Information & Ethics Committee on March 31st, 2023

[Damien Kurek, Conservative, Battle River—Crowfoot, AB]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chiu.

I'd like to dig down a little on the ethnic media side of things.

Mr. Ho, you mentioned something about that. Could you describe, for the benefit of the committee, how this process is used or weaponized for the benefit of the Communist dictatorship in Beijing?

[Victor L. M. Ho]

The basic principle for the CCP is to intimidate the so-called “hostile voices” in our Chinese community. On the other hand, they manipulate information and misinformation—even fake news—on social media like WeChat and TikTok, to spread official propaganda to sidetrack from the core problem.

For example, in the COVID-19 era, they spread the anti-Asian hate campaign. This was a national, even transnational—it was even in the United States—anti-Asian hate campaign, which made the agenda a racial issue rather than a public health issue. During the election period, they coloured the entire opposite views in the Chinese community—that is, anti-CCP action or commentary—as a racial problem, and sidetracked—

[Damien Kurek, Conservative, Battle River—Crowfoot, AB]

I hate to interrupt, but time is short here.

I have a quick follow-up on that. Because it's often in languages that many Canadians wouldn't understand—Mandarin, Cantonese, etc.—is this the sort of thing that hides in plain sight, Mr. Ho?

[Victor L. M. Ho]

Yes. This is an ethnic language problem, so mainstream society has no idea what has happened in our Chinese community in the past.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Thank you, sir, and thank you, Mr. Kurek.

Mr. Fergus, you have five minutes.

[Greg Fergus, Liberal, Hull—Aylmer, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I would also like to thank all the witnesses who are with us today. I am extremely grateful for their expertise.

Mr. Wilczynski, you said that the way this story played out undermined national security and Canadians' fundamental rights. Can you tell us more about that?

[Artur Wilczynski]

Certainly. I tried to explain a bit earlier that I believe respect for the law is a fundamental component of our democracy. We have to follow the laws that have been made. Laws are made because they are supposed to constrain us to obey the rules and give us a framework for how to act as national security officers. We have special powers that authorize us to conduct investigations and take measures to advance our national interest.

When government officials do not follow the law and do not respect the rules by which we have been appropriately constrained in the compliance that we have put in place to measure our behaviour, the effects are multiple, particularly, I think, on the human rights of individuals. When it's a government official using the powers and authorities to access information and then on their own, outside of the framework of the laws that govern us, deciding to provide that information without context, without explanation and without analysis to a public domain, that violates a whole range of things. It's not only their obligations, but the rights of the individuals named in those disclosures—their rights to privacy and rights to due process.

I think that is profoundly troublesome when people are working in security intelligence, in particular in an enterprise that has had a challenging history in Canada. To do so outside of the rule of law, again, is why I think it's fundamentally anti-democratic.

I'm sorry. Very quickly, I want to pick up on the earlier question, because it's related to it. One of the effects.... I mentioned it a bit in my statement. We in the security intelligence community need far greater diversity in our ranks, precisely so that we are able to understand language and cultural context, and to be able to provide the kind of insight that is essential. When members of those communities feel that we have not lived by the rule of law and we have not protected them to the extent that we need to, our ability to entice them to come and join us and be members of the security intelligence service is negatively affected. That in turn negatively affects our ability to be effective protectors of Canadian national interests.

[Greg Fergus, Liberal, Hull—Aylmer, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Wilczynski. I noticed several people nodding their heads.

Mr. Stanton, you have also talked a lot in the media about these alleged leaks from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, CSIS. Do you think those leaks are actually coming from CSIS, and whatever your answer is, what are your reasons?

[Dan Stanton]

No, I don't. I don't believe they're coming....

I'll be careful how I answer this, because I've been following this quite closely. You have two different lines of...we'll call it reporting with allegations, and there are qualitative differences between them.

People who work in intelligence, in professions like CSIS, don't get worked up about outcomes. If you work in counterterrorism, in some cases you're indifferent, really, whether someone's going to be arrested and go to jail.

