Canada-China Relations Committee on Nov. 17th, 2020

[Pierre Paul-Hus, Conservative, Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC]

Do you find it normal that ambassadors, diplomats and journalists are monitored in this manner, while members of the Chinese Communist Party can come to Canada and move about freely?

[The Chair, Liberal, Geoff Regan]

It's a five-second answer, Mr. Steil.

[Shawn Steil]

No, I wouldn't find that normal.

[The Chair, Liberal, Geoff Regan]

Thank you, Mr. Paul-Hus.

Now we'll go on to Mr. Virani for five minutes.

Welcome, Mr. Virani.

[Arif Virani, Liberal, Parkdale—High Park, ON]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

I wanted to ask some generalized questions about the state of the Sino-Tibetan dialogue from your perspective, Mr. Steil. I apologize for having not heard the first part of members' exchanges with you.

We know that dialogue was ongoing for a certain amount of time from about the mid-2000s to the end of the 2000s. Then around 2010 it came to a standstill.

Can you give us a sense of your understanding of the blockages to restarting the Sino-Tibetan dialogue and the importance of discussions about the middle way approach, which is the approach—you'll be aware obviously—that His Holiness espouses to ensure that there is a compromise between the perceptions of Tibetan independence versus the notion of being completely subsumed within the Chinese federation? It is establishing a compromise, which looks a lot like the way the Canadian federation was established. You just have a region that has greater linguistic, cultural and religious autonomy, but within the broader Chinese federation and broader Chinese constitution.

Could you give us an update on that piece and your understanding of it from the GAC perspective?

[Shawn Steil]

There's reason to be pessimistic about the openness of the People's Republic of China to engage in that dialogue at the moment. The signs are not there, at least as we see them. It would be lovely to think that somewhere behind the scenes of that harsh exterior and rigidity in the government's position, there is a little bit more openness to dialogue, but we just haven't seen it. The opposition to the Dalai Lama and the Sikyong, Lobsang Sangay himself, just tells us that there's not a lot of appetite.

Every time Lobsang Sangay visits Canada—or participates virtually, I suppose, in the last case—we receive protestations and representations from the Chinese authorities complaining that we are engaging with a separatist and a terrorist.

I've met Mr. Sangay. Each time in the past he's travelled to China, the Chinese have asked us to deny him a visa and asked how we could possibly provide him one.

That may be the harsh exterior of the official position that we're seeing, and that there's instead more openness somewhere. However, all of the signals that we get, whether it's directly around Tibet or Xinjiang or Hong Kong, for that matter, seem to suggest that the emphasis on stability and security and brooking absolutely no compromise in the unified leadership of the Communist Party suggests that the time is not nigh for an opening in that dialogue.

[Arif Virani, Liberal, Parkdale—High Park, ON]

Let me take it from a different angle.

There's an argument about asserting human rights protections and a basic defence of statutory rules or norms that exist on the books in China itself—things like the language of instruction in the Tibet Autonomous Region. There are rules about ethnic minorities and about the language of instruction, which actually on paper look like they could be somewhat—“robust” might not be the best word—rigorous in ensuring that Tibetan is a language of instruction in the Tibet Autonomous Region.

What is your understanding from the GAC perspective of Chinese compliance with Chinese rules themselves as they're outlined in the Tibet Autonomous Region? The language of instruction is a critically important piece, not just for language activists like Tashi Wangchuck—and I appreciate that the government has made representations about that— but also for the Canada Tibet Committee that operates here and advocates for at least the observance if the laws that are on the books in China.

Can you comment on the language of instruction and that sort of strategy?

[Shawn Steil]

Absolutely. This is one of the bases we have on which to advocate. It's one thing, which we always do, to appeal to international norms and universal human rights on these issues, but in fact it's China's own laws that provide a basis for respect of linguistic and cultural rights and religious freedoms. As I said, the trends aren't great.

I will give you an example. This has been broader than Tibet; there's been reinterpretation of bilingual education in China, including in Mongolia, and also in Tibet. There's more that could be done according to Chinese law.

[The Chair, Liberal, Geoff Regan]

Thank you very much, Mr. Virani.

Mr. Bergeron now has the floor for two and a half minutes.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

Mr. Chair, I want to very quickly address the failure of the 17-point agreement, which foreshadows the failure of the “one country, two systems” principle, which foreshadows the failure of the possible integration of Taiwan. I also want to address the whole issue of hope. Mr. Virani spoke briefly about this issue.

Are we still helplessly watching the situation unfold, or is the international community working together to try to force the People's Republic of China to change?

