Canadian Heritage Committee on Dec. 3rd, 2025

[Aengus Bridgman]

That is an excellent question. Thank you for it.

For the platforms, they are here. They are widely popular. They are widely used by Canadians. In terms of cutting off access for maybe under-18s, we'll see how that plays out in Australia. I think what I've said, and what others have said or hinted at as well, is that you can tune these algorithms to reduce harms. That is possible. That is a governable fact. That is an available policy option.

We've talked a lot today about the drug example on Facebook. We saw during the last federal election many AI slop ads using political content that were being promoted and that were political ads during the campaign. We ran a very small study using vision models: Is this political? During an election campaign, it's governed speech. Particular rules apply. The vision model can easily identify it. These tools are widely available. What is not being done is that there is not some pressure put on these platforms to apply that vision model effectively to ensure that the engineering and staff capacity time is put towards that. We have to turn that dial. We have to make it more expensive and more costly.

There are ways to tune this. There are ways to work with the platforms and say, look, this is not going to work. We're going to start imposing fines in this space. If you run an ad that shares drug content, not only can you not profit from that ad, but all of the revenue there will also be applied. There will be taxes and fines. If you apply the right lever, the company will change very quickly the number of resources that it's internally devoting to this.

The approach of the DSA is a harms-based approach that says we're going to identify harms on the platforms, platforms are responsible for proactively identifying harms and we're going to use those leverages, because we're going to try to reduce that amount of harm. They operate in probabilistic ways. For those of you who are kind of experiencing the new AI way, this is all probabilistic. We can play with those probabilities. We can post fines and adjust those probabilities in favour of reducing online harms, in favour of protecting children and in favour of a better democratic discourse. That's all possible.

[David Myles, Liberal, Fredericton—Oromocto, NB]

Has that been done in other jurisdictions?

[Aengus Bridgman]

Absolutely. This is what the DSA is doing. This is, to a certain extent, what Bill C‑63 kind of proposed and was trying to do. Yes, absolutely there's criticism of that, and there is space for that, but that was the approach. It was to try to reduce that harm calculus and to force....

In these decisions, we cannot think of these companies as engaging in evil behaviour. They are pursuing their advertising and maximizing. That is great. We say, okay, yup, that's good. You are free to do that. You profit from that and that is great, but here are the rules for our society. Here are the rules. Here are the harms we are okay with. Here are the harms we are not okay with. Here's how we are going to push you in that direction.

In fact, that is the purpose of government. The purpose of regulation is to do that.

[David Myles, Liberal, Fredericton—Oromocto, NB]

I will ask you the same question, Ms. Carignan.

Do you have any comments on that?

[Marie-Eve Carignan]

I agree with what my colleague just said. These are really important options to consider, and indeed, financial penalties work well with all these platforms, which are looking to make money because, unfortunately, money talks for them.

However, I believe there are also other elements.

You mentioned access to content and algorithms. With regard to content, I think it is fairly easy to work to prevent hateful content, i.e., to legislate against hateful and violent content online and to moderate content that infringes on other rights and freedoms under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. We must therefore be able to identify specific content without regulating disinformation, namely content that is problematic, violent, hateful, or contrary to other rights and freedoms. I think it’s easy to block.

Furthermore, during the COVID‑19 pandemic and the storming of the Capitol, specific accounts were closed because they were highly problematic in that they promoted violent and hateful ideologies. Since then, these platforms have been deregulated and the accounts have been reopened. I believe this shows that it’s possible to do so, but that it depends on the willingness of the platforms, a willingness that is not always there.

I will add a fourth element with respect to the environment. We need to provide good information and promote positive content. For example, Mark Zuckerberg and Meta recently stated that fact‑checking was politically dangerous and stifled opinions. But that is completely false. Fact‑checking does not block any content; it shows which content is reliable, verified by journalists and authentic. I believe we need to return to solutions like this and highlight content that is valued by media outlets belonging to internationally recognized journalistic initiatives or scientific content.

Platforms are therefore also capable of prioritizing good content and providing reliable sources of information to counterbalance all that. It would not be about blocking content, but rather about providing reliable alternatives so people online are also exposed to good information. In that respect, fact‑checking worked well, so there was no reason to stop it.

I believe we need to focus on blocking hateful content, implementing fact‑checking and promoting good content within algorithms and platforms. As my colleague said, I also believe we should have moderated algorithms to block certain hateful content and impose financial penalties if this is not done.

[David Myles, Liberal, Fredericton—Oromocto, NB]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Lisa Hepfner]

Thank you.

Mr. Champoux, you have the floor for about two and a half minutes.

[Martin Champoux, Bloc, Drummond, QC]

Since we talked about bill C‑63, I’d like to say that, during the previous Parliament, when that bill was under consideration, it was proposed that it be split so that everything concerning harm to children would be adopted. There was consensus, but the government refused to proceed in that way. However, if it could have been done, we would likely have made progress. I still find it unfortunate, and it’s important to point that out.