I remember when 18 Soviet diplomats were kicked out. I was working the Soviet section—I was working the KGB desk—and I think I was saddened for about three weeks that it had to happen, because there were all sorts of investigative equities in there and all sorts of things that go on in counterintelligence beyond kicking a diplomat out.

It's the same with someone being arrested or charged for various things. People who work in intelligence are professional. They're not thinking about outcomes that some policy-maker may or may not carry. I know that because I spent 32 years in there. I know the culture.

I also look at some of the stuff that's been in the media, where we now have this leaker idolatry. They're sort of held up as patriots who are outraged by this egregious cover-up, and they're going to now protect Canadians through the leakage. That also doesn't sound like people I know in a culture that I worked with for many, many years.

I could read a lot into the testimonial in the Globe. I can read a lot into the Globe's editorials on the subject as well. There's a bit of a slant towards SNC-Lavalin and things like that. It's a bit partisan.

I have an idea where these leaks are coming from, and in some cases they're coming through various filters to the reporter. In some cases it may be a document. I'm quite confident that the organization I spent a lot of time in is not the source of those leaks.

Some of it could be attributed to some third party, but I don't believe the documents are coming from the organization.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Thank you, Mr. Stanton.

Thank you, Mr. Fergus.

Mr. Villemure, the floor is yours for two and a half minutes.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Manthorpe, I liked your book "Claws of the Panda: Beijing's Campaign of Influence and Intimidation in Canada" a lot. In it, you talk a lot about trust. Considering the current situation, with these leaks, allegations and so on, what might help us restore people's trust in our institutions?

[Jonathan Manthorpe]

That's a very broad question, and I appreciate it.

I'm in the middle of writing another book about the problems of Canadian democracy, which maybe we can talk about when the book comes out.

I think we do have a problem of trust in our democratic institutions that goes beyond foreign interference. There have been several people who have mentioned this morning that it's not just the People's Republic of China that has gone beyond the bounds of lobbying and into the area of serious interference in Canadian public life. I think we need a registry for just that reason. This is a general problem, not something deeply concerned with only the People's Republic of China.

I think the level of trust in our institutions has degraded over the last 20 or 30 years for various reasons, perhaps more than is appropriate to go into with this committee today. I wrote a book that came out in 2020, called Restoring Democracy. It looked at the whole period from the end of the Cold War and the various pressures on democracy in the last 30 years.

My latest book, which will hopefully come out next year, deals particularly with Canada in that context. I suspect that this may not be a matter for this committee at this moment, but I'll happily answer any other questions you have.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Manthorpe.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Thank you, Mr. Villemure.

Mr. Green, you have two and a half minutes.

[Matthew Green, NDP, Hamilton Centre, ON]

Thank you.

Mr. Stanton, could you maybe—I'm picking up on this line of questioning—expand on other foreign agents, countries or actors that are out there that we should be focused on?

My concern—and maybe you can comment on this, because I've heard a lot about it—is that we're solely focused on China, and I think, in doing so, we may miss the broader picture. Can you comment on that?

[Dan Stanton]

Sure. That's a great question.

I think we're solely focused on China because it is, as I've said, the A-team when it comes to foreign interference. There is absolutely no comparison in terms of scope and qualitative differences.

One of my colleagues alluded to Iran. We've seen a shift in Iranian interference, such that they're now contracting out in the private sector. This is in the media in Canada, the U.S. and Britain. They're using private investigators to follow people. There are some shifts in how they do this, which is related to harassing and doing worse with dissidents.

Russia has always been a player, but Russia is very strong on its intel and intelligence services. It's somewhat different from China in the way it does things.

One country I'll say is India. India does foreign interference in Canada. We've seen this, and we've seen it in the media.

There are a number of foreign states. As one of my colleagues says, they're not necessarily all hostile to Canadian interests. Some of them are neutral, I guess you can say. Some of them could be allies.

It's hit-and-miss in some areas. I don't want to go back to belabouring the PRC, although that is the reason we're here. They just do it extremely well. They really do. It's a whole-of-government, whole-of-society approach. You know about the national security law that was passed in 2017, whereby anyone with Chinese status anywhere in the world has to co-operate.

