Canada-China Relations Committee on Nov. 17th, 2020

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Mr. Steil, for joining us at this late hour. We appreciate the fact that we aren't the only ones still at work at this time of day.

After Mr. Sangay appeared before the committee a few weeks ago, the committee prepared a report that was tabled in the House of Commons.

Has Global Affairs Canada followed up on the motion passed by the committee and tabled in the House of Commons?

[Shawn Steil]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Indeed, we took note of the motion passed by the committee to encourage dialogue, and that is a motion that is entirely consistent with the government's policy. I want to congratulate the committee for making the motion, because although we take opportunities to advance that position, when we speak with the Chinese government on the opportunities we have to raise these issues, I think it's important for the Chinese government to recognize that it's not just the government but our Parliament that supports that position.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

The motion is a call for dialogue. We're all baffled by the fact that Beijing is so indifferent to this openness to dialogue on the part of the Tibetan authorities in exile.

How does the Department of Foreign Affairs view Beijing's indifference when the Tibetan authorities are willing to fall in line and enter into a new agreement?

[Shawn Steil]

Mr. Chair, this touches on an essential problem that we have with the current government of the People’s Republic of China, which is increasingly rejecting criticism, no matter how constructive, of its positions and policies in places such as Tibet.

From a foreign policy perspective, it's important for us to maintain consistency in our approach and to continue to push these issues. I think the argument that is being put forward by the Chinese government not to engage in dialogue has only become hardened over time. It's difficult, given that rigidity, for the government to find a way to back out slowly and find a new way, more flexibility in their position.

We can only hope that by maintaining our own consistent policy, by pushing this as a potential solution, there will be at some point an opening that would allow the Chinese government to set aside this very rigid position and engage some sort of dialogue. It wouldn't be the first time. The Dalai Lama, back in the fifties, did engage with Chairman Mao. It was only after the uprising in 1959, when the Tibetan community said that enough is enough and the Dalai Lama fled, that this dialogue ceased.

There have to be opportunities for increased dialogue in the future. We truly believe that is the best way to ensure the stability within Tibet, within China, and the welfare of Tibetans both within and outside of China.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

I know that some of my colleagues addressed this issue a few moments ago. Mr. Sangay said that the failure of the 17-point agreement foreshadowed the failure of the “one country, two systems” approach, which may in turn herald the failure of a possible agreement with Taiwan.

What's your perspective on this? You were talking about hope earlier.

We asked Mr. Sangay this question. Perhaps you had a look at our discussions. He simply told us that hope is at the heart of the Buddhist religion and that we must keep that hope alive. Personally, I'm a little concerned about the fact that we can't think of a solution simply based on hope.

What can the international community do under these circumstances?

[The Chair, Liberal, Geoff Regan]

I'm sorry, but the six minutes are up.

You can ask Mr. Steil the question again in the next round.

Thank you, Mr. Bergeron.

Speaking of the late hour, it's now 8:33 in Newfoundland and Labrador, where we have Mr. Harris for the next six minutes.

Mr. Harris, please.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Yes, it is 8:30 now. We're a little later here.

Nevertheless, I'm interested in asking Mr. Steil some questions.

We had a very interesting meeting with Dr. Sangay. One of the remarkable things about his views, especially towards the end of his remarks about all the difficulties, was his great optimism. He believes that the future for the Tibet Autonomous Region and the people of Tibet is going to be positive. I think that's an encouragement to the rest of us to share that hope, and also to work towards it in any way that we can facilitate the process.

I thought there was an opportunity not so long ago, and a possibility, that discussions would start, but that didn't take off. Do you know anything about that? It was a couple of years ago.

[Shawn Steil]

I'm not immediately aware, Mr. Chair, of openings for dialogue. I think during the period of Hu Jintao, before Xi Jinping became president, there had been some openings. Hu Jintao, a former president of China, had some connections, I believe, with the Tibetan region. I'm not aware, however, of anything concrete that has come out recently.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

Leaving that aside, we supported the whole idea of the middle way and of working towards autonomy within the Chinese constitution.

Do you know what working within the Chinese constitution may mean? Do you know what an autonomous region actually consists of under the Chinese constitution and what one would expect under the existing constitution?

[Shawn Steil]

Within Chinese law at the moment, autonomous regions, of which there are a few, do have some provision for self-government and a self-say in the way they operate. It also provides, notionally within the Chinese constitution, freedom of religion and freedom of belief. I think Chinese officials will tell you, yes, we have all of that in Tibet, as long as it's in accordance with other aspects of the law. Then they may point you to the very broad notion of national security law, for example, which forbids anything resembling sedition.

