Canada-China Relations Committee on Feb. 12th, 2024

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

That's fine.

[Rob Oliphant, Liberal, Don Valley West, ON]

—and we're going to suggest that we do that to try to end at a reasonable hour tonight.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Yes, it is quite late here, Mr. Medcalf, although the energy has not flagged. I can tell you that.

Go ahead, Mr. Oliphant.

[Rob Oliphant, Liberal, Don Valley West, ON]

My question for Mr. Medcalf has to do with the concept of collective response through Indo-Pacific strategies that may be complimentary or may be unique to different countries. Various European countries, as well as Australia, obviously, and Japan, have an approach to the Indo-Pacific, as does Canada.

Are you seeing threads of commonality that help us deal with the superpower of the area, China, or are you seeing difficulties there that we should be addressing, in a sense, with our colleagues and like minds?

[Rory Medcalf]

Thank you. That is a fundamental question that brings us to the strategic situation.

As all of you are aware, the core strategic challenge in the Indo-Pacific is how to manage the power and assertiveness of the People's Republic of China in ways that do not lead to major conflict or escalate to major war. That's an incredibly difficult balancing act, and it's only going to work through a combination of deterrence, diplomacy and other methods, including development assistance to swing states between China and the U.S. That requires solidarity, strategic postures and diplomacy, and that's where the Indo-Pacific concept comes into play.

I've been a strong advocate of the Indo-Pacific idea for a long time now. It's heartening to see the number and range of countries and institutions, such as the EU and ASEAN, that have developed some kind of Indo-Pacific outlook, strategy or policy framework. It's very important that it's more than just words, of course. At its core, the Indo-Pacific idea is about building solidarity across a two-ocean region where we can develop a broader range of partnerships to manage Chinese power, deterring and engaging in equal measure. We can build a broader range of partnerships than we could if we worked in a much smaller strategic space defined by China. China much prefers to look at subregions such as southeast Asia in isolation and assume that any country not resident there somehow has no business there. Of course, that's partly behind China's attempts to dominate the South China Sea.

How are we doing? I think, on balance, the commonalities among all the various Indo-Pacific visions and policies of the nations and institutions engaged, such as the United States, India, Japan, Australia, European partners, Canada, some southeast Asian players—particularly the Philippines and Vietnam—and institutions such as ASEAN and the EU.... The level of commonality is substantial. There are principles that unite all these positions around the rule of law, the sovereignty of states, large and small, and non-coercion and non-use of force.

However, we could do better. We—

[Rob Oliphant, Liberal, Don Valley West, ON]

I'm going to stop you there so that my colleague can have a chance to ask a question as well.

Thank you.

[Rory Medcalf]

Okay.

[Peter Fragiskatos, Liberal, London North Centre, ON]

Thank you very much, Professor Medcalf, for being here tonight.

In the previous panel, a witness, Shihoko Goto from the Woodrow Wilson Center, said that, while she doesn't foresee immediate conflict, as she put it, between China and Taiwan, the threat of a misunderstanding is very real and the outcome could be unintended consequences, including and up to conflict. Certainly, that's how I understood her comments.

My question to you is less so on what you think about that possible outcome—although, if you have time, I would be interested to hear that. It's more so on where that leave countries such as Canada and Australia—middle powers that are stuck to....

Are we destined to simply watch? How can we be constructive in, as much as possible, mitigating that outcome?

[Rory Medcalf]

Thank you.

The “how can we be constructive?” question actually helps me complete my point on the previous question, because we need to bridge the gap between countries and institutions that focus very heavily on diplomacy, as if somehow entangling China in a web of rules, diplomacy, meetings and negotiations will prevent aggressive action. For example, ASEAN and the European Union seem to foreground diplomacy when they talk about the Indo-Pacific, rather than acknowledge that there has to be a role for deterrence.

On the other hand, with that gap, we have to work particularly with the United States to remind.... Yes, we want and need a very substantial deterrent power in the Indo-Pacific. U.S. leadership in that regard remains vital, but it needs to be woven in with agile diplomacy and engagement with this broad range of partners, for example, showing respect to the interests of southeast Asia.

That's the challenge. The contribution we can all make, for example, to the critical flashpoint across the Taiwan Strait is in all of us finding ways to contribute both to deterrence and to diplomacy. That deterrence is not and should not be expected to be frontline military deterrence from every actor—for example, from Canada—but there needs to be, at a bare minimum, a high level of understanding and support for the messaging that the United States sends, which is effectively to say to the PLA—not today but every day—that it's never going to be a good time to start a catastrophic war across the Taiwan Strait.

