Evidence of meeting #46 for Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics in the 39th Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was report.
A recording is available from Parliament.
Liberal
Carolyn Bennett Liberal St. Paul's, ON
Is he asking permission of the chair? He said, “Let me”. I think that was asking.
Liberal
Conservative
Mike Wallace Conservative Burlington, ON
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Paragraph 15(1)(h) of the act reads:
that constitutes diplomatic correspondence exchanged with foreign states or international organizations of states or official correspondence exchanged with Canadian diplomatic missions or consular posts abroad;
I am guessing that the piece of information, or some of the information, in the report, Good Governance, Democratic Development and Human Rights, was likely done via correspondence. That correspondence was either provided by Government of Canada officials who are on the ground, or it could have been provided by Afghan officials to Canada, and it was built into this report.
So, clearly, if the communications come from diplomatic correspondence or from exchanges with foreign countries, such as Afghanistan, and if these are believed to have a detrimental effect, based on what I have read, they have the right to black those out and to bring them back to the individual who made the ATI request.
Now, I don't know this for sure, because we haven't seen the report. As for anything reported in the Globe and Mail, I don't know if anybody knows how accurate that is, because the report hasn't been made public.
So we should be dealing with the real documents, not other stuff that people have put together. But we don't know what's in there, because we haven't had the right to see it. I have agreed with that position. Others haven't, and they have appealed that to the Information Commissioner, and he will make a decision. But we won't know that decision because we're moving ahead quickly before they have a chance to discuss the issue and do the proper investigation.
Paragraph 15(1)(i) reads:
relating to the communications or cryptographic systems of Canada or foreign states used
(i) for the conduct of international affairs,
(ii) for the defence of Canada or any state allied or associated with Canada, or
(iii) in relation to the detection, prevention or suppression of subversive or hostile activities.
Now, I'm not sure what's in there, but when we see it, it may have been in relation to the suppression of subversive activities. There could have been something in there about that. That is why the ATI person from this department who, in my uneducated understanding, has years and years and years of experience on this topic, and probably is very, very busy, because of all the work that's done—which doesn't mean you don't do good work.... My view, Mr. Chairman, is that busy people often do high-quality work, because they're used to the topic and become familiar with all of the issues surrounding it. I'm thinking that in this case, that is a clear possibility.
The act also...because it's not necessarily clear to everyone.... And I'm sorry that I'm only speaking English today, but that is my ability, and I am trying to learn French—and all I can say about it is that it is “going”.
Anyway, there is a definition subsection, so that people understand the definitions. Subsection 15(2) reads:
“defence of Canada or any state allied or associated with Canada” includes the efforts of Canada and of foreign states toward the detection, prevention or suppression of activities of any foreign state directed toward actual or potential attack or other acts of aggression against Canada or any state allied or associated with Canada;
So we clearly identify what an allied state is, and obviously Afghanistan is an allied state of Canada.
There is no question of any person looking at the ATI request and saying Afghanistan is not an allied state and that the report should not be viewed in that manner. Obviously with the military and humanitarian support we'll provide until 2009, and which this parliament had agreed to under the Liberal government, I think it's clear that we have been there a while—about five or six years now—and that we're doing great work, both military and humanitarian, and that this is part of the defence of Canada. So it meets the definition set out in the act.
Now, “subversive or hostile activities”.... Some people's definition of that might be different, but it's clear in the act what the definition is. It reads:
espionage against Canada or any state allied or associated
So it doesn't even have to be a spy here in Canada, or a spy about Canada. If somebody is in Canada spying on a foreign country, say, Afghanistan, or the United States, or one of our other allies--Britain, Australia--we have the right, based on the act, with the access to information, with the exemption that's provided under “International affairs and defence” under the “Definitions” portion.... We can prevent others from getting that information, if it's been provided by other governments or by our government, that may affect the activities that may constitute espionage, that may affect not only Canada but also other countries. And that's clearly set out in the definitions.
That may have been a part of this person's thinking pattern and decision-making when it came to deciding which parts would be released under the ATI request or not.
The second part is “sabotage”. Now, in this case we're talking about a report entitled Afghanistan 2006: Good Governance, Democratic Development and Human Rights. I don't know what's in the report because of course I haven't seen it in its entirety, but sabotage, obviously, is an important issue that could have been part of the decision-making. Based on the information that's in this report, that it was designed for the government to review and to make policy decisions that help prevent sabotage, not only in Afghanistan but also here in Canada, it is inappropriate, and obviously set out in the legislation...that's a possibility for why the ATI individual in the Department of Foreign Affairs may have decided that some of that information, knowing how it was provided, was not publicly available at this particular time.