[Shawn Steil]

Yes, Mr. Chair, I appreciate the chance to address the question.

I think an issue that's rightly pointed out here is that China's government has to come to an understanding that if it wants the international community to accept it at its word, it has to fulfill its word.

The 17-point agreement, long before Canada established diplomatic relations with China, is difficult for us to use as a basis for holding them to account, but certainly in the case of Hong Kong, as you've mentioned, the Sino-British Joint Declaration, a UN-registered treaty, and the violation of the obligations under that treaty give us pause. China has to realize that behaviour has consequences for the trust that the international community will bestow upon it.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

I'll proceed quickly, Mr. Chair, because I can see you waving at me.

Mr. Steil, President Xi Jinping announced a new rail link project in the Tibet Autonomous Region. What do you think about this new project?

Is the goal the development of Tibet?

The rail link will come close to the border with India.

[Shawn Steil]

Yes, indeed, and I think there are views on both sides: one, that this will bring more economic opportunity for Tibetans, but two, that it will hasten the speed of cultural assimilation in Tibet.

It would be clearer to us, which it were, if Tibetans themselves had freedom to move in and out of Tibet, which they do not.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Geoff Regan]

Thank you, Mr. Bergeron.

Thank you, Mr. Steil.

Now we'll go back to Mr. Harris for two and a half minutes, please.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

Thank you.

Mr. Steil, you stated a disclaimer at the beginning, saying that you weren't a Tibet expert. Therefore, I'll ask you this: Does Global Affairs have any expertise on Tibet? Do they have people with knowledge?

I see some general comments, but also that we don't know very much about what's going on. Do we know anything about migration patterns, population, people from the mainland or the rest of China being brought into Tibet? Are these speculations, or are these based on other people's information?

What is the state of knowledge within Global Affairs about this, or are we relying on CIA reports?

[Shawn Steil]

In terms of a cultural or linguistic expert, we have employees of Tibetan origin within Global Affairs Canada, as we do throughout the country.

In terms of understanding the actual situation on the ground, I think all of us, including those who study Tibet on a more or less full-time basis, rely, at least in part, on official Chinese statistics, the reliability of which you can question, but that's what we have. Whether it's statistics on economic growth, which suggests that Tibet's economy is growing much faster than the average—although from a low base—or population statistics, which tell us that approximately 90% of the population in Tibet that is shrinking slowly is Tibetan, versus for example, Han.

When we keep in mind things like that, you also have to remember that migrant labour is not necessarily counted in those official statistics, so they can be skewed.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

I did ask questions about religion in my previous turn, but I do want to emphasize that that's totally separate from the notion that religion is being suppressed and that the Buddhist monasteries are being suppressed actively by the government as well. Is that your understanding?

[Shawn Steil]

Yes, absolutely. I'll just give you one example. The Sera monastery in Lhasa has the capacity for 2,000 monks. According to reporting that we've collected, in 2015 there were 600 monks. When Ambassador Barton visited, there were 400. Part of that is because compulsory education, including patriotic education, is required before young monks can go to the monastery, so the numbers have been dwindling.

[The Chair, Liberal, Geoff Regan]

Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Harris.

I think we were all interested to hear that answer, as we are with all of these answers.

We'll go on now to Mr. Genuis for five minutes, please.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Mr. Steil.

I am going to go rapid-fire here because I want to cover a number of different things.

You said at the beginning that the Government of Canada recognizes the PRC as the governing body of Tibet, and for me, that includes not only the Tibet Autonomous Region but also historical Tibet, which is larger.

To me, in that recognition, there's nothing controversial. That's just the identification of a political reality, and if it weren't for that political reality, Tibetans would have no problem, so should I read anything else into that comment other than that you just recognize the reality that the territory is controlled by the Government of China at the present time?

[Shawn Steil]

No, you shouldn't read anything further than that. That's fine.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Okay. Thank you.

I think I heard you say to Mr. Bergeron that the motion that was passed is consistent with government policy. The motion that we passed expressed support for dialogue toward the establishment of the middle way—genuine autonomy for Tibet within the framework of the Chinese constitution.

I want to be clear. Is the motion in its entirety—dialogue with a view to genuine autonomy—consistent with government policy?

[Shawn Steil]

Mr. Chair, I should probably clarify my position. If I misread or misremembered the motion.... The Canadian policy does not include a specific reference to the middle way. It only refers to our advocacy for dialogue without specifying the content.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Okay, that's the current government position. It's not to oppose the middle way, and it's not to support it. It's to support dialogue, and that's where it stops. Okay.