There are other players. They're just not at the same depth.

[Matthew Green, NDP, Hamilton Centre, ON]

In your opinion, if we're dealing with the apex A-team in this, and we're providing legislative recommendations and frameworks from this committee, in dealing with China as a case study, is it your opinion that we would then cover off all of them?

Are the differences that you identified between the ways in which different foreign actors operate going to require a broader understanding of the different tactics and strategies used in order to safeguard our democracy?

[Dan Stanton]

I think in the general, macro sense, yes, we have to have these legislative tools. We have to have a capability of enforcement. We have to have some end games on that. You could use that template with other states.

There's a deterrence effect, as well, when you have legislation. You can use that to mitigate a bit of the threat.

However, they are different. Russians are different. Russians operate differently, and Iranians clearly operate differently, so I wouldn't want to suggest that we have some sort of broad review of all the state actors and try to come up with some common approach on things.

I think what we really should do is deal with what we're seized with right now, which, of course, is the PRC.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Thank you, Mr. Stanton, and thank you, Mr. Green.

We're going to go to Mr. Brock. Welcome to committee, Mr. Brock.

You have five minutes.

[Larry Brock, Conservative, Brantford—Brant, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I'd like to thank all the witnesses for their attendance at and participation in this important study.

I'd like to start off by saying hello to Mr. Chiu. I have a number of questions for you, sir.

I understand that it wasn't just you who were impacted by foreign election interference but, in fact, your former colleagues Alice Wong and Bob Saroya. I've done a bit of research. I understand that all three of those ridings have very large Chinese-Canadian populations.

Can you opine as to what you believe to be one of the factors, or a number of factors that contributed to the number of traditional conservative Canadians in those ridings who, for whatever reason, simply did not vote?

I understand there was a substantial drop in the percentage of voting, not only in your riding, but also in Ms. Wong's and Mr. Saroya's. Can you offer some information on that for me please?

[Kenny Chiu]

Absolutely.

There have been studies conducted that show that across Canada, wherever there's a high concentration of Chinese population in ridings, the amount of support that the Conservatives received in 2021 dropped. This bucked the trend of all the neighbouring ridings.

I think this is the effect of the disinformation that was spread. Yes, they targeted specific candidates, such as me, in ridings that I represent or where I was running, but at the same time, they also generalized this and used it across Canada in many of the Chinese ridings to indicate that the party itself and the leadership itself had taken an anti-Chinese role.

The fact is that they misconstrued that Mr. O'Toole and the Conservative Party would ban WeChat. Put yourself in their shoes. If you relied on WeChat as the only lifeline to connect you to your family and to conduct business in Canada, and a political party was going to do that, and in that particular party there's also an MP who proposes a foreign registry that would put you and your descendants in jeopardy, would you be voting for them, even though they align very well with your values?

I believe across the country, it hurt many of the ridings, even those we won, but potentially with a smaller margin.

[Larry Brock, Conservative, Brantford—Brant, ON]

I guess it really highlights the importance of social media to Chinese Canadians, particularly the platform WeChat.

Were there other platforms on social media or other ways that they spread the message that people ought not to be considering Conservatives in the next election?

[Kenny Chiu]

It's not just WeChat. It's not just social media; it's multi-dimensional. It's on the airwaves that the CRTC is supposed to be regulating. It's on printed media. It's also on websites. These multi-dimensional disinformation campaigns help to solidify the mistrust of certain particular politicians or a political party. It's very effective, especially during election time.

[Larry Brock, Conservative, Brantford—Brant, ON]

Were any of these issues prevalent in your election success in 2019? Did you feel pressure from Beijing?

[Kenny Chiu]

In 2015, I had an opportunity to sit down with the consul general in Vancouver. I believe that she was trying to size me up back then.

In 2019, they decided that I was completely beyond hope. The information that I got from my Chinese supporters has been that they've told people not to vote for me, but there is no active campaign against me that I can observe.