Evidence of meeting #4 for Canada-China Relations in the 44th Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was china.
A video is available from Parliament.
7:50 p.m.
Liberal
Serge Cormier Liberal Acadie—Bathurst, NB
Okay. I'll ask my question another way.
In this case, in terms of security, we could talk about foreign investment from China. To give you a very simple example a lot of fish processing plants in my area have been acquired, at least in part, by foreign investment, including investment from China, probably.
For the security of the country, should we in our regions be concerned about these takeovers by foreign investment like China?
7:50 p.m.
Assistant Professor, Department of Political Studies, Queen’s University, As an Individual
I think any doubts, challenges or vulnerabilities that we're able to identify should be a cause of concern to some extent. Having said that, I think the presence of foreign investment and Chinese business and economic interests in the country is simply a reflection of an interdependent global economy.
This makes the arguments for a possible decoupling from China seem unrealistic to me, or even desirable. I think this interdependence between China and global economic dynamics also mitigates the risks of confrontation and conflict.
The way in which China is involved with the dynamics of economic interdependence therefore opens the door to a certain positive reinforcement, which can be used to convince China to adopt more favourable behaviours, since it benefits greatly from the current international order. China is well aware of this.
7:50 p.m.
Liberal
Serge Cormier Liberal Acadie—Bathurst, NB
You spoke earlier about the centralization of power in China. You also said that, from the outside, there may be dissent with the Chinese regime. Can you tell us more about that?
7:55 p.m.
Assistant Professor, Department of Political Studies, Queen’s University, As an Individual
I think an expert on Chinese domestic policy, which I am not, could tell you more about this.
However, we can see that the Xi Jinping's rise and strengthening of power in China is quite consensual; there's a real centralization of power around this figure.
That said, I think there's a tendency to exaggerate this centralization of power by drawing an analogy between Xi Jinping and Mao. I also think it's important to be aware that these dynamics that we're seeing in China are also a response to a number of vulnerabilities in the country.
This underscores the importance of developing, supporting and fostering expertise in Canada on Chinese domestic affairs, which must be leveraged to truly understand what's happening in China. This would have a direct impact on China's position on the international stage.
7:55 p.m.
Liberal
Serge Cormier Liberal Acadie—Bathurst, NB
I think you also talked about Arctic security earlier. Did I understand correctly?
7:55 p.m.
Assistant Professor, Department of Political Studies, Queen’s University, As an Individual
Yes, I talked about the Arctic.
In fact, there is a lot of concern and speculation about a possible increase in China's presence in the Arctic, and again we tend to look for hidden motives or agendas. I was talking about the unknown unknowns earlier. In this case, there are fears of a growing Chinese presence in the Arctic. These fears are legitimate, since it's difficult to see where China wants to go with this in the Arctic.
That said, on paper, China is quite clear about its intentions in the Arctic. It obviously has a vested interest in developing its access to strategic resources in the Arctic and pushing for a definition of passages in that region that would allow it freer access to international waters.
I think it's healthy and constructive to look at what China is promoting. It isn't hiding its intentions. It's obvious that China is an actor that has interests and is promoting them on the international stage. However, I think the analogy that China has similar motivations in the Arctic to what it's doing in the South China Sea doesn't hold water. In fact, China isn't going to claim sovereignty over territories in the Arctic any time soon.
It has enough interests that may conflict with our national interest. If that's the case, then obviously Canada has to respond. None of this is—
7:55 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Ken Hardie
Dr. Martel, I'm sorry. I have to intervene. We've used up the time for Mr. Cormier.
7:55 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Ken Hardie
Now Madame Normandin has six minutes, and perhaps she'll ask you to continue.
7:55 p.m.
Bloc
Christine Normandin Bloc Saint-Jean, QC
Thank you for your remarks.
Actually, I had intended to follow up on the comments of Ms. Dancho and Mr. Cormier, and come back to the malicious intentions that are too often attributed to China. Your comment about that piqued my curiosity.
Can you give us some examples of times when malicious intent has been wrongly attributed to China?
7:55 p.m.
Assistant Professor, Department of Political Studies, Queen’s University, As an Individual
I'll answer your question indirectly by using the example of the conflict in the South China Sea. Much has been made of the fact that China responded to a decision by an arbitration tribunal in the South China Sea by saying that it wasn't going to comply with international law, or at least with the view of international law held by a tribunal it considered illegitimate.
Between this extremely strong rhetorical response by Chinese government officials and what happened on the ground, it was observed that China gradually abandoned the idea of presenting its claims in a manner considered to violate international law.
In fact, through the “nine‑dash line” concept, China stopped presenting its claims in a manner that the arbitration tribunal considered to be outside the bounds prescribed by international law. Instead, it has since attempted to align its official international position increasingly with that of international maritime law, at least within the limits of its interpretation of the rules of that law.
So there is one example where China's position on compliance with international maritime law has been much more ambiguous or nuanced than we expected.
8 p.m.
Bloc
Christine Normandin Bloc Saint-Jean, QC
Thank you for your response.
This committee stopped meeting before the release of Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor. I'd like to know if you've seen any change—positive or negative—in relations between the two countries since that bomb was defused. Could you also explain that a little bit?
8 p.m.
Assistant Professor, Department of Political Studies, Queen’s University, As an Individual
I haven't seen a fundamental change, no. I just see that we've come out of a period of crisis. Perhaps this is an opportunity to reopen channels of communication that were closed during the crisis and to re-establish a bit more of a constructive and productive basis on which to find interests that are perhaps more compatible than originally thought in some areas of global governance.
