Thank you very much for inviting me here today.
I am a self-employed privacy consultant who has been living and breathing PIPEDA since the law was first tabled in Parliament back in 1998. I'm something of a privacy law expert, or at least people refer to me that way. Although I am not a lawyer—and my clients always tell me they're glad I'm not—I'm willing to attempt to answer any questions you may have about the law and give you the best insights I can.
I look forward to a dialogue with you and to the opportunity to address, to the best of my ability, any aspect of the law that you wish to ask about and how it works in practice.
PIPEDA is important legislation. It establishes a fundamental right to privacy in the commercial marketplace and sets out a framework under which the interests of citizens in controlling their personal information are balanced against the needs of businesses to collect, use, and disclose it for reasonable purposes.
By and large, this balancing of interests works very well, and by and large, PIPEDA is a good law. In fact, as someone who helped write the CSA code that is a fundamental underpinning of this law, I have found it remarkable at times just to look back on it and notice how durable this law really is. The CSA principles were very well crafted and have stood up very well over the years, despite the fact that there's some complexity in the wording in places.
Despite the lack of clarity, the law is founded upon broad concepts that are solid and provide a basis for reasonable people to make reasonable judgments about how their personal information should be protected. This review process is nevertheless a very important opportunity to fix some problems with the law and to make it even more effective, more efficient for business in some ways, and more fair to the public in others.
To the comments that have been made that it is too soon to hold this review, I would say that is not the case. There are problems that need fixing right now on the basis of six years of application of the act, the insights gained from the next generation laws in Alberta and B.C., and growing concerns over such public issues as identity theft. The work you are doing right now about such problems is extremely important and will have a major impact on making PIPEDA an even better law in the years to come.
From the back rows, I've been intently watching the other witnesses over the past several weeks, and I've decided at this juncture to restrict my formal comments to addressing seven issues. I understand that my brief has not been translated but will be available soon.
I think the seven issues I'll be focusing on in my written submission are all important issues, some of which have not yet received a lot of attention. I'd be pleased to talk about any one of these. They are the question of commissioner powers; access barriers to the Federal Court; consent in the employment relationship; breach disclosure; attempted collection without consent; collection for national security purposes; and collection without knowledge or consent for administrative law purposes.
Of these seven issues, in my oral comments I want to speak about three of them. The first is breach notification.
Identity theft is a major problem and it affects the entire marketplace, even responsible companies that have strong data safeguards and have never encountered a breach. The costs of security breaches and identity theft are borne throughout the marketplace and result in higher costs to goods and services, and as importantly, lead to a diminished public trust in data sharing.
Responsible companies may believe that breach notification rules should be left up to them, and I have no doubt that responsible companies will act responsibly in this regard, mindful of the reputational risk, fiduciary responsibilities, and other such factors. However, as Canadian Marketing Association President John Gustavson once remarked about the need for a privacy law, when he advocated for one, in the world of privacy, the world is not made up of responsible companies.
There needs to be a mechanism that will enforce responsible behaviour throughout the marketplace, especially in this area.
Looking at the mechanics of breach notification, I am proposing a four-point model that I think is clear, fair, strong, realistic, and protects the public interest.
The first point is that there would be a duty to notify that would apply to all types of sensitive information, not just financial data. For example, a breach of health records can cause as much harm and damage to the individual as loss of information that could lead to identity theft.
Secondly, organizations should have some discretion to determine when to notify the public, but that should be based upon not just their own self-assessment on their own factors, but also upon an objective standard such as the reasonable persons standard that is currently embedded in the act, which forces organizations to act prudently.
They must notify the Privacy Commissioner when a reasonable person would consider it appropriate to do so and must make this notification in a short, legally prescribed timeframe following a breach. When they notify the Privacy Commissioner, under my model, they would be required to describe the impacts of the breach, the efforts taken to mitigate it, and what decision was made to notify affected persons. If they decide not to notify persons, which should not happen in most cases, but there could be exceptional circumstances, they must explain why they choose not to. The Privacy Commissioner could then question these decisions that were made.
The really important point about breach exposure, though, is that we need to have enforcement tools, and in this regard I believe it should be an offence under the act to fail to disclose notice of a breach where a reasonable person would expect that disclosure to have taken place. That offence should have similar penalties as other offences in the act.
To further back up enforcement, I think the act should state that whistle-blower rights specifically apply where employees notify the Privacy Commissioner about a breach.
My second point deals with consent in the employment context. I have seen enough evidence through PIPEDA complaint investigations and Federal Court decisions to satisfy myself that the requirement for employment consent for new purposes that are reasonable ones in the workplace imposes a huge administrative burden on companies and can and does lead to situations where employees exercise a right to refuse consent in an arbitrary manner and for what are really justifiable information collection purposes.
The Alberta and B.C. laws foresaw this problem. They wisely removed the requirement that consent be required in the employment relationship, moving instead to a standard where purposes must be identifiable, and actually identified to the individual, and must be reasonable.
I've seen no evidence whatsoever to indicate that the Alberta and B.C. model does not work well or that any real privacy rights of employees are trampled as a result of this model.
I undertook a very detailed analysis of the consent issues in my written submission, which I hope you will take a look at.
My final comments deal with a matter that has not received very much attention so far, and that's the way in which the Public Safety Act, 2002, amended PIPEDA to permit private sector organizations to collect new information about customers or employees, or about any other party on their own for purposes related to national security, defence of Canada, and the conduct of international affairs, or to do so at the request of a national security agency.
In making these amendments, which were added in the wake of 9/11 and the heightened concern for public security, PIPEDA enters a very different sphere than normal commercial business activity. With these amendments, organizations can, on their own or at the prompting of a state, undertake the kind of information collection that is normally undertaken only by state agencies and where our society has recognized a need for the highest level of constitutional protections under the charter.
With these amendments, because they enable a business to collect new information about a person on the suspicion of a security threat or to do so at the request of the RCMP or other security agencies, there's a great risk that charter rights could easily be offended.
As you know, private businesses are not subject to the charter directly, and in some cases have very little knowledge or understanding that charter rights could therefore be trampled if they collect information in ways that would not be considered reasonable. Moreover, if private companies are co-opted by security agencies to collect such information on their behalf, there's also a further risk that such agencies could use PIPEDA to bypass or to do an end run on their charter obligations.
In my written submission I made the effort to explain in great detail the nature of my concerns. This is a complex issue. I hope you'll take the time to read these detailed comments and consider them carefully.
I must stress that I am not a lawyer and not schooled in the intricacies of constitutional law and charter rights. However, as a privacy consultant who studies the details of PIPEDA very carefully, I was struck the moment I saw these new Public Safety Act amendments that there was a grave and real risk that charter rights--first section 8 and possibly section 7--could be violated if such collections of information ever took place. As constitutionally protected rights are at issue here, I urge the committee as a matter of public duty to give this issue the attention it deserves, and I recommend that it report to Parliament that the government should reconsider these amendments with a view to removing them from the act.
Thank you for the opportunity to give you my comments. I must say, in closing, that as a privacy consultant I am constantly asked in training sessions all kinds of questions about the act, and I'd be glad to answer any question you've got about the act and how it works.