p.m.
As an Individual
I think so. That is sort of what I was talking about in my opening remarks. The federal government's measures must be implemented across government and be integrated.
Honestly, this may be easier to say than do, but it is possible, especially if cabinet determined that six countries, for example, should be subject to screening. However, this does not mean that, every time the government buys a good or a service from a country, such as Belgium, it must systematically carry out a comprehensive screening of that country. Nevertheless, the screening measures must be tightened up and integrated a bit more.
For this to work properly, half a dozen countries must be designated as those we focus our efforts on. I honestly don't think that Canada's governments, both federal and provincial, particularly like carrying out those activities. However, certain countries must be monitored carefully, as the United States and France do, for instance.
I think that China poses a sufficiently serious risk to make it worth our while to tighten up the measures.
6:55 p.m.
Bloc
Stéphane Bergeron Bloc Montarville, QC
Extremely sensitive equipment and services are involved. We are talking about security equipment in Canada's foreign missions, in one case, and, in the other case, access to all the personal data of people who apply for a visa to come to Canada.
You were talking about entry points for Chinese cyber spies. What do you have to say, for example, about VFS Global, a company located in Beijing?
6:55 p.m.
As an Individual
That small centre located in Beijing and elsewhere, which gathers various people's personal data, must have access to data centres in Canada, where that data is processed and where decisions are made. It does not take a lot of imagination to assume that the Chinese agency, which comes under China's ministry of public security, will take advantage of that connection to data centres in Canada and use the opportunity to infiltrate the federal network in general.
I will give you an example. A few years ago, The New York Times published a report on a small family shop in Texas, which had a computer a certain country used to get into the data centres of half a dozen departments in Washington. The entry point does not need to be recognized as relating to national security or be in the country. An entry point is an entry point. That does not mean China will do it. However, what worried me when I heard your comments is that the possibility is there and, in my opinion, we should not have allowed that possibility to occur.
7 p.m.
Bloc
Stéphane Bergeron Bloc Montarville, QC
Especially not without having carried out adequate screening. Right?
7 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Geoff Regan
Thank you very much, Mr. Bergeron.
Now we'll go to Mr. Harris for six minutes.
May 3rd, 2021 / 7 p.m.
NDP
Jack Harris NDP St. John's East, NL
Thank you, Chair.
Thank you to both of our witnesses for coming to join us tonight.
Mr. Fadden, first of all, for you, I want to follow up slightly on VFS Global. You said recently—and you're quoted as saying—that Canada should end its relationship with having the Beijing police looking after our visa centre in China and in Beijing in particular. I can't disagree with you.
As you say, you “can't think of a more promising entry point for cyberspies”, and for other spies, I guess, and data entry, but we're told, Mr. Fadden, that the government didn't know about it until recently. That's not actually true, because this started in 2008, and VFS indicates that they advised the Government of Canada of who their local contractor was, which they are required to have by Chinese laws.
When you were head of CSIS, where was CSIS when all this was going on, starting in 2008? This has been going on for almost 20 years.
7 p.m.
As an Individual
It's a fair question. I can say that when I was at CSIS, I never heard of this and I wouldn't have, necessarily, but I think, to repeat a little bit of what I said in French a few minutes ago, one of the challenges I think we face in Canada is to develop an understanding of what we are going to do if we accept the view that countries like China present a risk.
Among other things, it means that we have to better integrate the activities of a variety of departments. We have Ms. Anand's department, procurement, and [Technical difficulty—Editor] hopefully knows what's going on, and we have immigration, which is a commissioning department, and I'm not sure that every time, on every occasion, everybody understands the risks we're taking.
Until we have a national consensus on the kinds of risks that you and your colleagues are talking about, it's very hard for a single agency to [Technical difficulty—Editor] Chinese [Technical difficulty—Editor]
7 p.m.
NDP
Jack Harris NDP St. John's East, NL
If I may interrupt, time is short here.
We don't have a single agency. We have CSIS. We do have the RCMP. We do have the CSE. We have the bodies that are there and are supposed to be doing the job, but we seem to have—I'm hearing it from you and I'm hearing it from all sorts of people—lots of fearmongering, lots of saying that there's something going on, but there are all these grey zones. Where is the point at which they become bright lines?
You mentioned secrets being stolen by China. Well, if this is theft that's going on, surely that's a criminal activity, and either the laws are inadequate or the enforcement is. It's one or the other. We need advice from people like you, advice to say, “Okay, look, the laws are inadequate.” That's fine. The laws may be inadequate. Well, which laws are inadequate and what changes need to be made?
What is it that we have to say? On foreign influence, a lot of countries like to influence other countries, and their diasporas play a role in that. Where is the line between influence and criminal activity? Someone has to define that a lot better than we have right now. What is it that we're trying to prevent and what's to be expected by any nation?
I will ask Professor Ong a question after you answer that one.
7 p.m.
As an Individual
I think you're absolutely right. I think the main distinction to be drawn between what is acceptable activity—in some cases it's diplomatic—and what is not is the issue of secrecy.
If another country is, through its agents, secretly trying to influence you or public servants or others, that falls into the rubric of foreign influence and foreign interference. If the Chinese embassy or the Chinese consul general in Vancouver is doing it openly, that's not so much of a problem.
The other issue is when they try to use threats about something that's happening either in Canada or in China. The difficulty there is that is very difficult to prove, because people feel threatened. We have to find a way to make people feel more comfortable coming forward and testifying. If they have family back in China who are being threatened, it's very difficult to expect people to do that.
7:05 p.m.
NDP
Jack Harris NDP St. John's East, NL
Professor Ong, you wanted to make some recommendations. We have very limited time, I'm afraid, but I'd like to ask you about the United Front Work Department. It's is busy throughout the world, as we know. It's active in Canada. I think part of their activity is the Confucius Institute. Part of it is that they have been accused of trying to influence candidates in elections and that sort of thing.
Where does the fearmongering stop and where does the actual illegal activity that's targeted and ought to be prevented and exposed come in?
7:05 p.m.
Associate Professor of Political Science, Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, University of Toronto, As an Individual
I think that needs to be studied very carefully by legal experts as well as intelligence experts.
Where my expertise comes in is that from my vantage point, I do hear a lot of fearmongering on social media. I'm not saying that there's no potential of threat. There is also the potential of threat, but I think there's also a risk of threats being exaggerated.
I think one area where the government—and I'm speaking of any party—could actually do better is in increasing mainstream government's penetration into the grassroots Chinese community. A lot of them still rely on news and information from Chinese sources because they do not read English. If our government could actually do better, we could reach out to these grassroots communities better so that they do not need to rely on Chinese-language news from China.
7:05 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Geoff Regan
Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Harris.
Now we'll go on to the second round. Mr. Williamson, you have five minutes.