Evidence of meeting #36 for Canada-China Relations in the 44th Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was csis.
A video is available from Parliament.
7:50 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Ken Hardie
Thank you, Dr. Ellis. That's your time.
We'll go now to Mr. Fragiskatos for six minutes.
7:50 p.m.
Liberal
Peter Fragiskatos Liberal London North Centre, ON
Thank you, Chair.
Thank you to all of you for being here tonight.
Mr. Vigneault, to what extent can we say that every democracy is dealing with these kinds of issues in some shape or form, with implications for national security when we look at issues of research and research collaboration?
7:50 p.m.
Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
I will use a very specific example to illustrate that point. My colleagues and I, the heads of the Five Eyes intelligence services, took the unprecedented avenue of meeting together in public for the first time in our history in October of last year at Stanford University in the context of talking about innovation and the need to secure innovation for the well-being, prosperity and security of our countries in the future. We had a common assessment, the heads of Five Eyes, that specifically the work of the PRC against all of us, against essentially any organization that has information or know-how that the PRC is interested in, puts us at risk because there is an institutional approach through the thousand talents programs, through covert espionage activities and through open arrangements and investments to try to get information.
What is done in an overt way is not the problem. In the case of the PRC, there is a very specific set of conditions that apply, and the Chinese Communist Party has been very clear that their goal is to have, for example, the most advanced and modern military by 2049. In order to do so, the President of China, Xi Jinping, who is also the general secretary of the Communist Party, chairs a committee of military-civil fusion. In all of the information, know-how and data they acquire, there is an institutional approach to try to leverage it and turn it into a military advantage.
From that point of view, Mr. Fragiskatos, you're right to say that it's not just Canada under threat, but any other country that has something the PRC is interested in acquiring.
7:55 p.m.
Liberal
Peter Fragiskatos Liberal London North Centre, ON
What would you say is the message to post-secondary institutions? I represent London, Ontario—or help to represent London, Ontario—in the House of Commons. Western University is in London. We have universities throughout the country that look at medical research and research in general, and collaboration is key to that research in so many different cases.
What message is being relayed either through the Five Eyes or generally? What would you say here to universities that look at situations like this and wonder about security implications for research?
7:55 p.m.
Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
This is one of the areas where we have to be very careful in how we engage in these discussions. Canada is a prosperous country because we have excellent know-how, universities and research. This is the basis for our prosperity. We have to be careful not to stifle that innovation, because we will not be where we need to be in 10, 15 or 20 years. That innovation needs to be protected. However, the world has changed, and the number of actors have also changed in the process. The way they are engaging in these activities has evolved to the point where some of these activities are indeed threats to our country.
One of the most important ways to specifically work with universities is to engage in open dialogue and share information with them. We have published unclassified documents that get at the core of this issue.
In the past year, we have engaged directly with universities. We visited 13 universities across the country. We work with the research universities in the country and with Universities Canada to share our information. We meet with academia, student bodies and academic administrators to essentially share with them what we know and the concerns we may have, and to work in collaboration to accomplish two objectives: great innovation in our universities and protecting our national security at the same time. Both need to be achieved.
7:55 p.m.
Liberal
Peter Fragiskatos Liberal London North Centre, ON
Beyond universities, you said there were around 200 organizations that CSIS has briefed. What kinds of organizations are we looking at here? What is the nature of those briefings? I ask that question because I wonder if there are particular sectors you're worried about that are more susceptible to threats.
7:55 p.m.
Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
Indeed there are a number of specific sectors we're more concerned with, such as quantum technology, biopharma and aviation. We're looking at anything related to cyber. Our agriculture is an area of concern, because we're developing very innovative approaches in our country.
We're meeting with universities, as I mentioned. We're also meeting with industry associations. We're publishing unclassified documents and trying to make them as available as possible.
If it's of interest, I can say that we're also working.... We have been talking about foreign interference. Elements of the approach by the PRC are espionage and foreign interference. They are often two elements of the same strategy. We've been engaging very significantly with the diaspora in the country to make sure we are seen by the diaspora as part of the solution. We share our information, listen to their concerns and better interact with them regarding what would be relevant.
The work of this committee is also very important, because it's increasing the knowledge and know-how we have that we can share through you. It's through these different efforts that we'll increase the resilience of Canada and Canadians.
