Information & Ethics Committee on Dec. 12th, 2024

[Daniel Rogers]

The concern, in general, is that the parent company of TikTok Canada is a Chinese entity and subject to PRC laws, which could compel them to act in ways such as getting data or using the platform for other means that the Communist Party of China sees fit. That risk continues to exist.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Is it the case that the Chinese company, ByteDance, operates the algorithm and owns the algorithm?

[Daniel Rogers]

That's my understanding.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Okay.

In terms of that operation, is it in China, in the PRC, that the algorithm is operated?

[Daniel Rogers]

I'm not well placed to speak to the specific operations of TikTok. That would be a better question for them. I imagine that there is a more distributed nature of that. I couldn't speak to that with any credibility.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Okay.

In terms of risk, at least from a theoretical standpoint, it would certainly be an issue to the degree that the algorithm is operated by the Chinese company ByteDance. In order for the algorithm to work, data necessarily would have to be shared with ByteDance. To the degree that the algorithm is being handled by ByteDance in that regard, then yes, pursuant to the 2017 National Intelligence Law, they could be compelled to share data with the Beijing-based regime.

The problem is that I don't see any evidence that this, in fact, has actually happened. It seems to be entirely theoretical.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Thank you, Mr. Cooper.

We're over time.

Mr. Rogers, do you have a quick response to that? It was more a comment than a question, I think.

[Daniel Rogers]

I think I've answered that. I'm happy to—

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Okay.

For the benefit of the committee, I did ask the clerk to reach out to TikTok to see if they would be available, because I thought they would be material to this discussion. As you may or may not know, they did file a legal challenge against the federal government shutdown order, so, not surprisingly, they weren't available to appear today.

Mr. Housefather, you have six minutes. Go ahead.

[Anthony Housefather, Liberal, Mount Royal, QC]

Thank you very much.

Director Rogers, welcome to the committee.

It's nice to see you, Mr. Lynd.

Mr. Cooper's questions were very good, but I don't think they related to the ICA decision. The ICA decision had nothing to do with Canadian users' privacy; it had to do with national security issues other than that. Otherwise, we would have banned the app completely, if we were dealing with the privacy issues.

Is that correct?

[Daniel Rogers]

I hope this answers your question.

Yes, you're right that the ICA decision was specific to TikTok Canada, because that's the transaction that triggered the review.

[Anthony Housefather, Liberal, Mount Royal, QC]

Looking at that, in its legal challenge, TikTok Canada argued that there were procedurally unfair things that happened related to the national security review.

I presume you would disagree with that contention.

[Daniel Rogers]

It's actually important for me to say that CSIS forms one part of that review. Our context in that review is to provide national security advice and assessments, which go into a broader context of decision-making. Very appropriately, the overall decision is not made by CSIS; it's made by others. There are protections around that decision, which include cabinet confidence, national security confidentiality and information that might be proprietary to the company. There's a limit to what I can say specifically, also because there is a matter in front of the courts, which I can't comment on.

I can say that CSIS participated in the decision. We did provide national security advice related to the decision. As I mentioned in my opening remarks, the decision was consistent with the policy. That's about what I can say.

[Anthony Housefather, Liberal, Mount Royal, QC]

I understand.

Without asking you if CSIS gave, in its own advice, the decision to do what the end decision was—which was to require the company to close—can I ask you if CSIS, in its review, found significant security concerns posed by TikTok operations in Canada related to foreign influence?

[Daniel Rogers]

I can say that CSIS did provide national security advice and that we did find that there were national security reasons to be concerned with TikTok Canada's establishment. The ultimate decision was what it was.

[Anthony Housefather, Liberal, Mount Royal, QC]

Was one of the considerations what the American Congress decided to do, which was to say that within a certain amount of time, they would have to sell the company to a domestic or American owner?

[Daniel Rogers]

That's not an input that CSIS would have provided into this decision.

[Anthony Housefather, Liberal, Mount Royal, QC]

You weren't looking at it through anything other than the framework of the law to say yes or no, whether there are concerns that would require you to then take action.

[Daniel Rogers]

That's correct. CSIS has a fairly prescribed role, which is to provide national security assessments to input into the decision-making process.

[Anthony Housefather, Liberal, Mount Royal, QC]

Let me come back to the privacy questions that Mr. Cooper was asking.

The former CSIS director, David Vigneault, had warned Canadians that they should steer clear of the TikTok app because it poses a data security risk.

Would you concur with that advice? Is that also your advice?

[Daniel Rogers]

I think Mr. Vigneault made a reasonable statement there.

I have to stick with my role in CSIS, which is not to make decisions or recommendations on behalf of the government.

I can certainly be clear that there are national security risks that we would assess inherent to TikTok as a platform, relating to what I described earlier about the potential for data, algorithms and other things to be used by the PRC contrary to Canada's interests.

[Anthony Housefather, Liberal, Mount Royal, QC]

While I have you here, is CSIS currently reviewing or has CSIS reviewed the algorithms of TikTok to determine if misinformation is being circulated on TikTok in different areas? For example, are TikTok's algorithms furthering anti-Semitism in Canada by teaching a narrative that turns people or users against the state of Israel?

[Daniel Rogers]

I will certainly say that rhetoric and narratives like the narratives that you describe are pervasive across many social media platforms, not just TikTok Canada. I don't have a specific point to raise here about TikTok Canada's algorithm specifically in relation to that.

As I mentioned earlier, we're very concerned with the amount of content online that serves to radicalize particularly youth against any number of targets, including the Jewish community, the LGBT community and many other targets. That's a trend that we're consistently and increasingly worried about.

[Anthony Housefather, Liberal, Mount Royal, QC]

Would I be at least correct in assuming that this is ongoing activity that CSIS is looking at with respect to monitoring extremism coming through the TikTok platform and other similar platforms being used today in Canada?

[Daniel Rogers]

Yes, it's TikTok and other platforms. In fact, we and our Five Eyes allies, along with our law enforcement allies, recently put out a press release and guidance related to the radicalization of youth online very specifically. It's a challenge for us investigatively, because often people are radicalized only online, and particularly youth. That is a worrying trend.