Paragraph 15(2)(c) says:
activities directed toward the commission of terrorist acts, including hijacking, in or against Canada or foreign states,
Obviously under the previous administration, under the Liberal government, we had the very tragic events of 9/11. Security, obviously, became an important issue of the day, and continues to be a very important issue for Canada and for other free nations around the world. Hijacking is actually mentioned. Terrorist acts are clearly indicated as a potential reason--a part of the definition of “subversive or hostile activities”--and these issues are clearly defined in the act, under the “Definitions” section. The information that was included in this report, that we're asking to have reviewed and seeing here before the Information Commissioner has a look at it...could easily have had information that would either have affected or had information regarding terrorist acts or hijackings, or any other events, not just against Canada...but also the possibility of it happening in foreign states, and of course that could be Afghanistan.
Paragraph 15(2)(d) reads:
activities directed toward accomplishing government change within Canada or foreign states by the use of or the encouragement of the use of force, violence or any criminal means,
So obviously under the definition of “hostile activities”, there could have been issues to deal with criminal activity that had been taking place or may have been taking place, or with the prevention of criminal activity. But if, in the opinion of the person in the ATI office, the information, whatever the report says, actually made it to the public, made it to the newspapers, and maybe made it to those who were trying to overcome in Afghanistan, and they were able to use that information to promote criminal activity, to promote violence, to use force, that information would be inappropriate to be in the public domain.
That could be a reason why it's there. But we won't know, Mr. Chairman, because we have a motion in front of us to deal with this urgently, prior to the Information Commissioner and his staff doing the work, seeing the information that's there and applying the criteria.
I'm just on the “Definitions” part of section 15. There are a number of other acts, 13 in total, where this could have made a difference--
Conservative
Conservative
Mike Wallace Conservative Burlington, ON
I don't have that one in front of me right now, but it might be in my pile. I'll certainly get there sometime today.
The next part of the “Definitions”, paragraph 15(2)(e), reads:
activities directed toward gathering information used for intelligence purposes that relates to Canada or any state allied or associated with Canada
So if you were confused about what is meant by the gathering of intelligence information, this definition clearly sets that out in the act, an act that has been around since 1983, I believe. But these exemptions clearly indicate to anybody who's in an ATI role in any department—and of course we're dealing with someone from Foreign Affairs. This act doesn't just apply to Foreign Affairs, but to every department across the government. And there are ATI individuals in every department who go through these requests for information and, for the most part, I think, provide the information on the most timely basis possible.
There are issues, which we have heard about, where it takes time, and more time than we would maybe like. I make no apologies that when it comes to the protection of Canada and our allies, they look at the exemption portion of the responsibilities of government and look at where these go.
So under “Definitions”, when it's about information used for intelligence, I'm not sure what information was in this report on good governance and democratic development and human rights, but it could be used against Canada or Afghanistan, because of the information in it. We won't know that, because we haven't seen the report. The report sent to the public was blacked out. Maybe it was blacked out for the right reasons, but, again, we don't know that, because the Information Commissioner has not ruled on it. And he hasn't ruled on that, even though my motion would have allowed him, or his office, to rule on that. My motion would have allowed us to call him and ask him what he was doing, what information was in there on this particular item that should or should not have been blacked out. Then we'd have something to work on.
Otherwise, I'm not sure where we're going with this motion, because the motion says we should deal with it urgently, and we may not have any information. If we deal with it next week, are we then done with it if they come and say to us, well, we're not available or not able to provide the information because it is under investigation? So our urgency may not be their urgency. But my guess is that they understand the political importance of this document and will be working on this to make sure it is done appropriately.
Paragraph 15(2)(f) reads:
activities directed toward threatening the safety of Canadians, employees of the Government of Canada or property of the Government of Canada outside Canada.
This is a very important piece, in my mind. The paragraph talks about activities directed toward threatening the safety of Canadians, and we don't just mean Canadians here at home or the Canadians we have in the field in Afghanistan doing military work, who are actually Government of Canada employees. I would just remind members of committee that our fine men and women who are in our uniform representing our country and doing very dangerous, very tough, very important work for us in Afghanistan are Government of Canada employees. We have to do what we can to make sure their activities and safety are not threatened by any information that could be gleaned from a complete release of the report, Afghanistan 2006: Good Governance, Democratic Development and Human Rights.