7:55 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Ken Hardie
Thank you, Director.
We'll now go to Mr. Bergeron. The next six minutes are yours.
7:55 p.m.
Bloc
Stéphane Bergeron Bloc Montarville, QC
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Good evening, gentlemen. Thank you for being here.
A few moments ago, I reported on an article published in the Journal de Montréal on January 29, 2024, in which we learned that, as early as 2010, you were warning the government of an increasingly aggressive attitude on the part of China, particularly regarding intelligence activities. What we've found is that the government has been slow to pick up the message, so much so that the minister was telling us a few moments ago that, until very recently, employees were essentially relied upon to self-declare in order to get a clear idea of the “pedigree” of the links they had with other institutions.
I don't mean to put you on the spot, but do you feel that the government should have put in place background check mechanisms sooner for people working in a high-level, tier 4 lab like Winnipeg?
8 p.m.
Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
Mr. Chair, I thank the member for his question.
Mr. Bergeron, your question is very interesting and touches on several important points. One of these matters to consider is China's evolution in recent years, especially since Xi Jinping came to power, the degree of aggression and disrespect for international law...
For example, China has refused to abide by the International Court of Arbitration's 2016 ruling on the South China Sea. Yet the ruling was very clear and unequivocal. This is one of the triggers. Since 2013, when Xi Jinping came to power, various examples like this one demonstrate an important trajectory for China.
At the same time, Chinese legislation and several programs have evolved. For example, the Thousand Talents Program has become much more institutionalized. In some ways, China is very open, but since 2017 and 2018, laws have been put in place to force people, companies and all Chinese people everywhere to collaborate with intelligence services.
I'd also like to mention the evolution and growth of the United Front Work Department. Its approach is to influence and control the Chinese diaspora and influence other countries in order to further Chinese interests.
The United Front Work Department, the Thousand Talents Program and the evolving threat posed by China are all elements that need to be taken into account. In fact, that's what our intelligence services, analysts and experts on China are doing. We need to take the information we have in 2024 and put it in the context of 2010. We have to take into account what we knew at that time, what was known and what measures could have been taken.
Finally, I'd like to add that, in working with my colleagues around the world on issues of Chinese spying and interference, I've been able to see that these behaviours have evolved everywhere over the past few years.
So Canada is also part of this evolution.
8 p.m.
Bloc
Stéphane Bergeron Bloc Montarville, QC
When you testified before the committee in March 2021, you were talking about the relationship between your institution and universities. You mentioned that the Canadian Security Intelligence Service maintained “a close dialogue” with universities and that you wished “to be able to engage in dialogues” that were even more extensive.
In March 2024, the CBC reported that the University of Saskatchewan would ultimately host Canada's first level 4 non-governmental laboratory.
Given your institution's limitations on information sharing, how do you plan to collaborate with such a high-level laboratory outside the Canadian government?
8 p.m.
Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
Once again, that is a very good question.
Mr. Bergeron mentioned the limitations of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act with regard to information sharing. The Minister of Public Safety, Mr. LeBlanc, has reported on consultations that have taken place in Canada and his willingness to table amendments to the act. We hope this will happen, as this is one of the existing gaps in our system.
With regard to the laboratory in Saskatchewan, I won't go into all the details, but I can say that we have had discussions, for a long time, with the organization in question to enable the exchange of information and to raise awareness properly.
While coping with the limits imposed by the law, we have been able to start a dialogue, and we hope that this dialogue will go even further.
That said, the dialogue is taking place.
8:05 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Ken Hardie
Thank you very much, gentlemen.
We'll now go to Mr. Desjarlais for six minutes.
8:05 p.m.
NDP
Blake Desjarlais NDP Edmonton Griesbach, AB
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
I want to thank the witnesses for being present today, and of course for your immense work in keeping Canadians safe and all the work your staff does to ensure that our work to make them safer continues. That's why we're all here today.
The question I want to ask is similar to what Mr. Fragiskatos mentioned about the sectors that are under threat. Coming from Alberta, I know this has been a conversation we've had for a long time, particularly with the development of our oil sands.
