Evidence of meeting #4 for Canada-China Relations in the 44th Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was china.
A video is available from Parliament.
NDP
Jenny Kwan NDP Vancouver East, BC
Thank you.
Given that China has launched, on multiple occasions now, ballistic missiles over Taiwan, and there are many Taiwanese Canadians who are very concerned about the state of play, I wonder if the professor has any comments on how Canada should be communicating its concerns on this with China. How can we show our support to Taiwan and Taiwanese Canadians who, rightfully, are very concerned about the situation?
Assistant Professor, Department of Political Studies, Queen’s University, As an Individual
I will say that they very much share the notion shared by a member of the previous panel, that sometimes doing the same.... Carrying on with what we've been doing is probably better than missteps, or finding new ways to act that might lead to avoiding the vicious-circle scenario that we want to avoid.
I think there is no solution to the Taiwan issue outside of diplomatic channels when it comes to Canada, in particular. We need to reinforce these kinds of solutions or a best course of action.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Ken Hardie
Dr. Martel, you've done double duty in this last segment of the last panel. You've handled a lot of questions extremely well, and we value your attendance here tonight.
With that, we have a vote coming up in about five minutes. We will pause and then come back after the vote to continue with panel three.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Ken Hardie
We'll call our meeting back to order for our third round.
Thank you, all, for doing your democratic parliamentary duties. Welcome back to our third hour.
I'd like to welcome our witnesses for the third hour today: as an individual, Dr. Thomas Juneau, associate professor, graduate school of public and international affairs, University of Ottawa; as an individual, Vincent Rigby, visiting professor, Max Bell school of public policy, McGill University; and from the Macdonald-Laurier Institute, Jonathan Berkshire Miller, senior fellow and director, Indo-Pacific program.
We'll ask each of our guests to provide us with a five-minute comment, then we will go into one round of five minutes each, for each of the parties represented here.
We'll start with you, Dr. Juneau, for five minutes or less.
Dr. Thomas Juneau Associate Professor, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa, As an Individual
Thank you for the opportunity to talk to you today.
Vincent and I will talk about the key findings and recommendations in a report we published with the University of Ottawa's graduate school of public and international affairs in May this year. The report was co-authored by Vincent and me with the support of a task force of a dozen senior retired officials, including deputy ministers of foreign affairs and defence, four former national security advisers, two former directors of CSIS, former ambassadors and others. The report is available online and I'm happy to pass it on to the committee in electronic form.
The report deals with the deterioration of Canada's threat environment and, overall, makes 65 recommendations on what we can do. Many of those recommendations are relevant to the committee's work on China.
The starting point of the report is one that will be familiar to everybody here, which is this: Canada faces a growing range of threats from great power competition, including, of course, the rise of an increasingly aggressive China, terrorism and extremism—both domestic and international—and a range of transnational issues, including climate change, pandemics and so on. The report's core message is that we are not ready, collectively, to address the growing range of threats Canada faces today.
Successive governments in Canada, in our view, have tended to neglect national security issues. To a large extent, we did that because we could. We are blessed by geography in this country; we are sheltered in North America, and we are under American protection. However, our main point in the report is that this luxury is eroding. As these threats intensify, our fear—and this is based on the collective wisdom, in our task force, of quite literally hundreds of years of experience at the highest levels of government—is that we will pay an increasingly high price, because we are not ready to address them. To be clear, China is not the only threat we discuss in the report, but it is, of course, a major and central one.
The committee is well aware of this aspect, so I will go on very quickly. China poses a threat to Canadian interests through cyber-attacks, economic espionage, foreign interference, growing military assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific and so on.
The value add of the report is in this next question: What can we do? Of the 65 recommendations we make in the report, quite a high number are directly or indirectly relevant to China. I'll mention only a couple of broad ones, then Vincent will take over with a few more specific ones.
The first I want to mention is a general one, in terms of our response: the need for a whole-of-society response to the range of threats China poses. The intelligence community cannot respond on its own to most of the challenges I just mentioned. Of course, it has a central role to play, but it needs to work with other partners in the federal government—economic departments and so on—and with provincial and municipal governments, the private sector—think about economic espionage—and civil society—think about, in particular, foreign interference with the Chinese-Canadian diaspora. We need to do a much better job in this country, at this level, with the federal government's ability and willingness to lead, coordinate and share intelligence on threats and advise on how to deal with these threats.
Within the federal government, sometimes, obstacles to information-sharing among national security agencies impede our ability to respond. It's even more of a problem, beyond the national security community, among the rest of the government—economic departments like ISED and so on—and when you look beyond Ottawa at other levels of government, the private sector and civil society. However, these other actors all have an important role to play in dealing with that range of threats.