Now, it may or may not have that information in there. We don't know that; we will not know that. I heard earlier, as brought up by my colleague, that there might be an unblacked-out report that somebody thinks they have and that was provided in the ATI access piece. I'm not sure how legal it is to have that document. And I'm not a lawyer, so I'm not going to comment on that, because you wouldn't want me to comment on the legality of these pieces.
But my view is that, as a committee, we should be looking at what was legally obtained and not encouraging people to get illegal government documentation, or any type of documentation garnered illegally, and treating it as evidence. That's like saying that if somebody breaks into another company and they're here about theft of their information, about identity theft—which we were dealing with earlier today.... If they got the information, but they had to break in to get it, and stole it, I think we should not be ruling that as something we would consider. I think that goes far beyond our obligations and our responsibilities to uphold the law. If somebody obtains something illegally, it should be deemed inadmissible here in this jurisdiction. I would caution anybody who brings anything forward that has an illegally obtained piece of information, that this may expose them to others getting involved--maybe those who uphold the law, from a criminal perspective, getting involved--and not us.
There are a number of reports, Mr. Chairman, that are referenced. So if you wanted to know where the government of the day, and then supported by the House of Commons, got that information, there were court decisions from 2002, decisions not involving the Information Commissioner.
In 2002 there was a report on section 15, on “International affairs and defence”. This report was done before we were in government and dealt with the exemption issues that are here in this piece, and we're supporting why those exemptions are in here.
There was another report about it, an index of case studies, case summaries, that had happened between 1994 and 2002, again, when the legislation was introduced and passed. Then the previous Liberal folks were in charge, I would say. They were the government.
Here's a number of case studies that they looked at, again, to help support these exemptions that are in this first piece, number 15.
That's available to the committee to help you make a decision on whether this blacking-out piece was done appropriately. I don't know if we're ever going to make that decision here. That's not really our role. I think that's the role of the Information Commissioner and the courts, if required.
In 2001-02 there was the Imperial Consultants of Canada Ltd. v. Canada case. This wasn't a Foreign Affairs issue. This was a Ministry of Citizenship and Immigration.... Foreign Affairs, of course, is usually involved in these topics, but this case specifically dealt with the exemption rulings in section 15 and basically supports what's in there.
In 2001-02, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade did a report. Again, that was under the Liberal government. In 2001-02, the “Performance Negatives”...“Antiterrorism and Secrecy”.... So there was a report done to show where we were going in terms of legislation and how the access to information legislation was working, particularly with the exemptions, and particularly on the “International affairs and defence” piece in section 15.
In 2000-01, there was a report done for disclosing e-mail addresses, which really may have had an influence on international affairs and defence because those e-mail addresses may be able to be used for other purposes.
In 2000-01, “Reform of Cabinet Confidences”, they actually looked at what constitutes a cabinet confidence and how it relates to the information act, particularly with the exemptions to international affairs. Again, it supports what's in this section.
In 2000-01, section 15, “International affairs and national defence”, another report. There have been two other court cases, not involving the actual commissioner, in 1999-2000 and in 1998-99.
So for this particular section, section 15, I've read you each paragraph, which I know you've taken in. I'm hoping this helps you understand at least that section on international affairs and defence, why it's important that we hear from the commissioner first, based on their review of what was available or not.
Of course, we did not and do not have any legally obtained report--the Good Governance, Democratic Development and Human Rights--and I haven't seen the blacked-out report piece, but we have some information here. The definitions are here...the backup reports of why this is important and why it's justified in the law. If this motion passes, we'll certainly call the Information Commissioner and see if he or the deputy commissioner will be able to shed any light on this. My guess is not, because it's in the process and we can't do anything about it.
There is another section about “Safety of individuals”. It's also under the “Exemptions”international area; it's under the “Responsibilities of government” area, which we take very seriously on this side of the House. We do have a responsibility to the people of Canada, to our people in the field in Afghanistan.
We have another section that talks about the safety of those individuals. It says:
The head of a government institution may refuse to disclose any record requested under this Act that contains information the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to threaten the safety of individuals.
I don't know how much clearer we can be than that. This document may, based on the view of the person responsible for this role in the department...whether they've made a decision that the safety of individuals will be an important piece in this act or in this documentation....
