Evidence of meeting #33 for Canada-China Relations in the 44th Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was japan.
A video is available from Parliament.
8:15 p.m.
Co-Director, East Asia Program, The Henry L. Stimson Center, As an Individual
Good evening, Mr. Bergeron, and thank you.
The role of the U.S. in the Indo-Pacific, from the Japanese perspective.... Ideally speaking, Japan always continues to look to the United States as a leading force in shaping the order of the Indo-Pacific as a rules-based region that is governed by universal values such as the rule of law, free trade and open societies.
With that said, though, recent developments within the United States make our leaders in Japan a little bit nervous about whether that will stay. That is exactly why the Tokyo.... Incumbent Prime Minister Kishida has been, especially currently, intensifying his government's own efforts to reach out to other U.S. allies and partners, both within and outside the Indo-Pacific region, to enhance Japan's partnership with those countries, and that certainly includes Canada. This is to make sure that, if there is a distraction within the United States that may handicap Washington's ability to lead, Japan, together with other like-minded democracies, will have the safety net, if you will, in place to make sure that there will be a collective, sustained effort to maintain that liberal order.
Japan looks at the potential return of a hegemonic, strategic competition. Back in the 1980s, it was the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Today, it is the U.S. and China. Of course, that has a very different feel for Japan because China, unlike the Soviet Union back in the 1970s and 1980s, is geographically so much closer to Japan. Also, regardless of whether Japan likes it or not, China will remain Japan's biggest and most populous neighbour for the foreseeable future.
It will put Tokyo in the constant dilemma of how to balance its effort to deter China with, at the same time, how Japan should handle this friendshoring and de-risking without severing ties with Beijing.
As you heard from Ambassador Yamanouchi in the last panel, Japan always looks for opportunities to engage with Beijing in the areas where Tokyo finds it mutually beneficial to co-operate with Beijing, such as climate change, disaster relief and other economic development or human security related areas. However, there are some areas that Japan cannot compromise. The question of sovereignty is one, and another is China's outright challenge to the existing international liberal order that is supported by the rule of law.
That's where Japan's co-operation with the United States and other like-minded democracies, including Canada, comes into play. That is why you saw Ambassador Yamanouchi. You have one of Japan's best diplomats in Ottawa, working with your government in Ottawa.
8:20 p.m.
Bloc
Stéphane Bergeron Bloc Montarville, QC
In an interview with France's Foundation for Strategic Research, you stated that “Japan can further improve its defence relationship with the United States by developing its own ties with other U.S. allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region. These efforts already exist as Japan continues to institutionalize its security relationships with countries such as Australia, India and the Philippines, as well as key U.S. allies in Europe such as the United Kingdom, France and Germany.”
You did not mention Canada. Why not?
8:20 p.m.
Co-Director, East Asia Program, The Henry L. Stimson Center, As an Individual
That wasn't intentional. Our core focus was really.... That was the scope of the parameters given by the editor, so please blame the editor.
8:20 p.m.
Some hon. members
Oh, oh!
8:20 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Ken Hardie
On that note, we'll thank Mr. Bergeron for his questions.
We'll now go to Ms. McPherson for six minutes.
8:20 p.m.
NDP
Heather McPherson NDP Edmonton Strathcona, AB
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
Thank you to both of our witnesses. This has been very interesting.
I would also like to get some more information about how Japan is negotiating with the increasingly belligerent Chinese government. When we had previous panels, they talked about the idea that, even when we try to diversify and work with other countries within the region, because of the outsized role China plays within the region, even if we are working with Vietnam or other south Asian countries, we are still, in fact, engaging with China because it has such a large role in the region. I'm curious to know your thoughts on that.
One of the things the Canadian Indo-Pacific strategy aims to do is decrease our dependence on China. You spoke a lot about the international rule of law.
Obviously, one of the other big players in the region, which is a democracy, is India. However, India has some real challenges with regard to human rights. Certainly, Canada's diplomatic relationship with China is stressed, which is a very kind way to put it at the moment.
Could you perhaps talk a bit about that? I'll start with you, if I could, Ms. Goto.
8:25 p.m.
Director, Asia Program, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, As an Individual
It's an interesting phenomenon right now. As we look at de-risking from China, China is actually beginning to champion free trade rules.
Here we are, based in Washington. The United States is reluctant to sign on to new trade deals, but China is part of some of the biggest, most ambitious trade agreements there are, with the most notable being the CPTPP. Japan has a tremendous role to play in determining which new member countries can join or not. It is acting as a gatekeeper, and Japan is staunchly against China joining the CPTPP. However, among the member countries, there are some that are equally in favour of China's joining.
