Evidence of meeting #145 for Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics in the 44th Parliament, 1st session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was data.
A recording is available from Parliament.
Assistant Deputy Minister, Intelligence Collection, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
All I would say is that their primary focus is to protect the Chinese Communist Party. What we're most concerned about, from a CSIS perspective, is foreign interference in Canada and them trying to achieve objectives for their own foreign policy in Canada.
I don't have details handy for the different themes of what they've been involved in, but our concern really is foreign interference in Canada on behalf of the PRC.
Bloc
René Villemure Bloc Trois-Rivières, QC
Do you see a difference in the use of English, Chinese or French, for example?
Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
That's a good question. I don't know if the Chinese use French or English more in Canada. I know they use any technique to effectively reach the majority of Canadians.
In general, there's a much more substantial English ecosystem in the United States, for example, which tends to have an effect on English-speaking Canadians or French-speaking Canadians who consume English media.
Conservative
The Chair Conservative John Brassard
Thank you, Mr. Villemure.
Mr. Green, you have two and a half minutes. Go ahead, sir.
NDP
Matthew Green NDP Hamilton Centre, ON
Thank you very much.
Perhaps the director can answer a question that TikTok itself couldn't answer, or at least wouldn't even entertain. From your perspective, why should I as a member of Parliament not be on TikTok?
Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
That's an excellent question.
The risks I mentioned earlier in one of my responses apply especially to members of Parliament, who may find themselves of interest to the Chinese government as a target of their influence. If your data is on TikTok and China avails itself of that data, it may seek to understand more about you, more about your personal networks and more about the ecosystem that you work in to be able to target foreign interference, espionage, cyber-attacks or other things toward you.
Obviously, as members of Parliament, you have a particular access to and influence with the government that most people don't enjoy, and I can imagine why you would be a particularly interesting target for the Government of China.
NDP
Matthew Green NDP Hamilton Centre, ON
How is that different from the other platforms? Presumably we're in surveillance capitalism, setting aside the state capitalist country of China. What's to say the Chinese, Indian, Russian, Israeli or American governments couldn't simply buy that information directly from Meta, X or any of the other actors that provide these types of platforms?
Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
That's another good question.
I would certainly not say that TikTok is the only concern we have with respect to Chinese access to data and its influence activities. It is one of the things we're concerned about, particularly given the potential for its national security law to apply directly to a company headquartered in China.
One of the primary differences between TikTok and others and between China and others is that China has shown a history of engaging in foreign interference activities specific to Canada. It has a very sophisticated and capable cyber-program for intelligence collection and espionage. It tends to be the number one cyber-actor prominent in Canada. With respect to which government, I think China has distinguished itself in a number of ways.
NDP
Matthew Green NDP Hamilton Centre, ON
Does your threat assessment change if the same types of activities are being observed by an “ally”?
Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
I think CSIS's act and mandate are not country-specific. We look at anything that meets a national security threshold for us and is contrary to Canada's national security interests. Right now, that certainly includes the PRC and tends not to include our allies.
NDP
Matthew Green NDP Hamilton Centre, ON
Wouldn't it be rational to think we're more influenced by American media and American information than we are by other foreign actors?
Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
As I mentioned earlier, the targeting of disinformation by certain foreign actors toward an American ecosystem has knock-on effects for Canadians who consume information in that ecosystem also.
NDP
Matthew Green NDP Hamilton Centre, ON
That's interesting. That wasn't exactly the question I asked, but it's an interesting response. Thank you very much.
I know my time is up, but I'll just say, Mr. Chair, that I still have more questions than we have answers on this. I would really appreciate any information from Mr. Rogers, even if it's at the direction of an in camera briefing. As an opposition member, I feel—and I'm not saying this as a question of privilege, but I'll put it out there—that we still don't have all the information to provide any real analysis on this.
Thank you very much.
Conservative
The Chair Conservative John Brassard
Thank you, Mr. Green.
On that point, I would leave to your discretion and that of other committee members how you want to handle this. The motion passed by the committee was to deal with this in the manner in which we are. Specific requests for witnesses were placed before us, and we're doing everything we can through the clerk to make sure we have those witnesses in front of us. I'll leave to your discretion which way you want to go with this.
We're still trying to get a hold of Mr. Vigneault, the former director of CSIS. Also, as I mentioned, I did invite TikTok. They weren't part of the motion, but I thought they were germane to the study. They respectfully declined given, I assume, the circumstances they're now facing with the civil case.
I'm reminded that there's the minister as well, who has indicated to us that he will be available at the end of January. I think that will be an interesting meeting. We'll see what we can do to get everyone here.
I don't have any other business, so Mrs. Shanahan, go ahead.
Liberal
Conservative
The Chair Conservative John Brassard
I'm leaving it open right now. I will give an indication to the committee. It's a very difficult proposition for me to just say no at this point. I don't know what's going to come up. You'll have an advanced warning. I understand that there's an event that night that you need to be at.
Conservative
The Chair Conservative John Brassard
Mr. Lynd and Mr. Rogers, I want to say, on behalf of the committee, congratulations on your appointments. I can't imagine the work you have in front of you. This committee has been engaged on and involved in the issue of foreign interference, disinformation and misinformation, which I'm old enough to remember used to be called lying. You certainly have a challenge ahead of you.
I want to thank you on behalf of the committee and Canadians. Again, I congratulate you on your appointments. Thank you for being here today and for dealing with the questions of the committee.
Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
Thank you very much. It was a pleasure to be here.
Conservative
The Chair Conservative John Brassard
That's it. Have a great weekend, everyone, and safe travels.
The meeting is adjourned.