The issue is about Good Governance, Democratic Development and Human Rights. One section is about human rights, and we have to make sure that any information that is released doesn't affect human rights or that any information that might be disclosed doesn't threaten the safety of the individuals.
So we have a tremendous number of Canadians on the ground in Afghanistan who are working there every day. Does this information that may be in this report provide a security risk to them? I don't know, and we won't know till the commissioner of information rules on it. But if this passes, we're not sure what would happen with it.
So I'm opposed to the motion as it's presented because I am not sure it goes to protect the safety of individuals. And that's said for our Canadian people.
Clearly in the definitions of this act we also have an obligation and a responsibility to the people of Afghanistan, that they are also protected, based on the information we may have that may have been provided by their government and that may have formed part or all of this report. I don't know what part it forms; it may form no part of this report. But I'm guessing that we have had some consultation with them, since we're doing a review of what's going on in Afghanistan in 2006, and that they have provided us with information about the progress they're making from either a democratic point of view...how their government is operating, the social net they are starting to develop, the military aspects, the policing aspects of what they are doing.
So they have issues that they may have presented to us about the issue of policing, for example, which directly goes to the safety of individuals, not only of individuals who are on the ground, who are Canadian, but also of the individuals who are Afghan civilians. In particular, maybe there are some issues in there about the Afghan police and their development, and that could be a threat to the work they're doing and to their own personal safety if this information had been released.
Now, I don't know if it should have been released or not. We haven't seen the report. It's blacked out. Of course, the Information Commissioner has received a number of complaint applications on this, and he will rule on that. He and his office and his investigators will get to see the report, in whole, which we don't, or we shouldn't, and he will make a determination and get back to us. His responsibility is to the House of Commons, not to this committee, to get back to the House on whether more information could have been released. That could be a few sentences, it could be the whole thing, or it could be nothing, based on what I've been reading about our exemptions that have been put in the act, which the ATI person could have been using to make their decision.
At the end of the day this isn't done with a machine; this is done by individuals who have been involved in the organization and the act and the issues dealing with access to information for many, many years. My understanding is that it was not a new person who made these decisions but somebody who has been involved in this and has a clear understanding of what the responsibilities are.
The individual person makes the decision. Could they have been wrong? Absolutely, because I have been wrong once or twice before—
Conservative
Mike Wallace Conservative Burlington, ON
It's true, and I normally deal with any item relating to me, and if corrective action needs to be taken, that's great. But it's not for us to do that. We can talk about the policy aspects of the exemptions. Do these need to apply? Do they need to be changed? Do the definitions need to be improved, whether in sections 15 or 17? The fact is we have the law in front of us and we don't have the position or ability to make that decision.
We have professional people whom we have asked to do an independent review of this. We have asked them to do it. People have asked them to do it; I didn't ask them to do it, but the individual requester did. After that is dealt with and the commissioner rules on it—and I do use the word “rules”, because that's what it is, as the commissioner gives his opinion.... And the commissioner told us previously that they can't compel a department to do something, but they work on that, and in the vast majority of cases it works. But I do have a list of 50 some items where it didn't work. Maybe we should review what the differences were under the Liberal regime, where they refused to make the change the commissioner offered. Maybe they had good reasons, but they had to go to court over it, and they lost. So we should look at that in the future, I think. So I'll be thinking about that and pursuing that.
We don't have the answers that we have on this section. Now, this section hasn't gone by without its own review. And let me tell you about reports. They're all 2002 or older, so it's not as if the Conservative Government of Canada, the new government of Canada, has made some major change to this. We are doing what the law sets out, the law that we haven't changed, the law that we are working on with these issues. The exemptions I'm talking about have to do with the responsibility of government. I've talked about the importance of our relationships in Foreign Affairs and that the exemption applies to international affairs and defence.
The exemption I'm talking about now deals with the safety of individuals, and it makes sense that we have the ability to protect people, both our people and our allies, with the information they may have provided us in confidence. Could you imagine if Canada provided another country with information in confidence, so they could make a policy or a diplomatic decision to work with us—whether they wanted to come to Afghanistan and be part of that major effort we have, both from a humanitarian and military point of view—but that information was released in the country and put that government, which should have been making an informed decision, on the hot seat, because the local press in that country was making something of the information they had?