Ms. Carignan, earlier you mentioned some proposed educational initiatives, such as the As de l’info program. There are others, including MAJ and Rad. These are various initiatives that already exist, and that’s very good.

What I find unfortunate as a father of young teenagers is that schools don’t seem to have the official mandate to educate young people, specifically with respect to social media and being vigilant about misinformation and disinformation. I have never heard my children come home from school saying that, today they learned how to detect fake news, that it was interesting, and that they now have tips for spotting fake content online.

Why aren’t we more proactive with respect to our youth in school?

[Marie-Eve Carignan]

The difficulty is that media education is often seen as a cross-curricular skill. Teachers who are required to provide media literacy training are not always trained to do so and do not always have the knowledge about how algorithms and social media work to educate young people on these issues. They therefore need help and tools to inform young people. That’s what As de l’info does, among other things. This site offers resources for teachers to provide young people with good tools so they know where and how to find information and approach certain sensitive topics.

Our research on the #30sec to check it out training, an initiative from the Centre québécois d’éducation aux médias et à l’information, or CQEMI, and the initiatives from the Agence Science-Presse, shows that it works over the short, medium or long term. Young people who have taken these training sessions become more informed about how social media works and the difference between professional journalistic content and influencer content. They are therefore better able to assess information sources. This doesn’t mean that they’ll necessarily stop consuming certain problematic sources, but at least they’ll do so knowingly and will be able to seek out other sources.

This initiative would benefit from being standardized within our education networks, but these networks are funded on an ad hoc basis, and it often takes a lot of resources. These include, among others, volunteer journalists who provide the #30sec to check it out training, but we already know that journalists are few in number and overworked, which certainly limits the number of training sessions they can offer.

[Martin Champoux, Bloc, Drummond, QC]

Without adequate training for our youth, is Australia’s proposal to restrict access to social media a good solution?

Should we do that or do both at the same time?

[Marie-Eve Carignan]

I am torn. I think restricting access to social media for very young children is a good thing. However, at 16, as we see in Australia, it’s more debatable because young people need to be educated. Later, when they have access to these networks, if they haven’t been taught best practices and are suddenly exposed to certain content, what will they do with it?

They need to acquire skills to effectively use social media, to develop critical thinking in relation to these platforms and to know how to evaluate resources and tools. I therefore believe that complete blocking is not a solution. We need to focus more on education and blocking hateful, violent and problematic content. We need both a legal framework and education about these platforms, because young people will find other ways to circumvent it.

We’re already hearing about this in Australia. There’s talk of adopting virtual private networks to bypass the law. Some young people use their parents’ accounts, who, as I said, find it very difficult to keep up with young people’s online activities. In any case, young people also need to be exposed to certain online content. So it is a little difficult to say what they should or should not be exposed to. I think it should be done through education and a certain amount of supervision.

[Martin Champoux, Bloc, Drummond, QC]

We may have let down a cohort in terms of digital literacy, but if we flood the market with educated and alert young people, perhaps we can reverse the trend.

[Marie-Eve Carignan]

In any case, it will have an effect. In our research, we see that young people who are exposed to good, reliable, quality information share it with their families. For example, the research conducted by the UNESCO-PREV Chair with As de l’info showed that young people who encountered reliable information online discussed it with their parents, and that this changed behaviours, for instance, with regard to perceptions of immigration and climate issues. So it has an amplifying effect within families, which is very positive.

Of course, it can sometimes create tensions. That’s what makes education difficult. Teachers don’t always dare to address sensitive topics with young people because they fear the parents’ reactions. It’s very difficult to have to confront certain issues.

At the moment, the chair has a project with UQAM and Stéphanie Tremblay, particularly on how to address sensitive topics in the classroom. I think it’s a matter that needs to be discussed. We need to help teachers address these topics in the classroom to have a positive effect not only on young people but also on their circle.

[Martin Champoux, Bloc, Drummond, QC]

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Liberal, Lisa Hepfner]

Mrs. Thomas, you have five minutes or so.

[Rachael Thomas, Conservative, Lethbridge, AB]

Awesome. Thank you very much.

Ms. Paul, my question is going to be directed to you first. I want to get your thoughts on what the solution is in terms of properly regulating platforms to prevent this type of behaviour. Based on what I'm hearing from you, it doesn't matter if the public is outraged. It doesn't matter if organizations like your own are doing the necessary research and reporting. These things don't seem to be doing it. There is still illicit material reaching the eyeballs of youth, and then, in the case of ordering illicit drugs, reaching their hands, and then, of course, having an impact on their lives.

What is it that we, as legislators, need to know in terms of how to regulate these tech giants, potentially, to generate change and ultimately to protect people who are under the age of 18?

