Canada-China Relations Committee on Nov. 15th, 2022

[Jonathan Berkshire Miller]

That's a great question.

I think I would start with a point that when crafting a successful strategy, empathy is essential. Obviously we need to be focusing on the interests and the values that matter the most to Canadians. If we do that without actually asking those in the region where we're providing aid and assistance, it's going to fall flat. We need to have a two-way conversation and actually talk to the region, rather than just sort of foisting deliverables and grants of money on them that don't suit their needs.

I think that's the first important point.

As far as learning other's regional strategies goes, I would start in the region itself. This is not to discount our European friends who are also thinking about the Indo-Pacific, but one thing I often say is that we are not Europe. Yes, we have great social connections with Europe, but we have a huge Pacific coastline. We are very much an Indo-Pacific nation.

Our Dutch friends would tell us this. Our Dutch friends had an Indo-Pacific strategy a year and a half before we even.... We still don't have ours out. They don't have a Pacific coastline. I guess they had Indonesia back in the day.

We need to start thinking about ourselves and realizing that we are a Pacific nation. I would say that the ones we should take the most advice from would be the Japans and the Australias of the world, as well as some voices in southeast Asia.

[Heather McPherson, NDP, Edmonton Strathcona, AB]

Dr. Massie, would you comment?

[Dr. Justin Massie]

I agree.

We should support Australia's strategy which was updated recently, as well as France's. We often forget that France is a regional power in the Indo‑Pacific. There are many French territories and France is a major maritime power as well.

France's strategy is based on seeking a middle ground between the United States' entrenched position with regards to China and a more open policy, which would be one of non-intervention. I think that France is finding the right middle ground between wanting an inclusive order, especially in commercial and diplomatic matters, and preparing itself militarily in order to be able to act in case of conflict.

That is Canada's biggest weakness: it's not our diplomatic position or our willingness to engage multilaterally, but rather our capacity in times of conflict.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

I want to point out to everybody that the bells are ringing for a vote. I need unanimous consent to continue until perhaps about five minutes before the vote. Is that sufficient for everybody to do what they need to do? Are we good?

I see we are. Please continue then, Ms. McPherson. Thank you.

[Heather McPherson, NDP, Edmonton Strathcona, AB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you for the unanimous consent, everyone.

It is an excellent point that we do need to listen to those people who are in the region. However, one worry with regard to the geopolitical situation is what you said, Mr. Miller, about the energy security and how that ties into what is happening with energy, security and the weaponization of energy with the war on Ukraine.

We did see Chancellor Scholz go to China recently, and he did speak about Taiwan. He cautioned the Chinese government against escalations in Taiwan.

I do wonder what you feel the implications are of the war in Ukraine and how the Chinese government sees what is happening there with regard to what is happening in Taiwan. Does that gives them a feeling of security to escalate? Does that makes them think that perhaps the world's attention is diverted elsewhere?

Perhaps you can comment on that.

[Jonathan Berkshire Miller]

It's a great question.

I think there are two different angles that China is taking away from this. One is obviously concern, because I think they're seeing how strongly the west has banded together on this, especially on financial sanctions. They don't want to be in a scenario like that, where they would also suffer from those sanctions, especially on technology, for example. Technology is the gasoline that makes the Chinese economy go. If we were able to effectively cut off a lot of that technology to China, I think it would be an economic nightmare for them. I think they're getting that lesson.

At the same time, I think they're seeing some of the weaknesses and trying to exploit those as well. One example is how they're taking advantage of the cheap energy prices to buy Russian gas and oil at 30% discounts. There is a story that they're selling off U.S. shale LNG contracts now to our allies in the region, such as Japan and South Korea, at market prices, while at the same point getting 30% discounts on Russian gas. The double irony is that part of that is our LNG, because it's our LNG that goes down through the United States, and China is profiting off that, and profiting off the war in Ukraine.

There are two sides to the story, I think.

[Heather McPherson, NDP, Edmonton Strathcona, AB]

Mr. Massie, did you have anything to add?

[Dr. Justin Massie]

Yes. I agree that China is learning, in light of the war in Ukraine, that you have to be well prepared if you intend to invade your neighbour. That is the big difference. We are seeing all the military difficulties that Russia is now facing.

There are always various degrees of intervention. So if there were an intervention, I would expect that the invasion would be strongly focused in the air and on the sea and, if we compare that to what Russia tried to do in Ukraine, that the Chinese armed forces would try to establish their superiority in the air and exploit all the divisions that exist between our allies. We have seen this with natural gas and oil in Europe, but for China, it would be in other areas. China would seek to exploit these divisions in order to reduce international support for Taiwan.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Thank you very much.

Now we'll go to Mr. Genuis for five minutes or less.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Thank you, Chair.

My questions will focus on the risk of another catastrophic war in the Asia-Pacific resulting from a possible PRC invasion of Taiwan, and Canada's response.