However, it also means that all of our countries need to be thinking about how to be prepared for conflict and crisis scenarios. The more prepared we are—including in terms of economic resilience, coordination with allies and partners, and perhaps a willingness to contribute to counterblockading operations in an extreme scenario—the more we're going to have a chance at influencing the calculations in Beijing.

To conclude, I don't think major war is likely but it's certainly possible, and the sense of possibility is going to go in many ways to the question in Beijing about whether the rest of the world will turn a blind eye to such a conflict.

[Peter Fragiskatos, Liberal, London North Centre, ON]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Thank you, Mr. Fragiskatos.

Mr. Medcalf, are you aware of the button that you can push for translation?

[Rory Medcalf]

Yes.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

It's that little globe at the bottom.

[Rory Medcalf]

Go ahead.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

All right. Good.

We will go ahead to Mr. Bergeron for six minutes, and maybe a bit more.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Medcalf, thank you for being here this evening.

Last November, the Australian prime minister and the Chinese president held a meeting, during which they agreed that the two countries could become trusted partners. Their interest was in restoring trade ties. This was described as a positive meeting by both parties, especially by the Australian prime minister.

In your opinion, can we really talk about an improved relationship with the People's Republic of China, and do Australians really believe in that?

[Rory Medcalf]

Thank you.

That's where the “stabilization” word becomes incredibly important.

In fact, there were a number of high-level meetings between the Australian and Chinese governments last year, but the meeting in question, I think, was at APEC. Of course, there was also a visit to China by the Australian prime minister in, I think, October of last year. These are key markers in the stabilization journey for Australia.

What that brings us to is a normalization of diplomatic dialogue. Of course, you need diplomatic dialogue with countries where you have differences. China lifting some, but not quite all, of the coercive economic measures—the sanctions it placed on a range of Australian exports—and the beginning of a larger conversation about the relationship do not equal trust, in my view. It does not, in my view, equal enormous ambition from Australia for the bilateral relationship.

The damage is done. I think the Australian population largely has a much higher level of distrust of the PRC than they did five or 10 years ago. Yes, we have a little bit of confrontation fatigue, I might say. There are parts of the Australian society and economy that obviously want to get on with looking for economic opportunities with China and elsewhere in the world. There are many parts of society and the business community that of course would prefer that we live in a world where the risk of military confrontation is not real, but I think there is now, quietly, an awareness that conflict is a reality in the 21st century. Ukraine has reminded us of that. We're not going back to the relationship of, say, 2015.

My final point to note is that the terrible outcome last week with the sentencing of Dr. Yang Hengjun, in my view, effectively ends the improvement in the relationship.

The relationship may not deteriorate again in the near term, but it's very difficult to see how an Australian government can, in any kind of self-respecting way, now keep calling for stabilization across the board or trust across the board. It just needs to look to managing the improvement that it's had and at the same time continue to build up its own security capabilities, alliances and partnerships— AUKUS is obviously very important in that regard—and help to discourage China from further destabilizing behaviour.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

You are certainly aware that Canada intends to create a foreign agent registry, something the Australian government did some time ago. Has the registry been helpful and if so in what way?

[Rory Medcalf]

The transparency register for foreign agents in Australian is large, long and extensive. It's certainly not China-specific, so it includes hundreds of individuals and entities involved in many relationships around the world.

One argument could be made that this has, therefore, not been very effective because it often captures relationships that actually have no strategic significance. On the other hand, it demonstrates that the Australian government is country-agnostic and that this is not about discriminating against China; it's simply about applying equal rules to all.

I think the law or the register has been moderately successful. I don't think it's been an incredible success, but it's been successful enough in tandem with the laws criminalizing foreign interference and all of the other pieces of the architecture.

Most interestingly, part of the deterrent effect of the register is that it's fair to assume that a number of individuals in fact ended their formal involvement in the China relationship or their formal involvement with institutions that had links with the PRC before the register came into force. That in itself has been a positive outcome.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

In your book Contest for the Indo-Pacific: Why China Won't Map the Future, you wrote that the Indo-Pacific is about organizing a collective response to China without resorting to capitulation or conflict. Is that vision broadly shared by countries in the Indo-Pacific, particularly ASEAN member countries, considering that some of those countries have relatively close ties with Beijing?

[Rory Medcalf]

Thank you for quoting my book on the Indo-Pacific. I am confident there will be a massive increase in sales in Canada following this evening's proceedings.

