Good afternoon, everyone.
Thanks for the opportunity to appear on your screen here today.
I am a professor at the University of British Columbia, as you've heard, and I'm speaking to you today from Vancouver, which is situated on the unceded traditional territories of the Musqueam, the Squamish and the Tsleil-Waututh nations. I believe a member of one of those nations is here today. I think so. It's hard for me to tell on the screen.
I resigned from my role as co-chair of the net-zero advisory body last December, and I did so with a heavy heart. It was a real honour and privilege to work with the other members, including Ms. Abreu, to provide independent advice on pathways to net-zero emissions for Canada. I enjoyed the work, I enjoyed the people and I remain grateful to the federal government for the opportunity to do that work.
As a legislated body, as we've just heard, the net-zero advisory body can provide a unique service to the government. Unlike all the other voices that seek to influence climate and energy policy, the NZAB and its members have no vested interests: You fire the members and they all go back to their day jobs.
Countries around the world, as was alluded to in the last statement—and this includes the U.K., across the EU, Korea and Australia, all these countries that Canada is trying to build stronger economic relationships with—benefit from similar legislated climate councils, similar bodies that also have no need to curry favour to gain access to power. They're going to be honest with you.
The NZAB structure, to be honest, however, was never ideal, and after last year's election, a series of structural yet manageable challenges, which had plagued the NZAB from its creation, expanded into full-blown crises. I'll highlight three of them here.
First, the NZAB's work—and this should be obvious—is pertinent across government, yet the body serves only the Minister of the Environment and Climate Change, who often, particularly in the current government, is not leading the relevant policy file. For example, last summer, we completed research on industrial pricing and on equivalence agreements with the provinces that was highly relevant, well beyond ECCC. We volunteered to brief people across government and received no response from the Prime Minister's Office and nothing but an acknowledgement from the office of the Minister of Energy and Natural Resources.
The second point is that in successful climate councils, the work is aligned with government policy timelines. This was the exception, not the rule, for the NZAB, with the one key exception of the 2024 annual report, I'll say, in which we gave advice on the 2035 emissions target and what can be done to reach the 2030 target. However, the gap with government policy timelines worsened under the current government. We were not informed of policy decisions under way nor asked to provide advice on those decisions.
If you add in the ongoing structural challenges we had, like procurement rules slowing our research process and just the awkwardness of the staff for the secretariat being ECCC employees who were being asked to work with us at times to critique the government, it became very difficult for us to produce any work of value.
The third point I'll highlight is that the member appointment process is extremely arduous, and the government simply did not plan adequately in advance. Last summer, the NZAB was down to six members. Despite repeated requests from me personally, I received no answers from the minister's office about a timeline for future appointments. By late fall, it had become evident that due to government inaction, I would have to continue chairing an understaffed body without a francophone counterpart for at least another six months, and I have to say that this is a workload that was completely unsustainable for me last year.
When the Canada-Alberta memorandum of understanding was released and the private briefing on our annual report scheduled for the next day was cancelled by the minister's office, I concluded that the NZAB's work had become performative.
To be clear about this, I was comfortable chairing an advisory body whose advice was considered but ultimately rejected by the government because, after all, we're not elected representatives like the rest of you. I was not, however, comfortable with the process becoming performative, in which we had little or no opportunity for our work to actually inform policy.
In addition, as the chair of the NZAB, and the sole chair at that time—and by rule, then, its spokesperson and its liaison with the minister's office—the MOU represented a direct challenge to my professional integrity, because I wasn't just the chair of the NZAB; I'm a scientist. I was inundated with requests for my professional judgment on the content of the MOU and the government's intentions with the MOU. I felt pressured to soften that assessment because of this uncertainty and the lack of conversation with the minister's office. That softening of my assessment is incompatible with my responsibilities as a scientist and a professor at a public institution. I simply can't do that. That's not my job.
Scientists like me only earn a seat at the table because of the integrity of our discipline, and I felt I could no longer serve people whom I felt were not being honest and forthright themselves. Therefore, I submitted a private resignation letter to the minister and then immediately afterwards informed the NZAB members. I announced that decision publicly a couple of days later.
I'll just conclude—thank you for the time—by saying that I'm a scientist and that this experience taught me that the goal of net-zero emissions is about so much more than fighting climate change and so much more than climate science. It's about building a prosperous future for Canada. Much of the world is rapidly transitioning to clean energy, as we just heard, and if we don't change our strategy, we really risk being left behind.
Thank you.