Okay, thank you.
The question of reforming Canada's electoral system presents both a first-order and second-order problem for party politicians, political analysts, interest groups, and the Canada polity as a whole.
The first-order problem, assessing the pros and cons of the current first-past-the-post system and its main alternatives, has essentially been solved to the satisfaction of most knowledgeable observers engaged in the study of comparative electoral politics and voting behaviour. It has been extensively investigated, documented, and analyzed by academic scholars, specials commissions, and citizens' assemblies. Indeed, at the provincial level, there have been a number of royal commissions and citizens' assemblies that have identified and recommended to their respective legislatures and public, a best alternative to first past the post.
I think it is fair to say that the results are in. As is often repeated, the concerns about alternative electoral systems to first past the post will never be to everyone's complete satisfaction since there are no perfect systems on offer, but by and large, there is an emerging consensus that the serious democratic deficits of first past the post are damaging to the overall quality and long-term functionality of Canada's version of representative democracy.
Further delay in reforming the system seems increasingly difficult to justify. As well, it seems to me that the fundamental principles that should guide the choice of any alternative voting system for Canada are fairly clear and agreed upon. The motion establishing this committee, with its five principles for electoral reform, is a case in point.
Finally, there are the vexing technical questions of how best to incorporate these principles into a viable alternative voting system that would meet Canada's specific needs. As they say, the devil is in the details. However, these technical questions have been addressed fairly successfully elsewhere, through a range of innovations and modifications to standard voting systems. These include hybrid systems such as MMP that seek to combine the benefits of first past the post and PR, the use of seat thresholds to reduce the fragmentation of the vote and eliminate fringe parties, open lists that give more power to voters and allow them to choose between party candidates, ranked ballots that ensure that winning candidates in single member constituencies are supported by a majority of voters, and differential treatment for very large or remote ridings.
I think there are ready solutions available to the first-order problem of electoral system reform.
No similar consensus, however, has emerged on the second-order problem of how and when Canada's politicians might bring about this needed reform of the electoral system. The second-order problem starts with getting sufficiently broad agreement across the political class on both the need for electoral reform and the timeliness of pursuing it now as opposed to in some indefinite future; on which of the many alternatives to the current system is preferable; and finally, on the mechanics of managing the process of moving to a new system, the steps that should be taken, the institutions and individuals involved, the timeframe for implementation, and so on.
It is the second-order problem, it seems to me, that has really bedevilled the electoral reform question in Canada. The distortions in regional representation created by first past the post, the negative long-term political impacts of these representational distortions, and the perverse partisan incentives to double down on political behaviours and strategies that reinforce and perpetuate them were first subjected to intensive scholarly analysis by Professor Alan Cairns in a seminal 1968 article in the Canadian Journal of Political Science. Cairns identified the institutional defects of the first-past-the-post system and their deleterious effect on the character and tenor of national politics and on the quality of representative democracy in Canada. These same defects have been identified time and again in subsequent studies of electoral processes and outcomes.
To briefly summarize, as I'm sure you've been made aware repeatedly in your hearings, these defects are the disproportionality of election results, often severe; the regional amplification effect, so clearly evident in the 2015 result here in Atlantic Canada; the suppression of diverse voices in parliaments and legislatures; the suppression of voter turnout; the detrimental long-term impact on democratic engagement and system legitimacy; and finally, its facilitation, if not exaggeration, of the systemic bias within the Westminster model of parliamentary democracy toward executive dominance.
In 2005 Professor Roger Gibbins, another respected senior political scientist in Canada, revisited the Cairns analysis and updated it to include all the federal election outcomes in the intervening years. He found that not only had the pathological patterns identified by Cairns continued, but arguably they had worsened. This left Gibbins lamenting the fate of hard-working academics whose best efforts to reveal the truths about the inner workings of political institutions have often been met with either stony silence or haughty dismissal by those who temporarily wield power within these institutions. Gibbins concluded his study, which confirmed Cairns' findings and reaffirmed the need for electoral system change, by stating, “Electoral reform with respect to the House of Commons is not going to happen. Not now. Not soon. Not ever.”
This skepticism about the prospect of institutional change is echoed by the cynicism of the media in their coverage of the process with which we are now engaged. Despite the clear pledge of the current Prime Minister, the creation of this parliamentary committee, and the consultations that are currently under way, the jaundiced eye of political journalists and media pundits continues to produce expressions of disbelief that the prospects of change will ever be realized, or that the end result could be anything other than the preferred outcome of the current government, which would be the one, of course, that would redound to their electoral advantage. The skepticism and the cynicism continue, not unjustifiably, it should be said, given the long history of this issue.
After the passage of so much time, why the urgency for electoral reform now? There are a number of possible answers to this question, but I would suggest two.
First, there is the problem of systemic legitimacy, often referred to as a democratic deficit, that is becoming worse given the changing expectations of an increasingly diverse and highly educated population that is less disposed to a shrugging acceptance of “politics as usual”. These citizens want a political system and a parliament that is more responsive to their views, that more closely aligns with their partisan preferences, and that more closely mirrors the composition of the society it purports to represent.
Second, there has emerged in Canada a relatively recent problem, at least in terms of its severity, that has been referred to as “policy lurch”. I say it is relatively recent, because for decades prior to the 1990s Canadian governance was shaped by centrist, brokerage-style politics that moderated the policy shifts that are the normal expectation of a change in government. However, the more ideologically polarized environment that has emerged in Canada since that time has given rise to concerns about more severe instances of policy lurch that are evident in other first-past-the-post jurisdictions with more ideologically polarized party systems. Indeed, it has been cited as one of the main reasons for New Zealand's decision to change its electoral system.
To illustrate the problem, the current Trudeau government has spent much of its first year in office, and will no doubt do the same for a good part of its second year, undoing many of the changes introduced by the previous government, at which point in time they will begin taking steps to prepare the way for the next federal election campaign. Yet a relatively minor shift in votes of five or six percentage points in that election could result in a new government that engages in another round of policy lurch, undoing much of the undoing that this government has been doing. This kind of roundabout “now it's our turn” policy-making can hardly be thought of as beneficial for stable long-term governance that is built on a solid foundation of a reasonably broad societal consensus.
Though perhaps less dramatic in its processes, this mode of consensual governance is the demonstrably better course of action in terms of outcomes for economy and society, and frankly the most valuable contribution that can be made by politicians intent on practising the art of politics rather than engaging in the crass power game of one-upmanship and cyclical dominance.
Changing the voting system means changing the incentives that affect how people vote, that is, their decision-making in the realm of electoral politics. A more proportional system, by making every vote count, would remove fears of vote-splitting and reduce the pressure on voters to engage in strategic voting rather than choosing the candidate or party they most prefer. For party politicians, it would disincentivize knee-jerk adversarialism and reward more respectful cross-party relations and interparty co-operation.
This committee, this Parliament, and this government have a rare opportunity to create the conditions and institutional incentives to “do politics differently”, a frequently voiced intention of new governments and newly minted MPs that inevitably frays and dissolves with the passage of time. This has not been due to the frailties of human nature or a sudden failure of resolve. It is the normal political behaviour encouraged by the design and functioning of our institutions, and particularly the electoral system.
I urge the committee to quell the doubts of the skeptics, to confound the many cynics, and to deliver on its appointed task of recommending to Parliament a new electoral system that will satisfy the five principles set down in the motion creating the committee. I wish you well in your difficult and important deliberations.
Thank you.
