Prior to the fire, Parks Canada ordered hydrants for Jasper with a thread on the side ports that was different from those used by all municipalities in Alberta and British Columbia. They had only seven hydrant adapters available in order to go from their thread to BAT, the British Columbia and Alberta thread. Our crew observed a Petro-Canada and a mobile trailer park burn down, but we could not engage due to being unable to connect to hydrants.
Our crew was credited by the captain of the Jasper Fire Department for saving what was left of the downtown because we were at a hydrant that had an adapter. We were able to engage impingements on buildings.
No secondary water sources were staged in preparation for hydrants going down. A lesson learned from past wildland-urban interface events is that it's normal practice to have water supplies pre-positioned.
Once it was confirmed that Arctic Fire Safety Services was deploying additional fire crews on behalf of an insurance company and a resort owner, our two engine crews were released from the Parks Canada response, with no explanation given. The structural protection specialist asked my crew lead, “Does Kris really have 20 fire trucks waiting in Hinton to come in?”
On the afternoon of July 24, I was contacted by a company based in the United States called RedZone. They undertake wildfire analytics and wildfire dispatching for insurance companies. They asked if I had resources that could go to Jasper for one of their clients.
I let them know that I had three type 6 engines, one type 7 engine and a tactical tender available to deploy. We were hired and tasked with protecting the Marmot Basin ski resort and the Jasper tram.
Shortly thereafter, I was contacted by their client, Pursuit Collection. I told them I was fully deployed. They asked whether we could find resources to protect their properties. I reached out to my other firefighting contractors, through a Facebook page, for oil field firefighters. By that night, I was able to assemble a fleet of 20 fire trucks and 50 certified firefighters, all making their way to Hinton. I even declined additional resources from other companies, as I felt we had enough to meet our response needs. These other companies included Safety First from Drayton Valley, Safety Boss from Edmonton, New Venture from Whitecourt, Superior Fire Control from Grande Prairie and Elite Oilfield Services from Clairmont.
On the morning of July 25, most of our crews were assembled at the Hinton UFA cardlock so we could convoy into Jasper. All crews drove through the night to get to Hinton for the morning. At 9:11, we departed the Hinton UFA cardlock and made our way to Jasper with the understanding from Pursuit and the Parks Canada liaison that we had permission to enter. We got to the first set of roadblocks west of Hinton and were denied entry at the order of Parks Canada incident command and turned around.
We attempted again to make entry to the park after we believed we had the issue figured out at 15:42, but we were once again denied entry. At 16:49, we were finally granted entry to Jasper Park. At 18:55, we got to the Jasper fire hall and checked with the structure protection specialist.
We split our teams up to do a hasty check of properties we were assigned to. We were not granted access to Marmot Basin, the Jasper tram or Maligne Lake Road. Of the properties we were able to access, none received damage. Of the properties we could not access, the Wilderness Kitchen was destroyed—an approximate value of $12.5 million.
We did not see any signs of active fire behaviour at this time. We returned back to Hinton. Our crews were exhausted from driving all night to Jasper, and they were morally deflated from not being able to help in time.
Throughout the Jasper fire, we encountered numerous examples of Parks Canada fire management actively obstructing our activities and not providing us with relevant information on the fire. We were provided with rules of engagement that we had to accept or be escorted out by park wardens. It was reiterated twice by a Parks Canada operations section chief, the second in charge to the incident commander, that we were not legally allowed to be there.
These rules of engagement included not being part of the incident management organization. Wildfire Defense Systems from Montana, which was hired by other insurers, was allowed to be part of the incident management organization. During the impingement and these rules of engagement, we were also ordered to not fight fire. We were denied access to Marmot Basin and the Jasper tram until July 29. It was clear that fire behaviour still threatened those sites, and our delayed ability to access those locations put the economic viability of Jasper at risk.
We were denied access to the Athabasca River or to the hydrant system, or to No Surrender and Fire and Flood Emergency Services water systems to get water for firefighting. We had to bring in eight 400-barrel tanks from Hinton. We had to bring in numerous truckloads of water from Hinton. The approximate cost to our client was $60,000 just to bring in water to fight the fire—