Canada-China Relations Committee on Feb. 26th, 2024

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

Not necessarily, but I do want Mr. Caouette to continue, because I'm going to ask him a question that's related to the previous question.

Mr. Caouette, in an article you co-authored for a special edition of the Canadian Foreign Policy Journal entitled “Canada and Southeast Asia in the new Indo-Pacific era”, you detail four challenges to Canada's desire to strengthen its relations in Southeast Asia. The fourth challenge—this brings me back to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations—is the fact that Southeast Asian countries don't want to take sides in rivalries between powerful nations. In other words, no one sees total, unconditional alignment with the United States or China as a desirable strategy. Some of these countries are closer to China, others a little less so.

You identify Canada's first challenge as a reputation problem. Might that be related to the fact that Canada, somewhat like the United States, considers the People's Republic of China to be an increasingly disruptive global power?

[Dominique Caouette]

That's a good question.

I think the people at Global Affairs Canada thought long and hard before they came up with the word “disruptive”; they wanted to find the right word. It would be fair to say that this is a time of change and turbulence in terms of power dynamics. Also, we don't know what will happen next November.

Canada has long relied on its reputation as a friendly country, a country open to dialogue. That dates back to the time of the current Prime Minister's father. Canada was respected because it was seen as powerful enough to have its own foreign policy and its own ideas, while at the same time having a knack for bringing people to the same table. Another unique feature, one that has since changed, was that when people from the Department of Foreign Affairs met with representatives of Asian countries, those representatives knew Canada had a reputation to protect whether the government was Liberal or Conservative. Canada's stance on the region was therefore consistent and transcended partisan affinity.

Canada's number one challenge is to work with its partners in Southeast Asia, including the Japanese, who have been a constant presence in the region. Canada needs to maintain its own constant presence by playing the role of dialogue facilitator. That's what it tried to do from 1982 to 2002, when it enabled and supported regional dialogues. It's important to note that there has been no conflict between the countries surrounding China. Yes, there was the Vietnam War, but countries in the region have not been at war with each other. ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, has its own distinct modus operandi, and we have much to gain from working with our allies.

The same is true of India. It is important to be a sought-after nation, one respected for its positions and capable of bringing people together around the same table, as we've done in the past. We need to reclaim a role that will restore our reputation as a soft power, one that leverages its power of persuasion. Consider Mr. Axworthy's human security doctrine and peacekeepers' military interventions.

Canada's Indo-Pacific strategy is a first step, but the big challenge is implementing it. Efforts have been made over the past year, but sometimes we've messed up rather than restoring Canada's reputation as a power capable of bringing people together around the same table and taking action on specific issues. Just look at the Convention on the Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines, which Canada put forward. I think Canada has expertise on issues such as Uighurs and the exploitation of trafficked workers. We need to focus on our strengths, not try to do it all, which sometimes seems to be the case with Canada's Indo-Pacific strategy.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

I want to come back to the term “disruptive”. You sort of conflated the word “disruptive” with the word “turbulence”. I would say that the disrupter is someone causing the turbulence, even if this definition may annoy a number of Southeast Asian countries.

I'll go back to your three challenges. The third is the fact that the strategy focuses on security issues and provides for a greater military presence in the Indo‑Pacific region—imagine that—when these issues are not aligned with the preferences or priorities of Southeast Asian countries.

Again, does this contribute to this reputation problem you were alluding to when explaining the second challenge?

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Provide a brief answer, please, Mr. Caouette, if you could. Thank you.

[Dominique Caouette]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I think you're touching on an important point.

Instead of relying on our expertise, which is to support civil society organizations, consumer movements seeking safer products and economic movements, by negotiating fairer free trade agreements, we're focusing on the military dimension, which is certainly not Canada's specialty or trademark.

We try to do everything, but by attempting to cover a number of fields, we forget what sets us apart from other countries and what Canada's added value is. It's especially important to be modest about it in today's world.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Thank you very much, Mr. Bergeron.

We'll now go to Mr. Boulerice for six minutes.