On January 12, 1950, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson gave a speech at the National Press Club in Washington in which he defined the U.S. defence perimeter in the Pacific. His defence perimeter excluded Korea. Six months later, Communists invaded South Korea, leading to the loss of 40,000 American lives, as well as the lives of many Canadians and others. The Communists invaded South Korea because they calculated that nobody would come to its defence.¸

Tragically, President Biden repeated this mistake. In December of last year, he promised heavy sanctions, but also explicitly ruled out an American military response to a further invasion of Ukraine, and so Russia invaded Ukraine two months later. When hostile countries are making decisions about acts of aggression, they generally make amoral but rational calculations about whether the costs will outweigh the benefits. The lesson of history is that making commitments to stand with democracies against aggression is the most pro-peace path available, because it deters aggression. Committing to defending allies from attack is a way of communicating in advance that the cost of invasion will be high, thus deterring invasion.

This leads me to the conclusion that western nations should be clear in their commitment to stand with Taiwan and that a clear commitment would deter war. A Chinese invasion of Taiwan would not be the result of a perceived provocation, because China's leaders are highly rational. A Chinese invasion of Taiwan would only occur if Taiwan's leaders were convinced, as Putin was in February, that the nation being invaded would not be protected.

With that in mind, I submitted a written question to the Canadian government simply asking this: Has the government made any plans related to how it will respond to a Chinese invasion of Taiwan? If so, what are the plans?

In responding to this question, the government noted its concern about potential escalation and its desire to engage in terms of trade and technology, but the government provided no information whatsoever about its plans for responding to an invasion.

Mr. Miller, I want to ask you this: What can Canada do to avoid the failure of deterrence that we have seen in the current Ukrainian war, and in the Korean War, as I spoke about, and what should Canada's plan be for responding to an invasion of Taiwan?

[Jonathan Berkshire Miller]

Thank you. It's an excellent point.

I think it needs to start with the premise that, as I mentioned in my remarks, any contingency over Taiwan.... This is not a luxury. This is not one that we insulate ourselves from. This is not Iraq in 2003. This is not a potential conflict of choice. If the United States is involved in kinetic action and hot conflict in East Asia versus China, it's only a peer competitor. We are intimately involved. Often, I tell people to look at a map. The idea that we could opt out of this one, I think, is not feasible.

Before that, though, how do we prepare for it? How do we plan contingencies? I think we need to work much more closely with a lot of our minilateral engagements. The Five Eyes, for example, is traditionally a signals intelligence arrangement. We need to start thinking much more closely with the Five Eyes partnerships on broader terms, in foreign policy terms and in defence terms. I think we need to be thinking about and preparing for these contingencies and finding ways to avoid them.

Lastly, I also think that when it comes to our boots on the ground.... I don't often put this all on the backs of the Royal Canadian Navy. I think we need to start thinking diplomatically and in terms of our security officials overseas. We need to have a much bigger presence to understand the intelligence on the ground. The Five Eyes were a net recipient of that. We need to start having our own intelligence in a robust sense there in really understanding what's happening in that part of the world.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Is it fair to say that a stronger presence and clearer commitments to support Taiwan would decrease the likelihood of invasion?

[Jonathan Berkshire Miller]

It should be standard and not controversial in almost every reference to the Indo-Pacific to be talking about stability and security in the Taiwan Strait. Even a year ago, and perhaps even now, it's controversial for some government officials to mention this. I think absolutely any time that we're mentioning the Indo-Pacific, this should be first and foremost because, as I said, without Taiwanese security, there is no Japanese security. There is no security in the South China Sea.

We need to be upfront about this. We can't be reactive and wait for question period to have to say it, if we have to. This needs to be right at the front of our Indo-Pacific strategy and foremost to our interests.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Thank you.

I'm sorry, Mr. Genuis. You are out of time.

We will go to Mr. Fragiskatos for five minutes or less.

[Peter Fragiskatos, Liberal, London North Centre, ON]

Thank you very much, Chair.

Thank you to our witnesses.

Professor Massie, I will begin with you. By the way, this is not related to anything that we're doing here, but we just missed each other at Queen's University. I studied with David Haglund and Wayne Cox. I know you know them and others there.

I take your points that you have raised tonight, particularly the one you raised with respect to climate change and how that offers a potential area of collaboration with China. The point has been made before at this committee and elsewhere, but I wonder how that would work. How could that proceed?

On the one hand, I think I see where you and others who have made that point are coming from. Climate change is an existential matter by definition, and therefore we should, on existential matters and existential threats specifically, find room for collaboration and co-operation with all states, regardless of whether or not they are democracies.

However, at the same time, Canada is a middle power and China certainly is not, so where China can find room to collaborate with the United States—and I see that there have been very positive, or what seemed to be very positive conversations, vis-à-vis Presidents Xi and Biden in the past few days on the issue of climate change—one could make the argument that the U.S. is more likely to be heard by China on the issue of climate change. The door then opens to discussion and deliberation between those two superpowers.

