Canada-China Relations Committee on April 15th, 2024

[Dominic LeBlanc, Liberal, Beauséjour, NB]

Thank you for your question.

I'd also like to thank you for your interest in matters of this kind, because it's in our country's best interest to understand threats to its national security. As I said earlier, the federal government is not alone in facing this threat. We have partners in the provinces and territories who are affected, and we've found all kinds of other institutions that may be subject to interference of this kind.

I'm also ready to believe that we're not the only country in this situation. Based on my conversations with my British and American counterparts, there is no doubt that many other western countries, like the Five Eyes and other Canadian partners, have seen a change in their relations with China. Thirty years ago, when I was a young assistant in Mr. Chrétien's cabinet, we sent trade missions to China that included all the provincial premiers. That's unlikely to happen today, precisely because of actions taken by the Chinese government.

The director has publicly stated that China is engaging in interference and he reported instances of interference that are completely unacceptable for Canada's sovereignty, and affecting our institutions—not just our democratic institutions but also our economic and security institutions. The government has publicly acknowledged this interference. It's a situation that's getting worse, and that's also true in other countries.

China's hostile actions are those of an acknowledged world economic power. That's the problem that confronts us in terms of appropriately shouldering our national security responsibilities, by which I mean recognizing that country's economic power. It's a challenge for other countries too.

I believe that we have to stop being naive. We can no longer assume that these players are always acting in good faith. It's not just China, which is only one country among others, but it comes up often in discussions with my colleagues.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

We've heard a lot of testimony, including at meetings we attend on the Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics, which conducted its investigation into interference, and we know that Canada is not the only country affected: France and Australia were among the other targeted countries.

Is it a matter of before and after Xi Jinping, or did that not make a difference?

[Dominic LeBlanc, Liberal, Beauséjour, NB]

I'm trying to come up with an answer to your question.

I am anything but an expert in international politics, and I'm not particularly knowledgeable about how these things work. The Department of Foreign Affairs probably has a more accurate view of things than mine. Nevertheless, based on discussions with my counterparts in national security about threats of foreign interference, the impression is that the situation isn't going to disappear all that soon.

I don't know what the Chinese regime's plans are, but I get the impression that there is a degree of stability missing from our governments. The predisposition of the Chinese government is therefore not about to soften, and as you put it rather well, Canada is not the only country concerned. Their approach is probably also not headed in a different direction. That's my view, but as I was saying, I'm not really a foreign policy expert.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

To give you an idea of what we're dealing with, the Chinese Communist Party will still be in power in 50 years.

[Dominic LeBlanc, Liberal, Beauséjour, NB]

So you're not confident that we will be too?

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

You never know; there might be some changes.

Mr. Vigneault, if we were to look at the situation retrospectively and were asked to draw a rising curve, would the arrival of Xi Jinping mark a significant change in the shape of the curve, or would it not affect it at all?

[David Vigneault]

Thank you for the question.

As the minister mentioned, if we were to look back to 30 years ago, we would see that there were prospects and opportunities in China as well as optimism that might have led us to believe China might join the global economic system and eventually move towards democracy. Not only that, but at the time, China's aggression towards its neighbours was perhaps somewhat different.

When Xi Jinping took over as general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party at the end of 2012, it was a turning point. It's clear to us now that things have changed since 2013. At my last appearance here, I mentioned certain events, including the decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the South China Sea Arbitration. Knowing what the decision would be, China totally rejected the authority of international law and decreed that it was a matter of its own interest and that it was going to decide what would happen.

We raised several points in recent years. Like many of its allies, countries like Canada rely on international law and international business standards to protect their prosperity and security. Unfortunately, under Xi Jinping, we saw the Chinese regime move in a direction that ran counter to our interests.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Thank you, Mr. Villemure.

Now we'll go to Mr. Angus for six minutes.

[Charlie Angus, NDP, Timmins—James Bay, ON]

Thank you so much, Chair.

Many concerning and disturbing facts have come forward, and we don't have all the facts, not having been invited to read the documents that were provided.

I'm really concerned about the March 2019 incident, when Dr. Qiu and Dr. Cheng were implicated in a shipment of live Ebola and henipavirus on a commercial Air Canada flight. How the hell did that happen?

[Dominic LeBlanc, Liberal, Beauséjour, NB]

Mr. Angus, when I saw that reported publicly, I had a reaction similar to yours. Again, the Public Health Agency of Canada is the organization that can speak to those particular things, unless the director wants to.

I don't have any information. I had the same reaction as you, Mr. Angus.

[Charlie Angus, NDP, Timmins—James Bay, ON]

Can we hear from CSIS then?

[Dominic LeBlanc, Liberal, Beauséjour, NB]

Perhaps the director wants to respond.

[David Vigneault]

The minister is right. For the specific details, I think PHAC is better placed to answer.

What I would say at the more strategic level is that the approach of the thousand talents program, the approach of the economic espionage of the PRC, is to acquire material, know-how and data that will enable them to pursue their objectives. I testified last week to the fact that there's also a very well-integrated military-civilian fusion system.