Herein lies the conundrum. On the one hand, we see a China that does provide economic opportunities. It's trying to position itself as being willing to play by the order that currently exists. On the other hand, we also have a China that is grossly violating the rules, and that has actually contributed to its amazing growth over the past decades. We are seeing it playing up its authoritarian rule, especially when it comes in the form of economic coercion.
One other point I want to make is that I agree with Yuki that there is a great deal of concern in Japan about the outcome of the presidential election in the United States. However, from an economic perspective, the Biden administration has effectively, in principle, carried on the economic policies of Trump. We are expecting a continuum of that positioning, regardless of the election results. That is to say, we're expecting a hardline stance toward China and the prevention of a technology transfer to China.
The end goal is a win when it comes to advanced technology competition, and for the United States to win in the form of being the pioneer of establishing new rules for new technologies and new values when it comes to issues concerning data, science and the like.
8:25 p.m.
Co-Director, East Asia Program, The Henry L. Stimson Center, As an Individual
Yes, I think I might focus on how Japan sees India as a partner in this endeavour.
As you have mentioned, India has some challenges when it comes to universal norms, especially in the democracy realm, but Japan really struggled in positioning with India in the immediate aftermath of the invasion of Ukraine because of India's unwillingness to really come out explicitly against Russian behaviour. That really put in some of the strategic thinkers in Tokyo a doubt about whether India can really be a reliable partner in the Quad moving forward, especially in the political-military arena. However, that said though, geographically speaking, with India as a gatekeeper on the Indian Ocean side, neighbouring the land border with China, Japan needs to work with India and ensure that India, even if it does not subscribe to [Technical difficulty—Editor] in the alliance systems, remains on our side of the orbit. if you will. There is the conundrum.
If you look at Japan, Canada and other countries in the Indo-Pacific, even in Europe, they all share the same conundrum, which is that it is practically impossible to decouple our economies with China. How do we de-risk it, and how do we friendshore it? Then I think that is why Japan is increasingly investing more effort in its working with like-minded democracies in terms of supply chain resiliency and ensuring that the supply of the critical technologies and materials is not so dependent on the Beijing-generated supply.
8:30 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Ken Hardie
Thank you, Ms. Tatsumi, and thank you, Ms. McPherson.
We'll now go to Ms. Lantsman for five minutes.
February 12th, 2024 / 8:30 p.m.
Conservative
Melissa Lantsman Conservative Thornhill, ON
Thank you. Thanks to both of our witnesses for being here.
Ms. Goto, I just wanted to hear you on a question that was asked by one of my colleagues, particularly around the U.S. election. You made reference to the fact that there was bipartisan support in Washington, but I would like to get your thoughts on potential change, military aid, the relationship with the Indo-Pacific, its neighbours and aggressive authoritarian regimes, if there was a change in the U.S. government.
8:30 p.m.
Director, Asia Program, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, As an Individual
I think there are two developments that we can see. How will the United States work with its allies and partners in meeting the China challenge, and how will it actually engage with China itself?
The bipartisan support from both Democrats and Republicans in seeing the China threat is going to remain unchanged.
If I can elaborate a little bit more on perhaps the strength of the Biden administration, of course it has come up with an Indo-Pacific strategy. I think that has encouraged a lot of other countries, including Canada, to develop their own respective Indo-Pacific strategies. An Indo-Pacific strategy, I see as a shorthand for a China strategy, so there is greater alignment amongst U.S. allies and partners on that. There is concern that the United States, under a Trump administration, would be more hesitant or downright object to having that kind of co-operative multilateral stance when it comes to meeting that China challenge.
If I may add, Japan is a very committed multilateral actor. It wants to work multilaterally on the security front and on the economic front too, and it wants to position itself as the champion of the rule of law as well, so we see the development of the free and open Indo-Pacific strategy by Japan being adopted by many countries. Japan is now pushing for a free and open international order, which I believe will be one of the issues that it will really want to play up moving forward.
Under a Trump administration, the United States is probably going to be less open to that kind of approach of a multistakeholder push-back against China.
8:30 p.m.
Conservative
Melissa Lantsman Conservative Thornhill, ON
I have one more question that goes back to your comments regarding a decreased dependence on China and the fact that you view any Indo-Pacific strategy as a China strategy. Do you have any particular thoughts on the specifics of what Canada can do on technology or supply chain, beyond just the partnership?
8:30 p.m.
Director, Asia Program, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, As an Individual
First of all, we have to define where there are areas of co-operation and coordination. We have to then realize the hard fact that when it comes to economic issues, especially on the trade front, there's going to be competition. There's going to be competition, because the private sector is involved. The private sector is the force that moves semiconductor production and innovation. We want to encourage that. We are going to see a great deal of overcapacity in certain industries, and the chips sector is definitely one of them.