Decisions need to be made on information. We all make decisions on information. Some of that information is confidential, and this country provides confidential information to other countries about Canada, about their country, and other countries we may be dealing with, that will help protect the safety of individuals and international affairs and defence—and those are just two parts of the act.
But of the reports I want to reference, there is one from 2002 that includes a section...it's Strong Medicine For Delays. That report, I think, would tell you that the issue of protecting the safety of individuals is very, very important, and that any delay in that could be detrimental to those individuals. So I would recommend you read this report, and it supports the exemption in the act.
There was also a report in 2002 about the safety of individuals, or section 17 of the act, a specific report making sure the exemption we have put in the act does what it's intended to do in terms of protecting Canadians, not only at home but also abroad, and our allies around the world.
Again, this isn't done in isolation. There are a number of reports here, Mr. Chairman. A bunch of case studies have been done, and there are case summaries that can be...and these cases happened from 1994 to 2002.
The report I referenced earlier, the Imperial Consultants Canada Ltd. v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), dealt with the issue of the safety of individuals. It was supportive of the responsibilities of the government. It was supportive of this exemption that exists in this piece of legislation that has been developed and that has been supported by the vast majority of parliamentarians over the last couple of decades.
There is also the report, which I referred to before, that was done under the Liberal regime, in terms of reform of cabinet confidence. It upholds the exemption piece on the safety of individuals and that this is an appropriate exemption in the act for the responsibilities of government. There is a section there; it's listed in the act.
If you want some of this information, you can get it right off the Internet. It is available to everybody to read, not just to us, as parliamentarians, of course, but to all Canadians. In fact, with the use of the Internet now, basically the whole world can look at this.
In 2001 there was a report, Strong Medicine for Delays, which I mentioned, but there's another section in there that you should be looking at.
There's an important one in 1999-2000, Fear of Retribution, which is another very important piece to look at. It was reviewed with the concept that the safety of individuals should have an exemption in the Access to Information Act that would help protect individuals from the fear of retribution.
And who knows? I don't know. You don't know whether any of the information in the report that's entitled Afghanistan 2006: Good Governance, Democratic Development and Human Rights, which is what we're debating here today, in terms of its release, in terms of its blacked-out form, would have been detrimental to somebody's safety, both Canadian or non-Canadian, in Afghanistan or at home here. Would there have been a fear of retribution if that information got out? I don't know what that form of retribution might be. It might have been a prison term. Hopefully, it would not be, but it could have been violence of some sort. It could have been loss of a job. I don't know what that retribution would entail.
Of course, we don't know that. We shouldn't know that, as the report has been sent to the Information Commissioner to rule on what other areas can be released. And we should be waiting for that decision to be made. I have full faith in the commissioner that this committee unanimously supported that they would make good decisions.
And we quoted...and Madame Lavallée was mad at me for quoting from it. He wrote a book on House procedure--he and his partner. We have a lot of faith in that book.
Conservative
Mike Wallace Conservative Burlington, ON
And we should continue to have faith in this individual making an appropriate decision on that.
So those are two areas that I'd like to talk about.
I have one final spot, if I have time, Mr. Chair.
Conservative
Mike Wallace Conservative Burlington, ON
Merci beaucoup.
The exemption is in section 21. Again, it's under “Operations of Government”. It's not something the Conservatives brought in. It's a part of the act that all ATI employees of this government--and previous governments--use to decide whether the information should be released or whether it does really affect the operation of government.
That's a tough decision, because I believe we do need to look at the access to information piece—and I've spoken to my colleague from the New Democratic Party on this outside the committee room, and I was actually quoted in the press earlier on—to make sure that people get the information that they are rightly entitled to, and in a timely manner.
But “rightly entitled to” doesn't mean the government of the day should be required to provide information that was provided in confidence or that would be damaging to the operations of government. And operations of government doesn't mean buying pencils and booking rooms and going to meetings; operations of government also has to do with our military and where we're going with our military.
Could you imagine if part of a report that was released gave our enemy in Afghanistan information on what our next move was going to be, in terms of where we were going to be on the road and which area we were going to go after next in terms of rooting out Taliban? Could you imagine what that information would do in terms of their ability to determine where to ambush our own men and women?
You can't just think in terms of the narrow definition of this, because “operations” sound as if they are the day-to-day workings of government in terms of its administrative operations. These go far, far beyond that, and you need to know when information should be released and when it should not.
