I've been a critic of elements of the Indo-Pacific strategy, so let me be clear: I'm not here to defend the government's position on this. I think the Indo-Pacific strategy is about a lot more than the Indo-Pacific. It's partly about our relationship with the United States, but it's also about our relationship with the developing world and the points that Mr. Houlden made about the fundamental importance of China in the global economy in other regions.
What I saw as a possible element in our Indo-Pacific strategy is that we should be opening dialogues and discussions with China about issues—including debt relief in the global south—and that there are elements of what they are proposing, some of it through belt and road but some through some other financing mechanisms, that might not be the best ones. They might not be good ones, but we should try to engage them in that. When we're now putting more resources into China, we're putting more resources into our embassies, etc., to see where China is playing in Africa. We're putting designated officers in 24 or 25 of our foreign embassies who focus on China even if it's not in China—if it's in southeast Asia, if it's in Africa and parts of it—because China is such a global actor.
We have to understand that this is so much bigger than a bilateral relationship between Canada and China. These are issues that are reshaping the global order, and it's useful for us to at least know what the Chinese are thinking and—this is the key—where we see it as good and where there is overlap to reinforce, not automatically reject.