The second recommendation I want to mention is on transparency. Our first line of defence against many of the threats posed by China—and others, for that matter—is not always CSIS, the RCMP or CBSA. In many cases, it is. In other cases, it's societal resilience—for example, against economic espionage or foreign interference. The target of these threats is not, in most cases, the federal government itself. A lot of factors go into building societal resilience. We could have an entirely different discussion on that, but one is trust in government, which is a challenge in democracies today, including, but not only, in Canada. There's no magic recipe to build societal resilience, but greater transparency has to be at the centre of that.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Ken Hardie
Dr. Juneau, you've hit the five-minute mark. You'll now be eating into Mr. Rigby's five minutes if you continue.
Associate Professor, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa, As an Individual
In 20 seconds, we need to define transparency more broadly as engagement, sharing information and sharing insight on threats to Canadian civil society and the private sector in general.
I'll stop right there.
Vincent Rigby Visiting Professor, Max Bell School of Public Policy, McGill University, As an Individual
So I still have five minutes—
Visiting Professor, Max Bell School of Public Policy, McGill University, As an Individual
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair, and thank you for the invitation to be here tonight. It's a great pleasure and an honour.
During a 30-year career in the public service, I have appeared many times before parliamentary committees as a government official. This is my first appearance, as the chair said, as a private citizen. I must say that I feel slightly less stressed than I did when I was a government official, but I guess we'll see how the next hour goes. Maybe we'll have a different conversation at the end.
In one of my last acts before I retired last year as the national security and intelligence adviser to the Prime Minister, I gave a speech to the Centre for International Governance Innovation, CIGI. It was one of the rare occasions when an NSIA has spoken out publicly on national security issues.
The theme of my speech was Canada's response to a changing global environment. I argued that the world was at an inflection point. It was experiencing seismic political and economic shifts and facing a complex array of new and old national security challenges.
At the centre of this change was heightened geopolitical competition. This competition was reflected in a tilt of the international balance of power towards the Indo-Pacific region, and the defining element of this multipolar transformation was, of course, the rise of China.
I identified Beijing's political, economic, military and technological emergence as one of the key international developments of this century. I suggested that China would continue to be a significant international force in the years to come and that China would become much more assertive in its region and beyond.
It expanded its power and influence, including through the belt and road initiative. It also attempted to directly undermine states it perceived as competitors, often—as we know all too well in Canada—within their own borders. China leveraged a well-integrated economic, military and diplomatic tool kit, as well as human and cyber-enabled espionage, to achieve its objectives.
Based on this analysis at that time—and this would have been June 2021—I concluded that the People's Republic of China represented a key strategic threat to the west and to Canada. It's a year and a half later, and I see no reason to change my assessment. Indeed, the Ottawa U report, which I co-authored with Thomas, put an exclamation point on my views.
China remains assertive on the global stage, as we have seen with its threatening behaviour towards Taiwan, its suppression of democracy in Hong Kong and its continued treatment of its Uighur minority. Its activities in Canada continue. The latest CSIS annual report identifies China's activities in such areas as foreign interference, espionage and cyber-threats.
The Deputy Prime Minister's speech at Brookings last week identified China as one of the world's dictators that are guided by entirely different principles from our own. She placed emphasis on economic security, saying that China was adept and intentional in using its economic ties with us as leverage to achieve its geopolitical objectives.
Collectively, these types of activities undermine our democratic institutions, our fundamental rights and freedoms, our social cohesion and our long-term prosperity.
If we agree that such a threat looms, how should Canada respond? Building on the Ottawa U report and Thomas's earlier comments, let me make a few quick suggestions before we go to any questions.
First, we need a new national security strategy that brings together all the government's assets, from intelligence to defence to diplomacy and international development, in an integrated and coherent way to counter the national security threats of the 21st century, including state actors. We have not had such a strategy since 2004—almost 20 years. We stand out among our Five Eyes allies in this regard. They regularly publish such documents, and I'm sure all of you know that the United States published its national security strategy last week.
Second, as part of that strategy, we need a specific integrated plan to counter the activities of hostile state actors. This would include China, but also Russia, Iran and others. This includes identifying specific measures and tools to counter espionage, foreign interference, disinformation and cyber- and economic threats.
Third, we need a home and an away game. National security covers both domestic and international dimensions. In this context, I look forward to the expected Indo-Pacific strategy that will be coming out soon, we hope, and which should bring our foreign policy, defence and development tools together to tackle threats in the region. It should focus on China in the region, in my view.
Finally, we need to work with partners. At home, as Thomas just pointed out—and to re-emphasize the point, because I think it's a really important one—this means other levels of government, the private sector, universities and research institutions, which are under threat from foreign actors like never before. It's not just state to state anymore; individual Canadians can be impacted.
Sharing information with Canadians in a transparent fashion will be critical in making this happen and, of course, internationally this means our close friends and allies, including in the Five Eyes and the G7. China likes nothing more than to divide and conquer. We need to stay together.