Based on that, over the years—and rightfully so, I would say—budgets have been kept secret until they're announced, so that nobody in this country or other countries profits from decisions that may have been made and are going to be announced at a certain time on a certain date. That is the operation of government. Can you imagine what it would do to the markets if we didn't have that, and things like those could be released? People would get rich off them. It would be an unfair advantage to those who would get these things. That's why, when you think about the operations of government, you have to think of not just some of the minor things, the day-to-day business of operating this place, but also of the actual documentation or information that would be available if this exemption did not exist.
For example, under the heading “Advice, etc.”, in subsection 21(1), the act says:
The head of a government institution may refuse to disclose any record requested under this Act that contains
(a) advice or recommendations developed by or for a government institution or a minister of the Crown.
I would be surprised if anybody could argue with that. First of all, they may think they're never going to form government; that's a possibility. But those of us who think that someday we will be a government, or are in government, believe there should be an opportunity for a minister of the Crown to be getting confidential advice on different topics, whether economic, environmental, or military—just to pick some big ones. So the advice they get from their staff, and from the individuals who have expertise in the area and who don't necessarily want to be identified with that advice, should be protected with the exemption rule under the heading of “Advice”.
Now, there might have been advice in this document that went to the minister. I don't know that. It did go to the foreign affairs department. I don't know what advice was in there. It may not be a section that the ATI employee used, but it's a possibility. We won't know that, of course, because we won't get a chance. If we call these witnesses, my guess is that because this matter is before the Information Commissioner, they won't be able to comment on this to any extent that will make us any more knowledgeable about the issue than we are now.
But advice is important. Recommendations are important, and they are included in the exemption. Look, on our side and on your side, we give recommendations to ministers. I know I have; I've done it verbally and in writing. That might be public information, and it might not, if it deals with issues of national security or other issues. I haven't provided any of those types of information. In fact, if anybody asked me, I'd be happy to provide what recommendations I have made to ministers.
But there is a sense that a minister of the Crown or a government institution—including, to my understanding, other departments, not just ministries—may have crucial information they don't want to release.
I'll give you a wild example. What if, Mr. Chair, all information was available, if the timing of prison guard changes, how the place is laid out, and the security system that's provided at a prison was public information? That, I don't think, is a good operation of government. I don't think it's a good choice that we allow that to be out there, and that others may use it for the wrong reason, and not just empirical reasons or interest reasons.
In paragraph 21(1)(b) it reads:
an account of consultations or deliberations involving officers or employees of a government institution, a minister of the Crown or the staff of a minister of the Crown
So this exemption to the access to information if a deputy minister or a senior minister in an office or a senior officer of a crown corporation or other organizations provides information or advice, either in writing or verbally—but obviously we're talking in writing because I don't think you can do it verbally—on a particular public policy issue, something that needs to be done to help protect Canadians to do something positive for the environment, to do something that would affect the financial markets for the day, that you cannot in good conscience say that that needs to be public information...that ATI officer in that department has the ability and the right and the knowledge to be able to say this is included in the exemption and it should be exempted because it can injure not Canada, individuals....
I've been using a number of examples, but another great example is the department for public safety. There may be names, there may be all kinds of issues that the minister gets briefed on by his senior officials on security issues for this country. Could you imagine if we didn't have this exemption and those were all public documents?
Conservative
David Tilson Conservative Dufferin—Caledon, ON
I have a point of order, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Wallace has been raising some excellent points. Again, I'd ask that you reconsider your ruling that this motion is out of order.
I realize that we have to wait for witnesses to come before us, but Mr. Wallace is raising the issue that if witnesses come, this may contravene the provisions of the information legislation. So, inadvertently, by allowing that to happen, we do that. Because of that conceivable possibility—I know you could say the witnesses aren't here and it hasn't happened, but I think you would acknowledge that it conceivably could happen, that witnesses could reveal areas that certain ministries, the ministries that Mr. Wallace has been quite correctly referring to, would normally black out, but because they don't have an opportunity to black them out, we, this committee, would contravene the provisions of the information act.
I therefore ask that you reconsider your position and rule this motion out of order.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Tom Wappel
Thank you for the succinct comments. I don't find your submission a point of order. And in any event, I will not reconsider my ruling.
Mr. Wallace, you have the floor.
Conservative
Mike Wallace Conservative Burlington, ON
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you for the breath of fresh air there on that one.
The--
Liberal
Conservative
Mike Wallace Conservative Burlington, ON
I hope to hear them on Tuesday.