[Alexandre Boulerice, NDP, Rosemont—La Petite-Patrie, QC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Like some of my colleagues, I would like to make a brief preliminary comment.

One of Canada's largest exports to the Indo‑Pacific region has long been bituminous coal, thermal coal. In 2021, the Liberal Party promised to end Canada's exports of this thermal coal. It's even in the Minister of Environment's mandate letter. The following year, thermal coal exports increased by 60%. That's eight times higher than our exports in 2018, when it is extremely polluting, and it violates all of our climate change commitments. I wanted to clarify that, because I find it absolutely inconsistent and contradictory. I'm all the more proud of Bill C‑383, introduced by my colleague from Victoria, Laurel Collins, who wants to put a legal end to the export of thermal coal while the Liberal government unfortunately continues to do so.

Mr. Vaillancourt, I very much appreciated your comments a little earlier on human rights, workers' rights and forced labour. You spoke at length, and rightly so, about the plight of the Uighur people. You also talked about the responsibilities of Canadian companies. If I have time, I'll come back to that.

The federal government is responsible for ensuring that our supply chains and subcontractors aren't involved in forced labour. In 2021, journalist Joël‑Denis Bellavance of La Presse revealed that contracts totalling $221 million had been awarded to a Malaysian company that, at the time, was suspected by the United States and the United Kingdom of using forced labour in its production.

How do you think the federal government could implement measures in this region of the world to avoid such situations when the federal government itself is not setting an example?

[Claude Vaillancourt]

That's a very important aspect. In my presentation, I proposed three interesting measures that I would like to come back to.

The first measure is the adoption of legislation on the prevention of forced labour. Our American neighbours have an interesting one. The proof is that they block a lot more goods from companies using forced labour than our own government does. It seems that products made by Uighur people in absolutely appalling conditions are getting into the country very easily without being blocked. So we have a model—that of our neighbours—that could serve as inspiration.

The second measure I talked about was introducing due diligence legislation for companies. This has been requested by a number of people and organizations in Canada. So it would be important to do that.

The third measure I was asking for was to transform the Office of the Canadian Ombudsperson for Responsible Enterprise into an independent office with strong investigative powers. The problem is that the ombudsperson is working with the data that businesses are willing to provide, when the ombudsperson should be able to require businesses to provide much more meaningful and important data. That would then make it possible to conduct real investigations and to have a better assessment of the stock that comes to us from China, the stock that is produced by work done under really trying conditions.

[Alexandre Boulerice, NDP, Rosemont—La Petite-Patrie, QC]

Thank you very much.

Indeed, the fact that companies can provide their own data and reports on their behaviour and compliance with the rules seems quite absurd to me. You have to have more objectivity than that. Investigative powers would be a good thing. The trans‑Pacific partnership changed its name to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans‑Pacific Partnership, or CPTPP. You once wrote in an article with Ms. Sujata Dey that the use of the term “progressive” was quite ironic. You're being polite. I would have said that putting lipstick on a pig doesn't change the nature of the animal.

Among other things, you wrote the following:

Despite commitments to gender equality and indigenous rights by the Trudeau government, this agreement does not include gender and indigenous rights clauses. Only the preamble mentions these issues, but this symbolic one is not legally binding.

How do you think Canada, as chair of the CPTPP commission in 2024, could further advance its own commitments to gender equality and indigenous rights?

[Claude Vaillancourt]

I think those things need to be in the agreement. I think free trade agreements, especially those that Canada has negotiated for a long time, often include separate chapters—one on the environment and another on labour, for example—with a series of good intentions. However, they are in no way binding.

In my opinion, when reviewing free trade agreements, it's very important to mention all the progressive aspects in the text of the agreement so that there are concrete applications. I think the Canada-Ukraine agreement has made some progress in terms of integrating environmental concerns. This proves that Canada has the opportunity to do so. That said, I think we need to go even further when renegotiating free trade agreements.

In my opinion, all the free trade agreements negotiated by Canada during the great years of free trade were liberalization agreements in which environmental and human rights considerations were secondary to the rights granted to businesses.