We also have to bear in mind that China is not taking all of this coordinated action against it sitting still. It has developed its own economic plans, as well. It is also enhancing its own economic resiliency and trying to build its own economic partnerships to secure the materials, the know-how and the finances it will need to move forward in the coming decades.
If the United States and its allies, like Japan and Canada, in particular, can work together more on the pioneering issues of AI and quantum. That is where the most co-operation and coordination can happen. Quite frankly, on the manufacturing front, there's going to be more competition, not less.
8:35 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Ken Hardie
Thank you, Ms. Lantsman.
We'll now go to Mr. Cormier, for five minutes.
We'll be working in French for the next segment, so click the button and away we go.
8:35 p.m.
Liberal
Serge Cormier Liberal Acadie—Bathurst, NB
Thank you to the witnesses for being here this evening. My questions are for all of you.
I would like to pick up on what you said about our dependence on China. Many people think it will be difficult to let go of our economic ties with China, and that it could even damage our economy and the thousands of companies that do business with China.
In your opinion, how can those concerns be managed? How can we explain to all those people that the Indo-Pacific strategy can help a great deal in reducing our dependency on China? Further, should we continue doing business with China in various sectors of our economy, even in the years ahead after our Indo-Pacific strategy is implemented?
8:35 p.m.
Director, Asia Program, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, As an Individual
Thank you for your questions, which I will try to answer, but will have to do so in English, unfortunately.
Canada is not unique in its position regarding the Chinese market. The Europeans, as well as the Canadians, are in a similar situation where the goal has traditionally been to have to decouple insofar as to ensure close, strong economic ties with China, whilst keeping China's military threat in check.
Canada is a core member of the G7. What we have seen are coordinated efforts on the part of the G7 to push back against authoritarian rule and authoritarian violation of the rule of law and international economic standards and regulations.
What we do want to see, though, is greater commitment from Canada on the restoration of international institutions such as the WTO. We are going to see more trade disputes. We need to have a mechanism for resolution and dispute settlement. That is not in existence. Just because the WTO today, for a number of political reasons, is weakened, it does not mean that there is no need for the WTO—far from it. Can Canada play a part in that? I believe so. That's one in terms of being a proponent of institutions that will ensure greater clarity and transparency and economic engagement.
The other, of course—and your discussion with Ambassador Yamanouchi talked about this at great length—is about energy security and the export of the rich natural resources that Canada enjoys. There is an opportunity there.
Finally I do want to say this. When we talk about supply chain resilience, and we're talking about reimagining how global interdependence can be more effective, moving forward, this provides an opportunity for Canada to be the innovation nation. It can be at the heart of some of the new pioneering areas of science and technology that are emerging. It has world-class universities and researchers. We are at a point where we are trying to establish new rules for data management and the like.
My hope is that Canada—because as I said, Canada is a high-trust nation—will leverage the trust that it has from the international community to be part of the rule-making order.
8:40 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Ken Hardie
Thank you very much, Mr. Cormier.
We will now have the two final two and a half minutes, because we'll need to move on to our final witness for this session.
Mr. Bergeron, the next two and a half minutes are yours.
8:40 p.m.
Bloc
Stéphane Bergeron Bloc Montarville, QC
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
My question is for both witnesses.
We heard the ambassador state very clearly that he wishes to deepen relations between Canada and Japan so they become important partners in the development of the Indo-Pacific region.
Equally, we heard that Japan also intends to work closely with India in that regard, something that Ms. Tatsumi expressed some reservations about in her earlier presentation. How can we reconcile all of that with the fact that relations between Canada and India have deteriorated considerably in recent months?
8:40 p.m.
Liberal
8:40 p.m.
Co-Director, East Asia Program, The Henry L. Stimson Center, As an Individual
Mr. Bergeron, I don't have all the wisdom to know the depth of the Canada-India relationship. I will say that Japan will also face this dilemma when it looks at its relationship with India. It recognizes India as an important strategic partner to counter China's challenge. That does not mean that Japan does not have issues, bilaterally speaking, especially with respect to its values. It has serious reservations about how India deals with its minorities and so forth.
Japan is actually trying its best to take a pragmatic approach, in which it recognizes India's strategic importance as a partner but it also speaks honestly to India about the issues that could present an obstacle to further promoting a bilateral relationship between Japan and India.
I don't know if that answers your question, but I see what Japan is trying to do. I share your concerns that countries like India always present a conundrum when it comes to such a relationship, especially now in the face of the emerging challenges with China.
8:40 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Ken Hardie
That, unfortunately, is your time, Mr. Bergeron.
We'll go to Ms. McPherson for two and a half minutes.