Canada-China Relations Committee on Nov. 15th, 2022

[Jonathan Berkshire Miller]

Well, with regard specifically to the issue of the detention of the two Michaels, I couldn't give you a firm answer. There were a lot of different moving parts. There were different administrations in the United States that spanned over it. This was a judicial decision as well.

I think there were a number of different angles, but I do think the core point that the United States principally hasn't thought of Canada as the most favoured partner in the Indo-Pacific is definitely a fair assessment.

[Raquel Dancho, Conservative, Kildonan—St. Paul, MB]

Can you comment at all on what we should be focusing on? Canada, as we know, is a smaller country compared to the U.S. or China, but I do think there are things that we could be doing, particularly in the Arctic. Can you comment at all?

If we're going to do anything, I think we need to show some strength. It seems like the Arctic would be a natural place to start, given that China is now saying that it's a near-Arctic state, so to speak. It obviously wants to play a role in what happens in the Arctic.

Do you agree? Where should we begin in this regard?

[Jonathan Berkshire Miller]

I do think the Arctic is a key area. I also think the North Pacific is. Look at Operation Neon. We've been engaged in it for several years to ensure that North Korea isn't able to circumvent sanctions. I think this is another tangible example of the Canadian military playing a role. We need to start finding more of these niches. We do have good capabilities, and these are some examples.

[Raquel Dancho, Conservative, Kildonan—St. Paul, MB]

I believe the last time you were here, you mentioned Canada's Indo-Pacific strategy. We don't have the concrete one yet. What has been written so far has been, to quote you, “overly focused on economics and investment” and needs to “realize the severe security challenges...in this region”.

With some of my remaining time, can you elaborate on that? Do you feel the signals we're getting from the forthcoming Indo-Pacific strategy from Minister Joly will meet the needs you outlined the last time you were at this committee?

[Jonathan Berkshire Miller]

Again, I'm a big fan of the CPTPP. It's great for our businesses and it's a great way to engage with our key partners, but the reality is that it should be just one piece. We can't go to Japan, South Korea, Philippines and Viet Nam to have discussions just on trade. They're all facing significant security concerns across the board.

I do hope that the Indo-Pacific strategy addresses this. I have seen some nuggets of goodness so far in what I've seen on this. The reality is that we have to make sure that this is a long-term commitment. This cannot be a box-ticker, a one-year or two-year effort. This needs to be for the long term.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Thank you, Director Miller.

[Raquel Dancho, Conservative, Kildonan—St. Paul, MB]

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Now we'll go to Ms. Sgro for six minutes or less.

[Judy Sgro, Liberal, Humber River—Black Creek, ON]

Thank you very much again.

Mr. Miller, we talk about investments, security, moving the dial along and becoming relevant rather than irrelevant in some ways. There are 60,000 people who currently live in Taiwan who are Canadian citizens. There are many investments. Northland Power, for example, is bidding on large multinational projects in offshore wind. When we visited them a couple of weeks ago, I asked them a question about the future, given some of the ongoing issues with China. People were very confident that no one was going to pull a trigger or do something dramatic. They were confident that things would continue to go along the way they are now and that the investment of Canada's pension funds and so on was in a good place.

What's your thought on that?

[Jonathan Berkshire Miller]

It's an interesting discussion right now of decoupling, for example, in the Chinese case and finding areas that we should decouple or sectorally segregate. One of the arguments against that always comes to the supply chains. If we were to do something with China, we have supply chains that connect through Japan, South Korea and a lot of other alliances. It's interesting that when Taiwan gets brought up, that same comparison and discussion don't come up.

From my point of view, Taiwan is very important in the supply chains, especially in the tech supply chains. We think of semiconductors first and foremost, but many of the other sectors there are very crucial to some of our investors. It's really important to keep in mind how critical Taiwan is, not just for the investments and its private sector ecosystem but also how that interconnects with the other key economies in that region that we're already engaged in. I think that's a really key point to keep in mind.

[Judy Sgro, Liberal, Humber River—Black Creek, ON]

The fact is that Taiwan is the biggest manufacturer of semiconductors around, and we are all very dependent on them. It seems to me that it's another reason for China to just bide their time and not be over-anxious to be causing additional problems.

[Jonathan Berkshire Miller]

I think you're right. I think that there are two main stories that we need to keep in mind here. One is semiconductors, obviously, in any contingency. The second one is energy security. If we think that we're having problems right now in Europe—and we are having problems with our European allies now being phased off Russian gas—just imagine what might happen in a contingency over Taiwan, where effectively China controls all of the waterways that would feed the energy to Japan and South Korea, which rely on 85% to 90% of their energy coming from the gulf. There's no other way to get it there easily.

There are two main vector points here that we need to keep an eye on: energy security and semiconductors.

[Judy Sgro, Liberal, Humber River—Black Creek, ON]

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Thank you, Ms. Sgro.

We'll now go to Mr. Bergeron for six minutes or less.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

Mr. Chair, Mr. Massie was not able to finish his presentation. He was able to bring up quite a few challenges that Canada is facing with regard to the situation in Taiwan.

I would like to hear Mr. Massie talk about the ways that Canada can meet these challenges, which were clearly defined in his opening remarks.

[Dr. Justin Massie]

Thank you for the question and for allowing me to conclude my opening remarks.

