Evidence of meeting #145 for Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics in the 44th Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was data.
A recording is available from Parliament.
Conservative
Michael Barrett Conservative Leeds—Grenville—Thousand Islands and Rideau Lakes, ON
I hear concerns from locally owned businesses in my community that sell their products in Canada using TikTok. What do I say to them? Should they also be concerned?
Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
I think the same advice applies. The data and use of TikTok will be available through the regime we've described. They'll have to make those decisions.
Conservative
Conservative
The Chair Conservative John Brassard
That was a good discussion, Mr. Rogers.
Just to let everybody know, I'm going to Mr. Bains for five minutes.
Mr. Villemure and Mr. Green will have two and a half minutes each.
That will conclude our meeting.
I see a thumbs-up from Mr. Green.
Mr. Bains, you have five minutes. Go ahead.
Liberal
Parm Bains Liberal Steveston—Richmond East, BC
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you to our security intelligence representatives for joining us today.
I'd like to take a moment to thank you for your work, your proactive efforts in community engagement and your work with respect to Bill C-70, specifically on strengthening the Foreign Interference and Security of Information Act, something that hadn't been done in over 20 years. I want to thank you and the department for your efforts there.
I want to start by stating that prolonged operations by TikTok could allow foreign actors to exploit Canadian user data or spread disinformation. Is this an accurate statement in your mind, Director Rogers?
Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
I think I missed the beginning of your question.
I think you asked whether TikTok could allow for the spread of disinformation. Yes, that's true, and it's also true of other social media platforms.
Liberal
Parm Bains Liberal Steveston—Richmond East, BC
Specifically, I said that the operations by TikTok could allow foreign actors to exploit Canadian user data and spread disinformation. Is that accurate?
Liberal
Parm Bains Liberal Steveston—Richmond East, BC
In terms of providing guidance on timelines for winding down the activities of TikTok to minimize potential risk to public safety and our democratic integrity, what has CSIS done?
Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
Our role is to provide advice to the government in that regard. We've provided advice on a number of decision points, including the most recent one to wind up TikTok Canada.
We also collect intelligence, obviously. Where we can collect intelligence that informs the government on how social media platforms are used by foreign adversaries or anyone who would seek to undermine the security of Canada, we do that, and that classified information would factor into future government decisions.
Liberal
Parm Bains Liberal Steveston—Richmond East, BC
Just going back to what my colleague Mr. Barrett raised about having the physical presence of TikTok on Canadian soil versus concerns about the app, can you distinguish the difference between those things?
Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
Yes. As has been pointed out, the app itself can continue to run independent of the presence of TikTok Canada.
Liberal
Parm Bains Liberal Steveston—Richmond East, BC
Is there a difference in risk between having them here...? Is it important for us not to even have them on our soil versus the app itself? I understand they can continue to produce information, take data and use algorithms to scrape people's information on what they're doing, but that's the question.
Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
The review of TikTok Canada individually did raise some national security concerns that were unique to that transaction. In the context of the Investment Canada Act, we review the transaction itself, and that was factored into the government's decision at the time.
Liberal
Parm Bains Liberal Steveston—Richmond East, BC
You talked about our allied partners, the Five Eyes. The government has aligned itself with our allies in recognizing the risks posed by TikTok.
How does CSIS assess Canada's response to these risks compared to that of our allies? What are they doing? Are you all exchanging information to say what is working and what is not working?
Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
It's a very good question. Each of our allies has different regimes for reviewing investments and for placing controls on applications and has other sorts of legislative frameworks. It's not a one-to-one comparison.
For CSIS, our primary activity is to make sure we share and compare intelligence and assessments with our Five Eyes allies. This includes the activities of, for instance, China and others as it relates to the use of social media platforms like TikTok and, I suppose when possible, where mitigation measures have proven effective by doing intelligence collection.
Liberal
Parm Bains Liberal Steveston—Richmond East, BC
TikTok is based out of China. It's a Chinese company, but it's being used by billions of people. Are you able to identify certain hostile nations using it more than others?
Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
I'll invite my colleague to jump in if he knows more than I do.
We've certainly seen foreign actors use many social media platforms, including TikTok. We've been fairly public about concerns with disinformation, misinformation and influence done by Russia, China and others.
Paul, do you want to add to that?
Assistant Deputy Minister, Intelligence Collection, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
Sure.
I would say the concern with TikTok is specific to its association with the PRC. As mentioned here, TikTok collects a lot of personal data and has access to a lot of personal data on your device. CSIS has been very publicly warning about the risks of using TikTok. It's very clear that there's a strategy on the part of the PRC to collect big data and personal data from all around the world.
The PRC is also the primary threat actor in Canada connected to foreign interference. When you have a vast amount of collected personal data and on top of that have AI and machine learning that you can use to sort through that data and use it against people, you can use it for foreign interference, to target individuals, for cyber-attacks, to intimidate, to influence and to compromise in the future.
Really, the concern is the vast access that TikTok allows to personal data and the fact that the PRC's national security laws would compel it to share that data.
Conservative
The Chair Conservative John Brassard
Thank you, Mr. Bains. I felt it important that Mr. Lynd answer that question, so you had a lot more time than normal. It was an important response.
Thank you, Mr. Lynd.
Mr. Villemure, you have the floor for two and a half minutes.
Bloc
René Villemure Bloc Trois-Rivières, QC
Two and a half minutes isn't very long.
Have we seen an increase in interference activities by the Chinese government here in Canada?
Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
We certainly see continued foreign interference by the PRC here in Canada. It has been spectacularly public over the last little while and it concerns CSIS. We are concerned about it specifically in the context of the potential use of social media to provide narratives beneficial to the PRC that may be disinformation or contrary to Canadian interests.
Bloc
René Villemure Bloc Trois-Rivières, QC
You were talking about radicalization a little earlier. I've often read that the Chinese government's goal was to create chaos through false stories.
Do you see a resurgence of certain themes, such as religion, for example? What are the current themes?
Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
You may want to add something about themes, Mr. Lynd.
I think China is particularly seeking to ensure pro-PRC narratives across the community. That's something we've seen fairly regularly. It's not necessarily about causing chaos, but about promoting a narrative that serves its own interests, whether to make it more appealing to Canadians to follow a Chinese perspective, which may be contrary to Canadians' interests, or to try to influence in particular the Chinese diaspora here in Canada.
Paul, is there anything you want to add?