That said, there hasn't been much change in the public debate across the country, or in the way China engages in a kind of rhetoric war with countries that it associates with a liberal western view of the international order. If opinion polls are any indication, Canadians' perceptions of China haven't changed either.
So I don't see a fundamental change other than an exit from the crisis. Perhaps we can hope that relations between the two countries will be restored on a slightly less toxic basis than they were before.
8 p.m.
Bloc
Christine Normandin Bloc Saint-Jean, QC
Thank you very much.
Global Affairs Canada has announced that the China issue will be somewhat integrated into its Indo-Pacific strategy. Is that a good idea, or should there be a completely separate strategy for China?
8 p.m.
Assistant Professor, Department of Political Studies, Queen’s University, As an Individual
There is a case for looking at our relationship with China separately.
That said, it's essential that our strategy toward China be aligned with a more comprehensive and coherent approach to the Indo-Pacific region, as the two must go hand in hand to avoid any risk of contradiction in our engagement in the region. China's position is also central to the negotiations on a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific region. So these two must absolutely go together, be coherent, and be aligned with each other.
8 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Ken Hardie
Thank you, Dr. Martel.
We'll now go to Ms. Kwan for six minutes or less.
8 p.m.
NDP
Jenny Kwan NDP Vancouver East, BC
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair, and thank you for the comments, Dr. Martel. My question to you kind of builds on this notion.
Your opening comments seem to indicate that perhaps China's intentions are misread in a variety of circumstances. Given what's happened in Hong Kong and given the situation we can see, the deterioration of what's going on in Hong Kong, the violence, the abuse and the arrest of civilians in that context and, of course, the imposition of the national security law and the application of it even extending here to veteran Canadian journalist Victor Ho, I wonder if you can share with our committee how we should interpret those actions.
8:05 p.m.
Assistant Professor, Department of Political Studies, Queen’s University, As an Individual
Obviously, when it comes to what China considers its core interests, clearly our preferences are going to clash with those of China. Our value system is going to clash with that of China. I don't think we should shy away from pointing that out when that is the case.
What I want to stress is that just because China's and Canada's and western democracy's interests and values clash on a number of key issues doesn't mean they clash everywhere. That would be the nuance that I would put to the committee.
We need to disaggregate areas where there are clearly conflicting preferences and interests that need to be put forward and discussed and may even warrant some condemnation. This doesn't mean that in other domains of global governance, such as climate change, we cannot find areas where we can align in terms of interests with China.
I think it's important for us to be able to have flexibility in our approach to China in this regard.
8:05 p.m.
NDP
Jenny Kwan NDP Vancouver East, BC
Thank you. That's interesting.
Should we have flexibility in our approach to the principle of democracy in China's approach to Hong Kong, which they actually promised, not just to Hong Kongers but to the international community, really? They promised a “one country, two systems” rule, which they really dismantled very quickly.
How should we entertain the principles of human rights and democracy in this regard? How should we advance that with China when we conflict in our points of view on that?
8:05 p.m.
Assistant Professor, Department of Political Studies, Queen’s University, As an Individual
China has proven over the years that it is impacted by naming and shaming on the international stage. Where I see room for flexibility is that, for this naming and shaming to be effective in terms of the end goal that we want, for human rights to be respected, for people not be subjected to tactics and behaviours that we see as condemnable, there needs to also be room for diplomatic channels to push for our preferred courses of action.
This is where I see flexibility. Naming and shaming, if the end goal is for us to feel better about ourselves as Canadians, only gets us so far. The end game that we want, really, is for China to align its behaviour in ways that are closer to what we would like to see.
There is room for flexibility in terms of pushing different channels, using name and shaming tactics for sure, which China responds to even if it says otherwise, but also using back channels as well.
8:05 p.m.
NDP
Jenny Kwan NDP Vancouver East, BC
When you say “naming and shaming”, there's of course the element of the inconvenient truth. On the issue around Uighurs and the genocide that's going on, China vehemently rejects the notion of human rights abuse of Uighurs. It says very clearly that it is simply untrue.
In the face of that, how should we approach dealing with that issue, trying to address it and ensuring that Canada is doing something to support Uighurs who are faced with these violent human rights abuses?
8:10 p.m.
Liberal
8:10 p.m.
Assistant Professor, Department of Political Studies, Queen’s University, As an Individual
It's going to be very difficult for Canada alone to do anything of consequence, so it's really about building our relationships with like-minded partners to be able to push China, and to present evidence that China is engaging in behaviours that are condemnable and need to be condemned.
8:10 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Ken Hardie
We're now into our second round. The bells are ringing, but we should get through the second round as long as everybody keeps as close to time as possible.
With that, we'll go to Mr. Kmiec for five minutes.
October 18th, 2022 / 8:10 p.m.
Conservative
Tom Kmiec Conservative Calgary Shepard, AB
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Prof. Martel, my NDP colleague asked a good question: how should we interpret the actions and attitude of the government in Beijing toward Hong Kong?
We saw that the Sino-British Joint Declaration was flouted by the Beijing government. Then we saw the violations of human rights and democratic rights of the people of Hong Kong. This isn't just theory. Our relationship with Hong Kong has lasted for decades. More than 300,000 Canadian citizens and their families live in Hong Kong, so we have very close ties, and it's in our national interest to make sure that our citizens are treated well when they're in other countries.
I'll repeat my NDP colleague's question: how should we interpret the actions of the communist government in Beijing when it violates the human, civil and democratic rights of our own citizens and then does the same thing by sending its intelligence officers to our country to continue the intimidation of these same people?