Mr. Chairman, we live in a complex and dynamic world in which, as the Deputy Prime Minister said in her recent speech, we have to find ways to coexist with competitors who do not share our values. This includes China, where we can potentially find common ground on issues like climate change and the management of pandemics, but we must do so with eyes wide open, clearly recognizing their strategic intent, and be ready to respond both at home and abroad to threats to our interests and values.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Ken Hardie
Thank you, Mr. Rigby. That is your five minutes.
Mr. Miller, you have five minutes.
Jonathan Berkshire Miller Director and Senior Fellow, Indo-Pacific Program, Macdonald-Laurier Institute
Thank you, Chair and members of the committee, for the invitation to speak before you today on such a critical topic to Canadian interests.
I'll be frank. Time is not on our side—obviously, not just the five minutes, but on this topic itself.
Increasingly, the international rules-based order appears to be hanging by a thread. Large nuclear-weapon states such as Russia and China continue to coerce neighbours—albeit in different manners—to achieve their maximalist interests. Meanwhile, smaller countries like North Korea pursue weapons advancement aimed at holding regional countries like Japan and South Korea vulnerable to nuclear blackmail, often with tacit support and backing from Beijing.
Chair, for too long Canada has been approaching its foreign policy toward China in tactical rather than strategic terms, thinking only of short-term goals rather than long-term challenges. Unfortunately, it took the unjust detention of two Canadian citizens, Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor, for nearly three years for Canadians to awaken to the real challenges in dealing with an increasingly authoritarian actor in Beijing.
In this context, it is overdue for Canada to frame a serious, clear and coherent strategy towards China that is situated within the context of a greater Indo-Pacific strategy, as my colleagues mentioned.
In terms of what that might look like, Canada must first finalize and implement an independent and interest-based strategy for the Indo-Pacific that engages its regional partners. Countries like Japan, Australia, India and South Korea are all important in one way or another, as is working with Taiwan. Canada should also look to complement its engagement with a renewed vigour and focus on robust and comprehensive relationships in Southeast Asia with countries like Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam. If we strengthen trade ties, increase security co-operation and improve our diplomatic linkages, we can meaningfully offset some of the challenges posed by China's increasing challenge to the rules-based order.
Moreover, multilateral organizations and trade agreements, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the CPTPP, alongside other ad hoc mini lateral alignments, all provide potential anchors for a renewed approach to this region.
Let me be clear: The Indo-Pacific strategy that's being developed should not ignore or dilute the challenges of China, nor be monopolized by or fixated on Beijing. A real clear-eyed approach to Beijing and the risks it poses, both to our neighbours and to the rules-based order more broadly, must be a foundational element to any strategy in the region.
Toward China itself, Canada must be far stronger and clearer on issues of human rights. This includes clearly and consistently calling out China's egregious behaviour against Uighurs in Xinjiang, Tibetans and other religious minorities, as well as condemning China's clear and escalating violations of the Sino-British joint declaration over Hong Kong. In each case, we should avail ourselves of our ability to apply Magnitsky sanctions against known human rights abusers. We should explore paths for greater refuge and resettlement for individuals at risk of political imprisonment.
However, we must consider other challenges as well. China's desire to dominate the critical materials and raw materials supply chain, for example, is a long-term challenge with serious national security implications that Canada must address in tandem with its partners in the region.
Meanwhile, heated tensions and provocative acts that threaten the stability of Taiwan are simply the latest in a sustained list of concerns with Beijing's increasing military posture in the region. Indeed, stability in the Taiwan Strait is directly connected with China's other assertive moves in the maritime domain.
The Indo-Pacific, frankly, is facing a host of shared security challenges, from maritime piracy and crime to heated territorial disputes. In this vast maritime space, stretching from East Africa to the Pacific island chains, the foundations of regional commerce and security are secured through freedom of navigation and secure sea lines of communication, yet there are several key challenges to this order and China is posing these challenges.
In the South China Sea, for example, Beijing continues to practise salami-slicing tactics aimed at ensuring its de facto control of much of this key waterway. Meanwhile, Beijing also continues to raise regional concerns through its constant insurgence into the maritime airspace surrounding Japan's Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea.
Finally, Canada needs to diversify its trade away from China and towards partners in the region, understanding the risks of overreliance on the Chinese economy. This should include the creation of a dedicated mechanism amongst democracies to support one another when countries like China use economic coercion to achieve their ends. Such action would send a strong message that targeting trade for political purposes—as China did with Canada's canola, cattle and pork exports—will be unsuccessful.