[Katie Paul]

Getting to some of the questions we've been hearing regarding the age verification laws, one of the things that's important to keep in mind is that companies like Meta have heavily promoted that as a solution, which should be suspicious. All that does is pass the responsibility on to kids, on to their families and away from the platform for the fact that it is directly profiting from harm. It also takes the responsibility off the platform to invest in any sort of moderation or quality control of its main product, which is advertising. We don't see any of these levers being used.

It's gone so far that for some of these platforms we're seeing direct sanctions violations. Because they are so heavily operating without any sort of oversight, they're actually profiting from sanctioned entities for things like advertisements and subscriptions—sanctioned individuals who use their full names as listed in OFAC's list.

This is because these companies have been able to operate with complete impunity for over a decade now, passing the buck of responsibility to parents. Keep in mind that not every kid has parents who are going to understand how to use social media. Not every kid has parents who are able to be involved in their lives. Some kids have grandparents who may have never even seen one of these platforms before. Again, it's all passing the buck of responsibility away from these companies who are failing to do their job and the quality control of their product.

Starting there with their product, which is advertising, and ensuring that is controlled is one of the critical pieces because that is their main financial lever. That's one of things that's going to force further moderation, so they're not incurring harm, fines or regulatory financial burdens that are going to harm their business model.

Looking from the top down, which is where the money starts, is one of the most critical pieces toward any successful regulation. Obviously, the DSA has been mentioned several times as something that is new regulation. The fact that the companies have pushed back so heavily on it.... Again, the DSA is not meant to police speech on these platforms. It's targeting illegal activity and terrorism.

The fact that the companies are pushing that hard, even having the U.S. President do things like threaten tariffs against Europe for imposing the DSA, suggests that any sort of regulation is effective in a way companies are not willing to comply with because it would require them to give up profits they've been making from harmful content.

Starting with the profit-driving mechanisms is one of the most critical ways to have effective enforcement in any country. Looking at how these companies react to the threat of enforcement is a really important measure for understanding where the pressure points are.

[Rachael Thomas, Conservative, Lethbridge, AB]

Okay. I can appreciate that.

In many ways, that's a fairly general answer. Are there specific pressure points that should be applied through legislation to be most effective?

[Katie Paul]

I'm not as familiar with the way the legislative process works in Canada, so I wouldn't feel comfortable speaking to that. However, I think that utilizing laws on the books and imposing fines for companies profiting from already illegal activity is a very easy first place to start.

Also, look at models that are happening in Europe and the U.K., where they are imposing online safety protocols in a way the companies are clearly unwilling to meet. For instance, Meta has announced that it's going to stop running political ads in Europe, simply because it's unwilling to make an effort to moderate its platform in a way that complies with reasonable regulations.

[Rachael Thomas, Conservative, Lethbridge, AB]

Thank you.

One of the things you talk about in an article that is within your sphere is that Meta can keep certain illegal material off its platforms, specifically images depicting child sexual abuse. You say, “The company is completely capable of doing this...It has the technology to address these issues. It's a choice at this point to not do so.”

If Meta is technologically capable of detecting and removing these types of things—trafficking—what explains their lack of action in this case, then?

[Katie Paul]

The failure of any sort of repercussions financially, civil or legally. Without repercussions, there is no incentive for the company to invest in moderation. In the years prior to 2020, for instance, where they really touted that they were investing in more content moderators in trust and safety—thousands of people they've since laid off—they were doing it because there was just the threat of U.S. regulation at the time.

Unfortunately, we have not seen that regulation come yet. In the meantime, the company has decided to lay off thousands of those moderators and not invest in these types of safety because, simply, there's nothing stopping them from not doing so.

[Rachael Thomas, Conservative, Lethbridge, AB]

Essentially, then, if regulations or legislation is to be put in place, to have teeth, it would have to impose a significant monetary penalty on these tech organizations in order to see change. Is that a correct understanding?

[Katie Paul]

It could be a monetary penalty or a penalty of any kind. Incorporating the fact that there is illegal activity that the average person, if they were.... It was asked if we work with law enforcement. I'm assuming the people running these ads for drugs and weapons would get arrested in Canada. They would certainly get arrested in the U.S., but the company that's profiting the most from running the ads in the first place is facing no repercussions, either legally or financially.

Any repercussions for profiting from that kind of behaviour and the facilitation of those crimes is a very base-level place to start. Again, I'm not as familiar with Canada's legislative process. From there, it's about understanding more abstract concepts, like what defines hate speech and what defines disinformation, but start with the illegal content because that's where we are. These companies are running ads for drugs, weapons and fraud.

[Rachael Thomas, Conservative, Lethbridge, AB]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Lisa Hepfner]

It makes me wonder about enforcement, given the prevalence of all this harmful content, but I will pass the floor over to Mr. Myles for five minutes.