In Alberta, as you may know, in 2012 and even previous to that, there was an economic policy by the Conservative Party to find ways to sell off assets, particularly our access to oil sands projects. CNRL, Canadian Natural Resources, was unfortunately sold to Nexen.... Sorry, Nexen was sold to companies controlled by China, and today that's the same.
How much of a threat is the People's Republic of China to our oil sands and to the production and development of research for petroleum products?
8:05 p.m.
Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
The question is interesting because you're looking at two things. One is the control and ownership of a fixed asset. You also talked about the development of know-how and innovation. I would make a distinction between something you can control, which is the asset.... You cannot, in the middle of the night, come in covertly and take it over. Knowing and understanding the intent not just of the PRC but of other countries means having the right legislation to make sure that you're able to protect it through the Investment Canada Act, among other things.
A very important question as well is the development of the know-how and innovation. When you look at carbon capture, there are very innovative things happening in Alberta and other parts of the country. We know that if it's of interest to the PRC or some other countries, there will be an effort, either overtly, sometimes through direct engagement, or through other means, including covert espionage, to acquire this know-how and information. We have to be very mindful of that.
At CSIS, we try to look at very specific activities, but we also zoom out and try to understand the cumulative impact of some of these issues and see what the consequence is for Canada's national security not only now but also in the future. This is the advice we try to provide to the government.
8:05 p.m.
NDP
Blake Desjarlais NDP Edmonton Griesbach, AB
That's a fantastic answer.
Just to frame that at the time these policies were in existence, I would assume they existed in 2012 when China took over Alberta's oil companies. Is that correct?
8:05 p.m.
Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
As I mentioned, what we've seen is that, while some of these conditions already existed, from 2012 to 2024 there's been a very significant evolution and there have been a couple of pivotal moments. One of them has been the ascension to power of Xi Jinping, but a number of other steps have been taken, including the publication of very specific strategies, like “Made in China 2025” and their five-year goals, strategies that are sometimes very overt. They say where they want to be and want to dominate this and that sector.
I think in the evolution we've seen since 2013, some of these elements were there. Some of these dynamics were there in 2012, but we've seen a dramatic acceleration.
8:10 p.m.
NDP
Blake Desjarlais NDP Edmonton Griesbach, AB
I see that. I hope you can see my curiosity and the very problematic connection that comes to mind when I think of the control of Alberta's oil asset, petroleum, which is an immense resource we have here in Canada, particularly in Alberta. I see your concern of the potentials, especially if we're looking at the PRC's mandate to have the strongest, most technologically advanced military by 2049, as I believe you said. Those two things in my mind present a credible risk. If they have control over physical resource assets like petroleum, an incredibly important asset for war and the military, they would also have access to the information that supplies it.
Do you believe the ownership of these companies should be challenged, especially now in light of what we're seeing with very aggressive modes of information and hostile actions?
8:10 p.m.
Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
That's a question I honestly would have to reflect upon. In the last number of years, the specific ownership of those resources has not been as much at the top of our agenda.
I will reflect on this, Mr. Desjarlais, and may bring back something more intelligent to share with you.
8:10 p.m.
NDP
Blake Desjarlais NDP Edmonton Griesbach, AB
I would appreciate that and look forward to hearing from you. Maybe you can supply that in writing at a certain time to this committee, when it's appropriate for you to review that information and supply an opinion or response.
8:10 p.m.
NDP
Blake Desjarlais NDP Edmonton Griesbach, AB
I understand I have 30 seconds, but I want to ask a question that I asked the minister about impacts of this study and other studies related to the Winnipeg lab. It's on our relationship with our partners across the globe, particularly the Five Eyes and NATO. Did that serious breach of information present a credible risk to our partners, and did they present that risk to you as a question or recommend ways to reduce that risk?
8:10 p.m.
Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
As I mentioned, we are working extremely closely with not just our Five Eyes partners, but a number of other extremely sophisticated intelligence services around the world. CSIS has over 300 relationships around the world with intelligence services, and this is one of the very significant issues we're talking about.
Each country has challenges when it comes to the penetration of institutions and espionage activities. That is one of the reasons we share so much together at the classified level. It is to collectively be more resilient and learn from each other. You can be sure that in a case like this, the lessons we learn as an intelligence service are shared with our partners to make sure, again, that we raise the bar and make it harder for hostile actors to threaten our well-being.