Canada-China Relations Committee on April 15th, 2024

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Is it acceptable that there was a three-and-a-half-month gap between PHAC knowing that these scientists were connected to the People's Liberation Army and finally having them removed from what is supposed to be Canada's highest security lab?

[Dominic LeBlanc, Liberal, Beauséjour, NB]

I take the legitimacy of that question, Mr. Cooper, but I would want to understand what information these officials at PHAC had at what particular time and what they knew of that relationship.

I take your question at face value, but I think one of the interesting and innovative things is that, by making a lot of this documentation available, Canadians have had a chance to see the sequence of events. However, I'm not comfortable speaking for the Public Health Agency's employment—

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Minister, would you at least concede that what happened at the Winnipeg lab constitutes a major national security breach and a major national security failure?

[Dominic LeBlanc, Liberal, Beauséjour, NB]

I think the whole government has acknowledged that within those two individuals lies an example of the kind of work that needs to be done.

In my briefings with the director and officials of the public safety department, I noted that in many respects—and the documentary evidence bears a lot of this out—the role that CSIS played with the Public Health Agency in many cases can be a best practice of how these things should—

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Minister, my time is limited.

Mark Holland testified that there were no scientists working in the Government of Canada's labs who were part of the Beijing thousand talents program. Can you confirm that?

[Dominic LeBlanc, Liberal, Beauséjour, NB]

I don't want to revisit what Mark Holland's testimony here—

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

He was unequivocal in his testimony, so I'm asking you. As Minister of Public Safety, can you confirm that?

[Dominic LeBlanc, Liberal, Beauséjour, NB]

What would you like me to confirm, Mr. Cooper?

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

That there are no scientists working in Government of Canada labs who are part of Beijing's thousand talents program.

[Dominic LeBlanc, Liberal, Beauséjour, NB]

I don't know those details, but perhaps the director can answer that question.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Before he does—and I would like to hear his answer—I'll expand the question to also seek confirmation or clarification as to whether there are any scientists employed by the Government of Canada who are in any way involved in PRC recruitment programs.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

You have about 30 seconds.

[David Vigneault]

CSIS has been working with PHAC on these issues for a few years now. If there were any individuals engaged in any way who represented national security issues, I would be working with PHAC to make sure they have the information to take the proper measures.

I cannot confirm the specifics of our investigation, but I understand the concern raised by Mr. Cooper. I share the concern about the threat this represents, and I can tell you that it will be—

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

On Beijing's thousand talents program—

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Mr. Cooper, I'm sorry, but you are out of time.

We'll go now to Mr. Naqvi for six minutes.

[Yasir Naqvi, Liberal, Ottawa Centre, ON]

Thank you very much, Chair.

Minister, welcome. Thank you very much.

I will start with the director of CSIS for my opening question.

I'll build on Mr. Cooper's line of questioning around the chronology of events that took place from the moment a patent was discovered. I believe this started around October 2018, and the two Canadian scientists were fired sometime in the middle of 2019.

Mr. Vigneault, looking at the chronology, your testimony when we last met was, “my expert colleagues have told me that...it was a fairly expeditious process.” Are you still of the opinion that the process followed during the investigation, the CSIS briefing and the steps that PHAC and the lab took were expeditious given the circumstances?

[David Vigneault]

Yes, I continue to hold the belief that it was a very expeditious process.

In August 2018, when we first engaged with PHAC to give them an insider threat briefing, they raised a concern with CSIS about the two scientists. That led us to share some information and some advice with PHAC.

They undertook their administrative review, and the results of that review were shared with CSIS. What you see in the chronology and in the documents that have been produced to the committee is that at the time of the first briefing to CSIS, we did not have a lot of information, but at the second briefing, we presented the results of our investigation. At that point, you could see that in this short period of time, we carried out a very extensive investigation that led PHAC to take quick administrative measures to protect the lab and Canadians.

[Yasir Naqvi, Liberal, Ottawa Centre, ON]

That's great. Thank you.

As we always learn, things can always be improved. I believe you were going to provide some written recommendations to this committee as to how that process could be improved.

Minister, I'll come to you. From your ministry's perspective, what lessons have been learned? What advice has been given to you on how we can improve the process when it comes to sensitive institutions like the national microbiology lab and ensure that these types of incidents do not happen again?

[Dominic LeBlanc, Liberal, Beauséjour, NB]

Mr. Naqvi, I think that question is a very important one in the sense that the Government of Canada and the security and intelligence apparatus for which we're responsible are very much focused on what lessons can be learned from this particular circumstance.

When the director, the deputy minister and I had a discussion about it last week, it struck me that if six years ago, CSIS decided to talk to governmental partners that run vulnerable institutions like the national microbiology lab—or pick your other particularly sensitive federal institution.... CSIS meets with them and gives them a threat assessment briefing or identifies potential threat vectors. The organization itself then looks at their particular personnel and particular circumstances and comes to the conclusion that there may be a vulnerability in a particular case. CSIS then works with that federal partner in detail to get the information necessary for them to make, in their judgment, the appropriate decisions. As I said, I believe there's an RCMP investigation with respect to this that's still ongoing.

In many ways, Mr. Naqvi, this is a good example of where federal security partners, like the RCMP, CSIS and border services—pick your particular security partner—should work with federal partners to help them understand this risk and help them manage what is necessary to ensure that the risk is contained or mitigated in the case that it turns out to be a real risk.

That's one of the reasons the director, my cabinet colleagues and I have been talking about potentially putting before Parliament amendments to the CSIS Act. One of the real limitations now is that when the director wants to talk to people outside the family of federal institutions, governmental institutions, he's very limited by law as to what he can say.

The threat doesn't only exist in federal institutions. It may be in provincial institutions or non-governmental research institutions. I think there's a conversation we can have about how we use some of the skill and experience at CSIS to share, in the appropriate way, with other vulnerable institutions, because we all have, I would hope, the same objective of limiting the risk to our nation's security from incidents like this particular one in Winnipeg.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

We have time for a short question and a short answer.

[Yasir Naqvi, Liberal, Ottawa Centre, ON]

You mentioned the modernization of the CSIS Act and the consultations you've been doing. Hopefully one of my colleagues will ask what you've heard in those conversations and what changes we can expect in potential legislation that would address this particular issue.

I think I'm out of time.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

We'll hopefully get to that answer in a subsequent question.

[Dominic LeBlanc, Liberal, Beauséjour, NB]

Nobody hopes more than I do, Mr. Chair.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

I'm cracking the whip because I want to make sure everybody gets their fair amount of time.

Mr. Villemure, it's good to have you back with us. You're up for six minutes.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I'd like to thank the witnesses for being here with us today.

Minister, you've been in the government for a long time now and you are, if I may put it that way, one of Mr. Trudeau's closest confidants.

I've been wondering when, in our relations with China, we became naive. Apart from what happened with the Winnipeg lab, we know that China has been active for a long time. It used to be called espionage rather than interference, perhaps. And yet for a long time, we had close relations with China and were definitely keen on developing partnerships. When specifically do you feel we were naive in this process?