Quite seriously, what I attempted to do in that book and what I continue to try to do through my work is to identify the commonalities of Indo-Pacific visions and then encourage our very diverse countries to work together as much as we can.

To say that the Indo-Pacific strategic idea is about avoiding both capitulation and conflict is not to say that if there were a conflict we should back down. It is to say that we want to do everything we can to achieve strategic equilibrium, as the Australian foreign minister calls it, to maintain peace and stability, but deterrence is part of that picture. Some countries are very serious in that regard. I think Australia is. I think Japan is, for example, and the United States unquestionably is, even, I think, under potentially a Trump administration.

Southeast Asia is obviously much more complex and problematic. Vietnam will attempt to deter China in its own way, but will not try to join with others in collective deterrence. The Philippines—I think a good news story—has become much closer to its U.S. ally in recent years and is even getting more serious about its own capabilities, so I think the Philippines sits in that camp of strategic equilibrium that Australia is pursuing. The Republic of Korea, again, I think is moving in the right direction.

There's some progress, but we are a long way from a uniform response. To be honest, I don't think we really strictly expect that. As long as we can ensure that major countries in southeast Asia, particularly Indonesia, are not effectively co-opted by China in a future conflict or crisis, that is probably enough, and incidentally remind our friends in southeast Asia that a conflict will touch them immediately. For example, a Taiwan conflict would immediately endanger the lives of hundreds of thousands of Indonesian nationals who are resident in Taiwan.

Reminding countries that you cannot avoid the situation, that you cannot sit on the fence and that you have to protect your interests is a really important part of the diplomatic challenge for Australia and indeed for Canada.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Thank you.

Now we will go to our final questioner and that would be Ms. McPherson for six minutes and change.

[Heather McPherson, NDP, Edmonton Strathcona, AB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much for being with us this evening. I must say, it does look much more pleasant there at this time of year, in February, than it does in Ottawa.

I'm struck by the similarities you've expressed with regard to Canada and Australia and our relationship with China.

My colleague from the Conservative Party brought up Huseyin Celil. We know about the two Michaels. Obviously, what's happening in Australia right now is very similar to that.

Obviously, working alone is not the solution. It is working with allies. Do you feel now that you are in this situation, that Australia is being supported by its allies? Are you getting the support that you require? In our situation, I'm not certain that we had that support.

[Rory Medcalf]

The short answer is that I don't know, and I would be misleading you if I was confident in the solidarity that we're getting.

I don't know what's going on behind the scenes. I would hope there's intense consultation among officials and, indeed, among ministers on this and that it's not just a bilateral thing. We need to be building regional and global solidarity among like-mindeds, and this is where particularly we can and should leapfrog geography. We should be looking to Europe, for instance, as core to those coalitions.

My sense of the last five or six years when Canada went through its terrible situation with the two Michaels, when Australia went through its economic coercion, when particular individual countries elsewhere have been targeted, is that we haven't, on balance, had enough solidarity. I think there's been broad talk of it. There's probably been interesting backroom conversations about how we can coordinate lobbying, coordinate sanctions and coordinate domestic policy settings or legislation, but it doesn't feel that there is enough of a grand coalition. I think that, frankly, all our countries are probably culpable in that regard.

This does go to the hostage diplomacy question, but it also goes to the economic coercion question. It's a very difficult question for someone like me to answer, someone who is an advocate of a pretty firm national security and democratic rights response to China's coercion. It is a question that was put to me and people like me by voices in the China lobby in Australia during our experience of economic coercion, which is to say, “Sure. Australian coal is now being shut out of Chinese ports, but don't worry. Others, including Canada, are picking up the market.”

In other words, your hope in solidarity is forlorn. That's not me criticizing Canadian economic or commercial policy, but it's certainly to say that we have to do better if we're going to demonstrate that democracies really do stick together.

[Heather McPherson, NDP, Edmonton Strathcona, AB]

Yes, absolutely. I think that we saw that in terms of businesses working in China—for example, the supply chains. We, in Canada, have very weak forced-labour legislation. We're hoping to have stronger legislation, but it hasn't come forward yet. We look at what other countries are doing around forced labour.

Could you comment a little bit on that—on how we could have a better, more cohesive way of looking at forced labour coming out of China and also on, perhaps, those risks that businesses that are working in the PRC are facing right now? As you say, China can pit us against each other to some degree, which adds a lot of insecurity and risk to businesses.