[Charlie Angus, NDP, Timmins—James Bay, ON]

I get all that. What I don't get is.... Am I reading from this that they walked out with vials of Ebola and got on a plane?

When did the agency find out? Why were they not immediately arrested? How is it possible that you can get on a commercial plane with deadly viruses and carry them?

Number one, how do you get through? This is a level 4 laboratory. Was anyone fired?

Tell me what the investigation was. This is very concerning.

[Dominic LeBlanc, Liberal, Beauséjour, NB]

I certainly understand the tenor of Mr. Angus's question, but these questions are properly for the Public Health Agency of Canada. Neither the public safety department nor CSIS is dealing with these employees' actions.

[Charlie Angus, NDP, Timmins—James Bay, ON]

I would suggest that this is a question for CSIS. I don't know; maybe you don't watch sci-fi movies like I do. If you've ever watched 12 Monkeys, you'd know what happens to the world. You're thinking that's a crazy movie, but here I am reading down all the many things that went on. They walked out of a laboratory with live Ebola and it took another three years to fire them. They weren't charged.

How does a lab have level 4 accreditation if someone can pick up a vial of Ebola, stick it in their pocket, hop on a flight to China and give it to them?

I think all this blame on China right now is misdirected. The blame has to be that they walked out of a lab carrying very deadly viruses. If something had happened on that plane or they had wanted to do something with them, people would have been hurt.

Surely to God, CSIS investigated this. Isn't this a major threat?

[David Vigneault]

I think the question is absolutely legitimate. However, as I said, CSIS is not in the business of running the lab. That is why we went to them with our concerns about national security in 2018 and to share with them our expertise. This is our job. We share with them our expertise. Then they reacted by telling us about a number of issues.

I believe PHAC has testified, as the documents that have been shared with the committee demonstrate, about how those vials of ingredients were transported. There are international rules for this. The problem is the authorization. My understanding—and again, PHAC should speak to those details—is that it was not a security issue with those vials. It was an authorization issue, which speaks more to the potential espionage concerns.

[Charlie Angus, NDP, Timmins—James Bay, ON]

You spoke to them in 2018, because we know that in 2017, the Chinese national institute filed a patent for an inhibitor for the Ebola virus that included one of the doctors as a key contributor. Was she taking research that she had done in Winnipeg and being allowed to file a patent? She got the Governor General award for innovation the next year.

Again, I'm not the brightest guy on the planet, but my red flags are going off. We know that an employee came forward and raised serious questions about this in 2018. You said you went to the lab in 2018. Was it about these two or was it just a meeting about things in general?

[David Vigneault]

The documents I think provide a level of clarity about this. In my testimony last week and this week, I spoke to the fact that we went to the Public Health Agency and the lab to share with them our concern about an insider threat specifically about the type of environment they're in. It's at that point that they raised specific issues with those two individuals. We launched our investigation at that point.

In response to Mr. Naqvi, I mentioned that from that time until the moment we were able to provide very clear indicators of significant national security concerns, it was done in a fairly tight time frame.

[Charlie Angus, NDP, Timmins—James Bay, ON]

I get that. My time's running out.

I realize that you have to be fair with people. You can't just hold them up and jail them or whatever. However, when we go back to the fact that serious virus threats were removed and carried on commercial airliners, the fact that they were still able to go back to work the next day, once it was found out, to me is a massive breach of obligation.

How do we reassure our international partners and the Canadian public that we are going to protect them from the deadly viruses out there?

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

That's a question that perhaps we can get answered on Friday, because PHAC will be here. You're all invited back.

Let's go to our second round.

For five minutes or less, we have Dr. Ellis.

[Stephen Ellis, Conservative, Cumberland—Colchester, NS]

Thank you very much, Chair.

Thank you to the witnesses for being here.

Mr. Vigneault, you were here with us last week. I have some more questions around the talent and recruitment programs.

How can you reassure Canadians that no further PRC-based scientists are part of talent or recruitment programs working at government labs in Canada?

[David Vigneault]

One of the elements I've talked about is the work of this committee and the work that we've been doing with Public Safety, ISED and specifically CSIS to make sure that we talk about these issues. It's very important, because it's only through the knowledge of ourselves and other people that we'll be able to address the concerns expressed.

By definition, these approaches are covert. The PRC is trying to obfuscate their approach. The more we talk about it, the more the PRC is adapting their methods. I talked about the fact that this is a cat-and-mouse game. The better we are, the better they are changing, and they're obfuscating their approach.

The best way forward, to answer the question, would be to say that we can never rest on our laurels on this. I think it's a good thing that we were collectively able to identify these two people. My concern as the director of CSIS is that it's a relentless effort on the part of the PRC. They are using all methods to acquire technology know-how and data.

From that point of view, I'm not sure anyone can provide a level of one hundred per cent clarity on this, but from CSIS's point of view, in terms of transparency, we are absolutely focused on the issue of talent programs. That's why we've been talking, writing and publicizing about it and engaging directly with the organizations that are susceptible to being infiltrated by the talent programs.

[Stephen Ellis, Conservative, Cumberland—Colchester, NS]

Is it fair to say that you still have some ongoing investigations at the current time?