However, Canada is clearly not in that category, so how do we get China's attention on this? What areas can we specifically focus on to advance the dialogue?

[Dr. Justin Massie]

Thank you for the question.

First of all, we have to acknowledge the problem: even with the commitments that Beijing announced this week, it won't meet the United Nations' targets in the fight against climate change. China has to do more, and the same goes for Canada.

Alone, Canada cannot do much to change China's position. However, Canada's strength lies in its capacity to rally its allies and other states around positions that are similar to its own in order to exert pressure. One of the ideas that is currently being discussed within the European Union is to impose tariffs according to the amount of pollution caused by international imports. If we establish an international consensus with the United States and our European friends in matters of trade and we set a price on pollution, that could change China's position. This type of cooperation would be one of the ways to do so.

We naively think that all countries will wish to collaborate on this issue, because it is a matter of the common good and that everyone will die if we don't fight climate change, but that's not true. Sometimes, China does not want to decouple the issues of the day, which means that it establishes links between cooperating in the field of climate change and our positions regarding Taiwan.

We have to stop this, and the only way that Canada can do so is to collaborate and establish common strategies that seek to set a price on pollution.

[Peter Fragiskatos, Liberal, London North Centre, ON]

Thank you very much.

For my final question, I'll go to Mr. Berkshire Miller.

The point has been made—and I think it's a compelling one—that because Canada been blessed with the three f's—food, fertilizer and fuel—this offers an opportunity for leverage in terms of international security. How can those three f's be leveraged to promote security in this particular region, and in Taiwan in particular?

[Jonathan Berkshire Miller]

That's a really great question.

I think every country needs to look at its strengths in some of these contingencies and play them up. I think we're seeing a clear example of this with Russia's war in Ukraine. I think that one of the roles that Canada can play—should play—is in the three f's that you mentioned.

In a potential contingency in Asia.... I think this is key for Taiwan, but when I mention a Taiwan contingency, I also think of Japan and South Korea. Again, imagine the potential coercion they would face on all of those f's: on agricultural supplies, on energy, on fertilizers. That is a role that Canada needs to be preparing for in any contingency, We need to be finding ways that we can ensure the food security, the energy security and the fertilizer security to our most important allies in northeast Asia. We also can't do this one year ahead. We need to be doing this five to 10 years ahead in planning.

I think it's a really great question and one that we should be paying attention to.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Thank you very much, Mr. Fragiskatos.

We'll now go to Mr. Bergeron for two and a half minutes.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I don't know if you heard the discussions we had with the first group of witnesses, but I would like to repeat the declaration made by the Minister of Foreign Affairs when she spoke at the Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy. She said that Canadian companies who do business with the People's Republic of China do so at their own risk and that Canada should seek to deepen its economic ties with Taiwan.

We know how much the People's Republic of China likes to threaten individual nations everywhere in the world to try and isolate them.

Does the doctrine that the Minister of Foreign Affairs seems to be using here run the risk of inciting the People's Republic of China to hit back?

[Dr. Justin Massie]

You have to be able to explain the decisions being made in this area.

Given the available proof, we are able to establish that there is industrial espionage, that there are threats to the private sector when we do business with China, and that there are links between the Chinese Communist Party and Chinese state corporations. This allows us to better understand the reasons for Canada's reluctance in dealing with China, especially in highly strategic sectors.

I am not referring to clothing factories here. Rather, I'm talking about high-risk sectors, such as high tech and mining. That is where we have to reduce our vulnerability, and not only Canada. This is what China is trying to do, attack the smaller players. That is precisely what it did to Australia to make it pay, knowing that Australia could not inflict the same damage as the United States.

The way to get out of this situation is to have common positions, and that is what Canada has to work on. Canada has to reduce its vulnerability, but do so by establishing ties with other countries who have a similar vision with regards to the situation, in order to reduce the burden and limit possible costs for the Canadian economy. I use the term “limit” because there will definitely be costs. However, the inverse would certainly be worse. It would be dangerous to continue to deal with China and to make our businesses, our citizens and our academic researchers vulnerable to espionage and intellectual property theft, for example.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

Mr. Berkshire Miller, would you like to answer, too?

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Give a very brief answer, please, sir.

[Jonathan Berkshire Miller]

I think the intention in the minister's remarks is right. There are a lot of challenges—economic espionage, forced technology transfer, etc.—in China. However, I really think the remedy is a consistent and sustained dialogue with the private sector. It cannot be one warning and one speech saying that the private sector needs to be aware of the risks in China; I think we need a consistent and sustained dialogue with the private sector on these risks, involving them in these decisions, not making it seem like the government is telling the private sector something but having a long-term dialogue with them on this matter.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Now we'll go to Ms. McPherson for two and a half minutes or less.