Good morning, Chair and members of the committee. It's an honour to join you today and to have the opportunity to contribute to your discussion related to misinformation and disinformation. These complex issues cross into a number of different areas of concern for CSIS, as you might imagine, as well as for the government and all Canadians.
Under the CSIS Act, CSIS is mandated to collect intelligence on threats to the security of Canada, to advise government on those threats and, when appropriate, to take measures to reduce them.
Misinformation is incorrect or misleading information that is presented as fact, whereas disinformation is deliberate and deceptive planned messaging to alter narratives. When these activities constitute a threat to the security of Canada, as defined by the CSIS Act, we investigate and we take action. CSIS has long-standing investigations into specific threat actors believed to be targeting Canada's democratic institutions through clandestine, deceptive or threatening means. This is foreign interference.
Foreign states use many tools to counter Canadian narratives and advance their own inflammatory ones.
As state actors become more sophisticated, these threats become harder to identify and counter. A growing number of foreign states have built and deployed programs dedicated to undertaking online influence.
These online influence campaigns attempt to change voter opinions, civil discourse and policy-makers’ choices, as well as sow confusion, discord and distrust in Canadian democratic processes and institutions. They may use a coordinated approach to amplify a single narrative while also promoting inflammatory content.
These tactics can also be leveraged by non-state actors, which can magnify the threat further. Unfortunately, violent extremists use misinformation and disinformation to promote their own narratives, to sow division and discord, and to create mistrust in institutions and authorities in furtherance of a particular ideological position. The spread of misinformation and disinformation online can, in extreme cases, even have the effect of radicalizing individuals to violence.
It is therefore imperative that all Canadians work together. This effort begins with informed and transparent discussions among all levels and branches of government, as well as with communities, academia and businesses. As a committed partner in this effort, CSIS continues to investigate, to provide analysis and advice to government and, when appropriate, to take measures to reduce threats. CSIS also routinely engages and briefs public officials, including members of Parliament, to promote awareness of threat activities and to strengthen individual security practices.
Other tools include stakeholder engagement, which, through education and knowledge dissemination, builds awareness and resilience against these activities in order to protect their interests.
CSIS is keenly aware that diaspora, marginalized and otherwise vulnerable communities are directly targeted by foreign interference and disinformation efforts and are often the most vulnerable in our country. This is why CSIS works hard to listen and better understand the communities that we serve, to establish trusted relationships and to convey threat-related information in multiple languages to increase awareness and resilience to foreign interference, in particular.
The government has proposed amendments to the CSIS Act that seek to close gaps in the legislation. The global shift towards digital communication and technology has widened these gaps. These amendments would enable CSIS to better equip national security partners outside the federal government.
Finally, I will note that I cannot publicly comment on investigations or operational matters in order to protect the safety and security of Canadians. Nonetheless, I welcome this opportunity for a frank and transparent discussion, to the extent possible, and will be happy to answer your questions.