Most importantly, and in conclusion, our relationship with China must be contextualized in the broader Indo-Pacific region. We should consider bilateral ties with Beijing no longer as an exceptional relationship, but rather as simply one important relationship among many in a diverse region. Canada must urgently rebalance its relationship with China and ensure that it advances its interests, both in national security terms and, importantly, in tandem with its partners.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Ken Hardie
Thank you, Mr. Miller.
We'll now go to one five-minute section for each party. I believe we'll look to Mr. Chong for the Conservatives.
Conservative
Michael Chong Conservative Wellington—Halton Hills, ON
Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to our witnesses for appearing.
I was struck by your opening remarks about the need to work more closely with allies and partners, not just in the Indo-Pacific region, but around the world. I was surprised, as I think many people were, about the July 7 press conference. It was a joint press conference—unprecedented, I think—between the head of the FBI, Director Christopher Wray, and the head of MI5 at the MI5 headquarters, Thames House, in London this past summer. Christopher Wray and Ken McCallum, the director general of MI5, gave an unprecedented press conference, saying that China presented the biggest threat, not just to the United Kingdom and not just to the United States, but to allies in Europe and elsewhere.
They also indicated that the government in Beijing had definitely interfered in the congressional elections in New York state this year. I think many Canadians have concluded that Beijing interfered in the last federal election as well. Therefore, your comments ring true.
My first question is a very simple one. Have you had any indication that the PCO, other central agencies or the departments responsible are looking at a new national security strategy for Canada, since we haven't had one since 2004? Is there any indication that the government is seized with this idea of coming forward with a new national security strategy to parallel the Indo-Pacific strategy?
Visiting Professor, Max Bell School of Public Policy, McGill University, As an Individual
I'm not aware, sir.
Director and Senior Fellow, Indo-Pacific Program, Macdonald-Laurier Institute
I'm not aware either.
Conservative
Michael Chong Conservative Wellington—Halton Hills, ON
Okay. Thank you for that.
The other question I have relates to the Indo-Pacific strategy that is to be released before Christmas this year. My question is for each of you. What do you think is or are the essential thing or things that must be included in any credible Indo-Pacific strategy? When that document gets released, what will you be going through it looking for this December?
Director and Senior Fellow, Indo-Pacific Program, Macdonald-Laurier Institute
If I may, I'll answer that quickly first.
I think we need a balance. For too long, the way Canada has approached this region has been overly focused on economics and investment. We need to realize—and I think my colleagues also highlighted this through their statements—the severe security challenges we're facing in this region, whether it be in the South China Sea or whether it be in the Korean peninsula.
We need to have that empathy with our partners. We can't just base a strategy purely on what we want. Of course, it needs to be premised on our interests, but it needs to take into account the empathy of our partners and what sort of engagement they want from Canada.
That's very much what I'm going to be looking for.
Visiting Professor, Max Bell School of Public Policy, McGill University, As an Individual
I agree very much with what Jonathan said. I hope it addresses the security issue head on. Whether you like it or not, China is the 800-pound gorilla in the room, so it should not be focused exclusively on China. There was a conscious decision made to not focus it exclusively on China, and I think that's the right decision at the end of the day. It should be broadly regional, but China is there, and it cannot be ignored, so security has to be front and centre, I think.
At the same time, any strategy needs to be fully integrated. I use this word a lot for any strategy that we do, whether it's national security in the Indo-Pacific or a broader foreign policy strategy. It has to include defence. It has to include diplomacy, development, economic—
Conservative
Michael Chong Conservative Wellington—Halton Hills, ON
We know there's a defence review going on right now, as we speak. Presumably, there's coordination between the Indo-Pacific strategy that's being worked on and the defence—
Visiting Professor, Max Bell School of Public Policy, McGill University, As an Individual
This is where it will get interesting, because the defence update, I think, was called not long after Russia invaded Ukraine and might have had a European focus, but I hope it has a global focus. I hope it has a domestic focus as well, because there's a lot happening in our own neighbourhood, so it definitely needs to be fully integrated.
The last thing I'll say is that it has to be sustainable. One of the criticisms that Canada has had in the Asia-Pacific or Indo-Pacific region is that we pop in and out, especially on the security side. We're there for a little while, then we come out. I heard this 15 years ago when I was at the Department of National Defence: “Don't just send a ship once in a while; you need to really get in there and get your hands dirty.” So I hope it comes with resources and we can sustain it.
Associate Professor, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa, As an Individual
I will just add to that. Based on the public reports we've seen on what might be coming with the Indo-Pacific strategy, the focus is a lot on diplomacy and trade, and a bit on defence. That's all important, but I will be looking at the elements of intelligence and national security, which are very rarely in the public discussion in this country, but should be as part of what our interests are in the Indo-Pacific. Part of it is the threats we discussed.
What's in it for CSIS, the RCMP and CSE? What's their role? Are there additional resources for them? They're overstretched in many ways to address some of these threats. I can't say I'm very optimistic that they will be addressed.