I know the committee has been studying Hong Kong and the national security law there, so you have a good idea about that broad definition of national security, which in some sense will trump other provisions of the constitution and law that allow for religious freedom, for example.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

Some of our colleagues have asked about freedom of the press and freedom of religion. In the Chinese context, to my knowledge, that is not a China-wide phenomenon, although they have it in their constitution.

Would you care to comment on that? Is there something particular about the way this is approached in Tibet, or was there an expectation that they would, by virtue of being an autonomous region, expect greater freedoms?

[Shawn Steil]

Everything, even within the autonomous regions, is increasingly subject to the guidance and the supervision of the Communist Party of China. That conception of autonomy would be quite different, I think, from a common understanding of “autonomy”. There's no electoral process to participate in, and any leadership of the Tibet Autonomous Region must be vetted through the Communist Party system.

As just one example, if you want to be a Communist Party member, you're forbidden from practising religion, and so, in a Tibetan region that excludes many people who would want to be involved in any sort of political process.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

That may be a function of political activity elsewhere in China, that because of the nature of Communist Party membership, they are the ones in control, but if religion prevents you, then you aren't able to exercise any autonomy.

Is that the way it works?

[Shawn Steil]

I'm not sure it would be quite so cut and dried, but there are all sorts of formal and informal blockages to true autonomy.

Let me give an example, not in terms of the political sphere but the economic sphere. Most of the investment into Tibet—and, yes, there are statistically higher rates of GDP growth in Tibet—is the result of investment from outside Tibet, often through state-owned enterprises. This has created, some say, a closed loop of economic benefit. The Tibetans themselves, who had been at least provisionally and historically nomads, are cut out of that economic loop.

[The Chair, Liberal, Geoff Regan]

Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Harris.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

Mr. Chair, on a point of order, I'm unable to hear anything you're saying.

[The Chair, Liberal, Geoff Regan]

Mr. Harris, I'm sorry about that. I should have learned by now. When does one learn to unmute when one should?

That's your six minutes. Thanks very much for concluding on time without hearing me.

We'll now move on to the second round.

Mr. Paul-Hus, you have the floor for five minutes.

[Pierre Paul-Hus, Conservative, Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Good evening, Mr. Steil.

A Chinese company called Nuctech operates throughout China. This company provides surveillance and monitoring tools for the security bureau in Xinjiang. We know that citizens are being monitored.

In your opinion, is this surveillance tool being used to monitor Tibetans?

[Shawn Steil]

Sorry, Mr. Chair. I might have missed the name of the company, but it does not ring any immediate bells. It might be something I'd have to get back to the committee on.

[Pierre Paul-Hus, Conservative, Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC]

The company is called Nuctech.

Does this sound familiar?

[Shawn Steil]

Yes. I recognize that it's high on the agenda for parliamentary committees at the moment.

I don't have any first-hand knowledge of the company itself and its activities elsewhere, so I'm afraid I can't comment. I would certainly be pleased to consult with some of my colleagues who watch that a bit more closely than I do and get back to the committee.

[Pierre Paul-Hus, Conservative, Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC]

Do you think that, unbeknownst to us, some of the COVID-19 protective equipment that Canada purchased recently, such as gowns, may have been manufactured in Tibetan labour camps?

[Shawn Steil]

There have been increasing reports about labour camps in China and the potential for the use of forced labour. Many of those reports, of course, have been linked to the situation of Uighurs in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, but as the member points out, there have also been reports of labour camps being set up in Tibet.

There's less information about what's happening with labour internment camps in Tibet, but we do know, even before this period, that there was forced resettlement off nomadic lands, the relocation of Tibetans who were traditionally working off the land as nomads or shepherds, to make way for mining or infrastructure projects, or for other purposes, and then having them retrained and put into factory jobs.

There seems to be significant evidence to suggest that this has taken place and continues to take place in Tibet as well.

[Pierre Paul-Hus, Conservative, Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC]

Unfortunately, the Canadian government may have purchased equipment made by people in forced labour camps.

We know that Canada is currently considering renovating the embassy in Beijing. Do you think that has Canada taken steps to ensure that there are no forced labourers from Tibet or elsewhere in China?

Has the Canadian government provided any instructions in this area?

[Shawn Steil]

For Tibet in particular, the major concern we have is less for the safety of the diplomats who travel there, but the surveillance they're under when they do. In Tibet, and I think the ambassador would attest to this, it's very difficult to break away from your handlers and the constant surveillance you might have.

I would note, as mentioned in my opening remarks, that you're not required to have permits for travel to Tibetan areas outside of Tibet, in places such as Sichuan province or Qinghai province. We've noted that, historically, when diplomats do travel there, they are indeed under surveillance and followed when they're there.