We do indeed have to establish which interests Canada must defend given the resources at its disposal.

That's why I am proposing three strategic areas in which Canada can exercise its leadership and its capacity to rally other allies, because Canada's influence on its own is limited. There are areas in which Canada can be quite influential, and there are others where Canada can only contribute. In terms of leadership, Canada's strength lies with its initiatives and its ideas, such as the Ottawa Convention, the Kyoto Protocol and other areas where Canada has proven its leadership.

I see two strategic challenges that Canada is facing currently and that it can tackle head on.

A strategy to fight disinformation is one area where Canada could take on a much more ambitious leadership role with its allies to develop ways to counter attempts by certain actors and visionaries to question the truth in order to rewrite history and control the narrative.

The other area where Canada can be influential is that of foreign interference in the electoral process, where, unfortunately, Canada is itself a target of foreign interference and hostile activities. To flex its leadership muscles, Canada could develop best practices with its allies as well as strategies to share better information.

As to the other areas, I think that Canada should count on its capacity to influence or to contribute, whether it be in matters of cybersecurity, reinforcing institutions and governance or, more specifically, military defence.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

In his presentation and in the answers he gave to our Conservative colleague, Mr. Berkshire Miller spoke about the difficulties that Canada could face if intervening in a conflict between the People's Republic of China in Taiwan.

Both of you have underscored the importance of working with our allies in the region to try to prevent such a conflict.

Mr. Colby, whom we unfortunately have not been able to hear today, declared that the risk of an invasion by the People's Republic of China during this decade is very real and even though it is good that a country is aware of the threats posed by the People's Republic of China, this awareness creates a risk, because it can incite the People's Republic of China to act decisively before a coalition of allies is able to react to a military threat.

Gentlemen, what can we do to rapidly build up this coalition of allies so that we are not overtaken by the People's Republic of China? I'll start with Mr. Massie.

[Dr. Justin Massie]

First of all, we need that rapid force deployment capacity. What we are currently seeing in the case of Ukraine is that we do not have the industrial capacity to wage a high-intensity war over time. Nor do we have a rapid force deployment capacity on the ground. What's more, these capacities take an enormous amount of time to build up because we are living in a peacetime economy, and not a wartime economy.

However, as the saying goes, “If you want peace, prepare for war.” We need this type of capacity going forward in order to be able to deploy force and ideally, to not have to deploy it. The beauty of deterrence is that there would be such a fear of costs on Beijing's part that there would be no military intervention. If we could be sure that there would be an American intervention or that such an intervention would cost China dearly and would keep it from realizing its objectives, there would be no intervention. That is what we should be aiming for, i.e., this capacity for deterrence and threat of rapid deployment. The best way to realize this objective is to have credibility and the necessary capacity. Up until now, however, Canada has not had this capacity and has not shown any credibility, because to have a rapid deployment capacity, for example, it would have to participate in military exercises with its allies.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

Mr. Berkshire Miller, over to you.

[Jonathan Berkshire Miller]

Thank you for the question.

To add to what my colleague said, I think there are three main points.

I would agree on deterrence. We absolutely need to build up deterrent capability. Many of the allies in Asia do as well. For example, Japan still hovers at around 1% of GDP spending, which is almost half of what NATO requires from most of its allies, even though some of them don't meet 2%. I think Japan is one example of an ally that needs to be doing more in terms of defence spending. Deterrence is a big one.

The second one, obviously, is diplomacy. I think we need to work publicly and privately to signal to the Chinese that there are certain thresholds and certain red lines that can't be crossed.

The third one is contingencies. We have to talk very privately with the Americans, with our Five Eyes allies and with other partners and allies in the Indo-Pacific about the “what-if”, the worst situation possible, and how we prepare for that. Some of that will be a public message, but a lot of that needs to be privately done.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

Gentlemen, I would like to hear what you think about what could be done. Should we join the “Quad”, also called the “Quadrilateral Security Dialogue,” which is an informal group comprised of the United States, India, Japan, and Australia, and AUKUS, which is a military alliance between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States?

What do you think about these possibilities?

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Give a very brief answer, please, Dr. Massie.

[Dr. Justin Massie]

I think it would be a good idea given the fact that Canada is excluded from most regional security institutions. We have seen this with AUKUS and the Quad.

Canada would like to see consensus amongst its allies. There is no real divergence of opinion between the Europeans, the Americans and the Japanese on the issue of Taiwan, but it would be good to stake out a common position. That is one of the advantages of Canadian multilateralism. Let's make these institutions bigger so that there are more actors, like France and Canada. This would serve our interests well.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Thank you very much.

Now we go to Ms. McPherson for six minutes or less.

[Heather McPherson, NDP, Edmonton Strathcona, AB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much to our witnesses for their testimony tonight.

Ultimately, what I'm hearing over and over again is that Canada has to do more. In fact, Mr. Miller, you've said that Canada is late to the game. We have heard as well that Canada can and should show more leadership.

One question I have for both of you is this: Knowing that more needs to be done and that more can be done, who should we be taking lessons from? Are there lessons we can learn from Australia? Are there lessons we can learn from South Korea, Japan and some of those other countries that are working and dealing with this thorny issue of Taiwan?

Perhaps, Mr. Miller, I could start with you.