On paragraph (c), again, it's under the “Advice” section, I want to make sure this is clear because there may have—
Conservative
Liberal
Conservative
Mike Wallace Conservative Burlington, ON
No, I only move forward, sir.
I haven't dealt with paragraph 21(1)(c), which may have been part of the report on good governance, democratic development and human rights and is referred to in this motion by Madame Lavallée. I don't know if it's in there or not, but let's talk about this paragraph for a moment. It reads:
positions or plans developed for the purpose of negotiations carried on or to be carried on by or on behalf of the Government of Canada and considerations relating thereto
Now this clearly states that if there's any advice dealing with negotiations with the Government of Canada, the government has the right, under the section on advice and the exemptions for the operations of government, to black it out. We don't know if that's the case, because we haven't seen the report. But let's just look at the title of the report, Afghanistan 2006: Good Governance, Democratic Development and Human Rights. I think it's possible that this report may include positions and plans that were developed to help us negotiate with the Afghan government. We don't know that, but clearly, the advice that was provided may have been in writing, both from the other departments.... It could have been from Foreign Affairs and it could have been from the Afghan government. And the advice was maybe then turned into part of the report.
What the act says is that the access to information officer who was assigned to this department has the right, and not just the right but the responsibility, to look at the advice that was given under the operations of government exemption and to black that out so that the public doesn't get it.
The downside, Mr. Chair, is that if this information is released—not just in this report but in any report—who then is going to provide advice to the minister? If you're at risk of saying some very strong things about another government, for example, or an individual department, or a policy or a program the government has, why would anybody want to give advice, particularly in writing, if there's a major risk of it being released to the public before anything is done with it?
What if we were negotiating with another country, or what if a government organization were negotiating with another government organization? Maybe we're negotiating for property. Maybe we're negotiating about getting our people out of a hot military situation. Maybe we're negotiating to go to Darfur with the UN. Maybe we're doing that—maybe—and the minister gets advice on that, but it's in writing and it's from the UN, Sudan, and our allies. But, no, it's not protected, because it's not under an exemption. But it is under an exemption. And this advice that could have come may have been in this report. That may be why the access to information officer blacked it out and made sure that the public and Canadians and our allies were protected from any breach of this.
In fact, if we didn't have this clause in here, for negotiations carried on by or on behalf of the Government of Canada, there'd be very little diplomatic discussion between our countries on moving some agendas forward. It would all be social. We'd have nice social relationships with everybody, which is a good thing--don't get me wrong, we need that part. We need to develop those relationships. But after those relationships are developed, even in our own business, in our own way of operating as members of Parliament, eventually you get down to brass tacks on whatever the issue is, and sometimes you agree and sometimes you don't agree. And if those things are in writing, sometimes they can be damaging not just to Canada but to the country that may have provided that information. And we need to protect that.
That's what this paragraph does. It protects ministries and other departments of the Government of Canada and advice that clearly affects the operations of government and is clearly exempted and clearly could be part of that report that we're debating at present.
Paragraph (d) reads:
plans relating to the management of personnel or the administration of a government institution that have not yet been put into operation.
Clearly, this could be part of the advice that's in Afghanistan 2006: Good Governance, Democratic Development and Human Rights. Mr. Chair, I haven't seen it, but if you put that title in front of me, my guess is that it probably has a lot to do with how things went in 2006. But my guess—and I haven't seen the report—is that it has the ability to say this is what happened in 2006, but this is what we should be doing in 2007, 2008, 2009. Here are the plans. Here's the framework for the plans to be developed, whether that is on humanitarian aid, what we're doing in terms of financial aid, personnel aid. Or it could deal with the military: plans on where we're going to be deployed, who our partners are going to be, who the partners should be, what we should negotiate on, where we should go with it.
So there are a number of issues in terms of plans that very clearly could have been a part of why this person blacked out that part of the report. I don't know if that part of the report is even in there, because I haven't seen that report. It's blacked out, and I think it would be illegal for me to have a copy of the non-blacked-out report because at present that is the position of the ATI committee.
The ATI officer in this case may have used this advice section and clearly believed that any plans or potential plans that could be derived from this shouldn't be released, but it would be released if this documentation wasn't blacked out.
I don't know about my colleagues, but I'm of the opinion that we continue to rely on the ATI experts who we have in these departments. This individual has been there for many years doing this same work, day in and day out.
And we're inspecting....
Can I have a little quiet?
