Canada-China Relations Committee on April 19th, 2024

[Nadine Huggins]

The individuals attending the lab would have attended as temporary visitors under the policy at the time, which required them to be escorted if they were in the lab. They were granted access because they were not going to be in any part of the lab that was secure or required a clearance.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Thank you, Mr. Cooper.

Mr. Erskine-Smith, you have five minutes.

[Nathaniel Erskine-Smith, Liberal, Beaches—East York, ON]

Thanks, Mr. Chair.

I don't want to dwell on this, but I do want to ask one follow-up question in relation to that transfer at the end of March 2019.

There's a big difference between the RCMP escorting someone out and curtailing their authority while an investigation is ongoing. When someone is under investigation for serious allegations that have potential national security consequences, due process is justified, of course, but in the interest of our national security, surely we should be looking at curtailing individual authority.

When we look at lessons learned here to ensure this does not happen again, are you looking at the processes by which one might curtail someone's authority while an investigation is ongoing?

[Heather Jeffrey]

Our security processes and procedures have been enhanced across the board. We have in place additional policies around security clearances, around access controls and around the types of visitors and students who are able to access the lab, and those policies are much more stringent than they were at the time, which would provide—

[Nathaniel Erskine-Smith, Liberal, Beaches—East York, ON]

I apologize for cutting you off.

Knowing that, if the policies that you have now had been in place and these allegations had been made—an investigation is ongoing, you have the preliminary report from Presidia and the transfer happens at the end of March—would the transfer have happened, knowing what we knew as of the end of March?

[Heather Jeffrey]

All I can say is that it's a hypothetical question, Mr. Chair, because the collaboration—

[Nathaniel Erskine-Smith, Liberal, Beaches—East York, ON]

It's not, because we have the evidence as of that date in March, and we have new policies. We apply current policies to a fact pattern that is existing. It's not hypothetical; it's an existing fact pattern.

Would that transfer have occurred at the end of March 2019 if the current policies had been in place?

[Heather Jeffrey]

Under the current policies, there would have been two additional layers of review for that collaboration, which was in fact approved in November 2018, although the shipment took place later.

The collaboration was approved much earlier, in line with the policies at the time. The difference now is that it would be approved by two additional layers of review.

[Nathaniel Erskine-Smith, Liberal, Beaches—East York, ON]

If the answer isn't, “No, it wouldn't necessarily have stopped the transfer,” you might still want to revisit those policies, because the answer should be, “Of course it should have stopped that transfer.”

There is a second avenue of questions I want to get to.

Presidia was contracted in December 2018. It made its first report in March 2019 and made a second report in February 2020. It effectively found nothing of value in comparison with what CSIS found out.

CSIS made a preliminary assessment in April 2020; mere months later, in June 2020, it blew the whole thing open, and that's why Dr. Qiu was ultimately marched out of the lab.

Why did CSIS not get involved earlier?

[Heather Jeffrey]

CSIS was involved from the outset. Indeed, it was an awareness session with CSIS that led the security branch to begin its investigation, working with the lab to see if we had vulnerabilities of the nature CSIS described.

Obviously, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service has tools and methods available to it under its act that afford it greater insight into covert and clandestine activities. CSIS has appeared before this committee previously.

The Public Health Agency could act only on the information provided to us. The investigation the service conducted was disclosed to us on June 30, 2020, and we took action at that time.

What I would say is that individuals—

[Nathaniel Erskine-Smith, Liberal, Beaches—East York, ON]

Given the different outcomes of the Presidia analysis and investigation and the CSIS analysis and investigation, and knowing what we know today, do you think PHAC ought to have had CSIS undertake more detailed assessments earlier in the process?

[Heather Jeffrey]

The Canadian Security Intelligence Service was involved and informed of the activities that were under way from the outset of the cases that are under way. As disclosed in the documents, they were engaged and aware, and we were working together as of August and September 2018, so—

[Nathaniel Erskine-Smith, Liberal, Beaches—East York, ON]

Give a simple yes or no. Do you see a material difference in the quality of the investigations between Presidia and CSIS?

[Heather Jeffrey]

Yes, of course. Canadian Security Intelligence Service members have tools available to them under the act that only they have. They were involved in the fact-finding and the investigation all the way along. It wasn't until the later stages of that investigation that they were able to obtain the information that informed that June 30 letter.

For example, under a letter of April 9, they had not yet found the information that was available to them later. That letter suggested that there still was no reason to suggest that the scientists had willingly co-operated or that they were vulnerable. Clearly, in the intervening time between April 9 and June 30, their investigations and their tools uncovered information that radically changed that assessment, and we acted immediately upon receiving that information.

This was a case in which people took steps to hide their activities, and the national security and law enforcement investigations were deploying all their tools throughout to try to uncover additional evidence. They eventually did so on June 30.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Thank you, Mr. Erskine-Smith.

[Nathaniel Erskine-Smith, Liberal, Beaches—East York, ON]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Just to recap where we are, because you missed a couple of rounds, Mr. Villemure, you're getting the next five minutes. We'll then go to Dr. Ellis and Mr. Fragiskatos, and then there will be two and a half minutes for Mr. Villemure and two and a half minutes for Ms. Idlout. I think that will just about wrap up the session.

Mr. Villemure, it's good to have you back with us. Five minutes go to you, sir.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank my colleagues for their understanding.

Ms. Jeffrey, in listening to your answers, we get the impression that everything is going well. You say that policies were put in place, and that it was not a problem.

Policies protect people of good faith. So we have to know what to do with other people.

Were any individuals held accountable? I'm asking you to be specific. Were there any consequences for certain people who were directly responsible for all the mistakes or incompetence identified?

[Heather Jeffrey]

The individuals who hid their activities and undertook clandestine collaborations have been terminated, fired from the public service and the like. The—

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

I'm sorry to interrupt, but that's not who I'm talking about. I'm talking about people at the agency who didn't see anything when they should have seen something.

Were any individuals, other than the two scientists, held accountable for this whole mess?

[Heather Jeffrey]

I can say that it was the Public Health Agency that first raised issues about potential activity that was under way that launched the investigation.

The Canadian Security Intelligence Service has already stated that we acted as expeditiously as we could, given the information that was available. We found allegations. We followed them up with an administrative investigation. We sought the evidence, working with our security intelligence partners, and we fired the scientists involved.

The processes and policies that we put in place are designed to have further layers of security and process that will allow us to detect efforts to disguise collaborations, affiliations and other motivations as quickly as possible in the future.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Ms. Jeffrey, was there incompetence in the management of the agency?

[Heather Jeffrey]

In this case, the leadership of the agency and the lab took steps as quickly as they could to respond to the information. They detected and raised the allegations, and measures were put in place accordingly.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Was there incompetence at the agency?

[Heather Jeffrey]

In this case, we are talking about scientists who, despite clearances and work that was widely recognized as leading science globally, hid their activities—