Right now, where we are, we have the opportunity to transform things and include much more important elements in free trade agreements.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Boulerice. Your time has expired.

We'll now go to Mr. Chong for five minutes.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

The second-highest-valued merchandise export to the People's Republic of China in 2023 was bituminous coal. When we look at the record of China on climate change and coal, their words and western governments' approaches to this issue are completely contradictory.

Ten years ago, I think it was reasonable for western governments to propose co-operation with China on climate change and GHG emissions. Many people, including western governments, thought coal demand would peak in 2013—including the IEA, I might add—and decline from there.

They thought the PRC would work in good faith with the world community on reducing emissions, but a report came out last year from a Finnish-based non-governmental organization called the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air and from Global Energy Monitor, which is a second not-for-profit that monitors fossil fuel infrastructure. In 2022, China approved the largest expansion of coal-fired power plants since 2015. In the rush to build these new coal-fired plants, they granted permits for 106 gigawatts of capacity in 82 new locations across China—the highest number since 2015, and four times higher than in 2021.

As a result, China is now burning more coal than the rest of the world combined, and the world this year is burning more coal than it ever has—a record amount. Last year, the world burned a record amount of coal, as it did in the previous year. This is all because of China's absolute commitment to massively expanding the burning of coal, which happens to be one of our largest exports to the People's Republic of China.

In November of 2021, Canada announced its intention to ban thermal coal exports in six short years to the People's Republic of China. Are these two things compatible? That's my question.

[Carlo Dade]

I'm not familiar with the figures you presented. I do handle the trade side. Fortunately, we have a natural resource centre that focuses on energy, the environment and the energy transition, but I'd be curious to see the numbers for India too. I imagine their numbers are going up. I know exports from Australia certainly have, following their agreement with India.

You could say that China is one step forward, two steps back. Someone from the other side, who's on the clean energy side—the solar side—could say it's two steps forward, one step back.

There are many factors at play with China. I'm not trying to equivocate here; it's just a very complex, multi-faceted engagement with them on energy and the transition. China is doing things that I think countries that are concerned about climate change and reducing emissions would support very much, and there are things for which China would be castigated. I think that's across the board in the developing world.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

Let me ask you this, then. Nowhere in the Government of Canada is there a definition of clean energy—nowhere. We pointed that out in committee a number of meetings ago. A large part of the Indo-Pacific document is based on the export of clean energy, but nobody can define what it is.

Would you classify LNG as a clean energy export?

[Carlo Dade]

Let me say that I enjoyed that particular session of that meeting.

Yes, I would, absolutely. I think the government recognizes as well that LNG is necessary.

I keep getting mixed signals. We talk about the Japanese ambassador's comments. Japan is looking to transition. If you're talking about engaging Japan on LNG, you have to recognize that it's a part of the transition.

I think there's some confusion, perhaps, in the government about this, but I see a definition from them that includes LNG from time to time.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

Do you think it's a reasonable foreign policy goal for the Government of Canada, in order to contribute to the global fight against climate change, to make the export of LNG a priority so that it can displace coal-fired electricity generation plants, seeing they have double the greenhouse gas emissions per kilowatt hour of natural gas plants?

[Carlo Dade]

Of the limited contributions of significance Canada could make, I think that the move to LNG would probably be the second most significant contribution.

The largest producer of greenhouse gas emissions in Canada is the Government of Canada, followed by the provincial governments. Look at the release of GHGs from forest fires. If you own the land, you own the emissions. Forestry policy is one area I haven't heard the government speak about, in terms of forestry management practices such as cutting. Modern forestry practices would be a huge contribution.

LNG exports would be second. Our LNG is going to Asia, but it's going through Mexico. How about having us sell it, having us reap the rewards by selling lower-impact LNG? It just seems to make sense.

I think it's a policy in search of a problem.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Thank you, Mr. Chong.

We'll now go to Mr. Fragiskatos for five minutes.

[Peter Fragiskatos, Liberal, London North Centre, ON]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to our witnesses.

