Thank you very much.
Evidence of meeting #36 for Canada-China Relations in the 44th Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was csis.
A video is available from Parliament.
Evidence of meeting #36 for Canada-China Relations in the 44th Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was csis.
A video is available from Parliament.
8:25 p.m.
Bloc
8:25 p.m.
Liberal
8:25 p.m.
Bloc
Stéphane Bergeron Bloc Montarville, QC
We've learned that, among the charges levelled against the two researchers, one was the fact that people were allowed to work unescorted inside the laboratories.
How could such a thing happen? In your opinion, is this the kind of practice that can still go on, or has it been tightened up since then?
8:25 p.m.
Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
As far as I know, we've learned from our mistakes.
Our colleagues at the Public Health Agency of Canada have been very rigorous in implementing these lessons to plug some of the safety loopholes that existed. To the best of my knowledge, these practices no longer exist.
On the other hand, the very nature of espionage and counter-espionage work means that the more useful and effective our tactics and techniques for understanding and gathering intelligence become, the more our adversary changes techniques to make our task even more difficult. So it really is a game of cat and mouse. We can't sleep soundly thinking it's all settled. That's why I always talk about partnership and dialogue between national security experts, like those at CSIS, and the organizations, because the situation, techniques and methods of espionage are evolving.
So we have to evolve at the same time.
8:25 p.m.
NDP
Blake Desjarlais NDP Edmonton Griesbach, AB
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
I now want to turn to what I believe to be an overarching concern related to China, which is the potential of China organizing global allies toward their own ends. I know the mandate of this committee is more narrowly specific to China, but my concern is largely how China could be leveraging its state supporters to meet the ends that you described at the very outset of our meeting today.
The greatest potential and greatest risk that I perceive from your comments in today's meeting is the plan towards a larger military, which from the New Democrat perspective is bad for peace. Of course, when you have larger and larger militaries continuing to gather, it makes an inevitable situation likely. I think it's a major concern for not just Canadians but the globe writ large.
How concerning is China's relationship with other state actors toward what could potentially be a really serious collision course with NATO and our allies?
8:25 p.m.
Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
One of the significant by-products, if you will, of Russia's invasion of Ukraine has been a rapprochement between the People's Republic of China and Russia. We're talking about two dictatorships. We're talking about two authoritarian systems that collaborate because they see an interest in doing so for each one of them. The dynamic of an increased military collaboration between the PRC and Russia is of concern. We see also a rapprochement with North Korea. When you start to look at the security dynamics in that part of the world, you start to see a number of indicators going in the wrong direction.
For Canada specifically, we see that the PRC has invented a new concept and declared themselves a near-Arctic state. That did not exist before, but now it exists, at least in their nomenclature. It's for the specific purpose of trying to increase their capabilities for operating in the north, including in the Canadian Arctic. They see economic potential with climate change and the opening of sea routes in the north, but there's also a military component to this. From a Canadian point of view, we are concerned about, specifically using this example, what is a potential direct impact on Canada's security now and in the future.
Also, as you mentioned, Mr. Desjarlais, there's the question of the global instability that is created by military arrangements, the sharing of military know-how and the sharing of equipment in that part of the world. This is of significant concern now but also in the future.
8:30 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Ken Hardie
Thank you to you both.
To take care of our final two five-minute periods, we will go to Mr. Chong and then Mr. Naqvi, who will wrap this up.
Mr. Chong.
8:30 p.m.
Conservative
Michael Chong Conservative Wellington—Halton Hills, ON
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
The Government of Canada outsources to and contracts with a lot of outside individuals and companies. ArriveCAN has obviously been in the news recently, but one thing that surprised me in reading the documents we received was that a private company did some parts of the investigation.
Why is a private company, in this case Presidia Security Consulting, doing security investigations for the Government of Canada? What is your view of that? Secondly, what is the relationship between CSIS and this private company in respect of these investigations?
8:30 p.m.
Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
I think it's an interesting point in the sense that some organizations may have more in-house capabilities to do some of these sophisticated investigations.
In this case, Mr. Chong, I don't know if you've had the chance to ask PHAC a question on why they did that. In my experience, one of the issues is that people do not have enough expertise in some specific areas. I'm speaking in a general manner. I don't know. There is no relationship between CSIS and such an organization for the simple purpose that there is nothing we can share with them. We would not be sharing our techniques and methods and our information with them.
I would say again, at a general level, that there might be scenarios in which it could be useful. Some private companies have a lot of very good expertise in niche areas of investigations, so that might be useful, but that of course needs to be complemented, especially if you're talking about government assets and government information, with a government investigation. This is where CSIS would have to come into play. Of course, in the context of potential criminality, our colleagues at the RCMP need to be engaged.
8:30 p.m.
Conservative
Michael Chong Conservative Wellington—Halton Hills, ON
In other words, the department and the agency are responsible for carrying out the investigation with their own resources, and if they don't have them, they contract a private company to do that. I would have thought that if there was a security concern within PHAC, they would have contacted Government of Canada authorities such as CSIS or the RCMP to conduct the investigation rather than hiring a private contractor to do the work and gather the information.
8:30 p.m.
Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
Our mandate at CSIS is fairly clear in this circumstance. We would investigate the national security threat and do the security screening aspect, but everything between those arcs, the administrative portion, we would not be equipped to do. It would not be appropriate.
I want to reiterate that I was making a general comment when I said that—
8:30 p.m.
Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
—so I don't know the rationale for PHAC.
8:30 p.m.
Conservative
Michael Chong Conservative Wellington—Halton Hills, ON
I have a related question.
CSIS does intelligence assessments, so if an individual wants to get clearance to go into the Winnipeg lab, CSIS will do the assessment on that individual and provide advice to the department or agency. Within the machinery of the Government of Canada, who is normally responsible for granting that security clearance? Is it the deputy minister or head of the agency, such as the president of PHAC? Who is it normally, and can those authorities be delegated?
8:30 p.m.
Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
According to the government security screening policy, the authority rests with the deputy head of each organization.
8:30 p.m.
Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
Yes.
In terms of the delegation of authority, I believe it is possible—
8:35 p.m.
Conservative
Michael Chong Conservative Wellington—Halton Hills, ON
In the case of PHAC, would the authority responsible for the NML and for granting the security clearance be the president?
8:35 p.m.
Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
Yes, the authority is indeed through the president or the deputy head. It's the same for revocation.
8:35 p.m.
Conservative
Michael Chong Conservative Wellington—Halton Hills, ON
I understand. Thank you.
My last question concerns a report. There's basically one level 4 lab in Canada and it's in Winnipeg. There are two parts to it, the animal side and the human side, one side run by CFIA and the other run by PHAC. It was reported last month that the University of Saskatchewan is interested in setting up a level 4 lab. Do we have the state capacity in Canada to have another level 4 lab, particularly at a non-governmental institution, in light of the massive security breaches we saw at the government's lab in Winnipeg?