Professor Caouette, if I could begin with you, sir, I want to make sure I understand your point about soft power. I think it's important in the context of this discussion, but I want to make certain that I understood you.

[Dominique Caouette]

The concept of soft power was developed by Joseph Nye, an American political scientist, and the idea of soft power is that a country could exercise influence without being military. That soft power is the power of persuasion, the power of attraction and the power of reputation. Soft power is a key asset, and it has been a key asset in the past, as I mentioned, for Canada.

I think that this soft power that Canada had, its power of attraction, has diminished over the years. I think it's partly because there has been a lack of continuity in policies. I think it was much easier a while ago for Canada to engage on difficult issues, for example. Whether they were environmental issues or forced labour, there was receptivity. I think the idea now is that Canada's posture towards Southeast Asia, Asia and the Asia-Pacific is, if not confused, at least not specifically directed.

What I am trying to argue is that we have more chances to enter environmental or labour conditions issues if we are at the table as equal partners in the region.

At the moment I would say that people are really focusing on China, and there is a China obsession in many ways, but, as I was trying to point out, there are important Chinese diasporas in Southeast Asia. These diasporas are the big businesses, and they are potentially good allies for influencing policies on China.

I think Canada needs to be more modest in its claims and be at the table as an equal with members of the Indo-Pacific region. The difference is also that in many ways—and we see it in other parts of the world—Canada is not needed or sought after. They can go to other countries. Times have changed, and it's part of the change that I was talking about at the beginning of my intervention. We need to understand the position we're in, what the value added of Canada is and where we're going to be respected and listened to.

As I was saying, one of the key points would be to help build consensus, and that part has to be rethought. I think that unless it is clearly stated and it's a strategy that is not time-bound by an election, that will be key in terms of restoring this capacity to facilitate the processes that are more in line with our objectives of a clean environment, better labour conditions and processes, migration whereby people can migrate under good conditions, and indigenous peoples' rights, which is a challenge that we also face in Canada.

If we work as partners or counterparts in these processes, I think that Canada's soft power influence will be much greater and not based on high-powered political influence. I don't think it's high power, which is military, that will be our trademark, at least for the next coming years or the next decade.

[Peter Fragiskatos, Liberal, London North Centre, ON]

I think you read my mind, sir, because I was trying to get your thoughts on soft power and then apply that to your initial comments on diaspora in your opening comments, but you've beat me to it, so I appreciate that.

I take your point that there is a lot of potential in looking to diasporas in not just the Indo-Pacific strategy but writ large when it comes to security and economic policy. I think there is a lot of value added there.

Mr. Dade, I have only 45 seconds left, so I'll turn my attention to you.

I have a very simple question: How critical is China to the economy of western Canada?

[Carlo Dade]

It is our second-largest trade partner when you look at what we export. For example, with reference to agricultural goods, 13% of Canada's trade in agricultural goods is with China. That's higher than the total for overall trade with China, so it's absolutely critical that we engage and do so intelligently.

[Peter Fragiskatos, Liberal, London North Centre, ON]

You say to do so intelligently. I couldn't agree more. Sometimes I hear musings—not, maybe, in that kind of language, but something approximating a call for an embargo does come up from time to time, whether it's in the House in debate or in other places from Conservative friends.

I think it's important to understand that issue before engaging in the kind of hyperbole that we sometimes hear.

[Carlo Dade]

When Donald Trump launched his trade war with China, U.S farmers were compensated to the tune of, I think, $20 billion U.S., which would be the entire GDP of Newfoundland and Labrador or ten times the budget of Canadian agriculture and agri-food.

If you are going to do those things, you have to be aware of the cost and, as with the Americans, you have to be prepared to defend your values, to pay the price of your values. Your values carry a cost. Before speaking publicly about how you are going to defend them, you have to be prepared to pay the cost, or you undermine your values. If you're not willing to defend them after saying that you will, you undercut their value.

Regarding that $20 billion, I think it doesn't mean you don't do it; it just means you have to know the cost and be prepared for it.