Information & Ethics Committee on June 2nd, 2023

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

I call this meeting to order.

Welcome to meeting number 74 of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics.

Today’s meeting is taking place in a hybrid format, pursuant to the House order of June 23, 2022, and therefore, members can attend in person in the room and remotely using the Zoom application. Should any technical challenges arise, please advise me immediately. Please note that we may need to suspend a few minutes as we need to ensure that all members are able to participate fully.

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(3)(h) and the motion adopted by the committee on Wednesday, December 7, 2022, the committee is resuming its study of foreign interference and threats to the integrity of democratic institutions, intellectual property and the Canadian state. In accordance with the committee’s routine motion concerning connection tests for witnesses, I am informing the committee that all witnesses have completed the required connection tests in advance of the meeting.

I would now like to welcome our witnesses for the first hour today. We have, as individuals, Dean Baxendale, chief executive officer, China Democracy Foundation and of Optimum Publishing International, Thomas Juneau, associate professor, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa, and, by video conference, Andrew Mitrovica, investigative reporter.

Mr. Baxendale, the floor is yours for a five-minute opening statement.

[Dean Baxendale, Chief Executive Officer, China Democracy Foundation and of Optimum Publishing International, As an Individual]

Good morning. Thank you very much for inviting me.

Today I hope to provide additional insights relevant to your investigation and understanding of foreign influence in Canadian elections and other spheres of Canadian society.

Today I will speak with two hats on. One is as CEO of Optimum Publishing, which has published multiple books on human rights abuses by the Chinese Communist Party, espionage operations by the MSS and the PLA, and triad organized crime and money laundering in Canada and other nations around the world. During this time, I've learned more than I ever wanted to know about foreign interference in Canadian affairs.

The second is as CEO of the China Democracy Fund, whose mission is to defend free speech by academics and journalists who fall prey to the United Front Work's disinformation and suppression operations in Canada and around the world. Countless people, from the Tibetans to the Uyghurs and the people of Hong Kong, have been oppressed and murdered and have seen their culture erased by the CCP. I stand in solidarity with their right to freedom and democracy.

I also stand as a defender of democracy here at home. Canada is at a crossroads. Will we continue to remain wilfully blind to Chinese infiltration into our elections, business, media and academia? Will we continue to abandon our fellow citizens in the Chinese diaspora to the threats, intimidation and manipulation, also known as transnational repression?

I put to you that we must exercise option two. If we do not, we risk becoming a captive state, losing our sovereignty and our ability to make decisions in the best interests of our citizens.

Today, I am going to talk about one of the most important threats and tactics used by the CCP. It is called elite capture. This is the co-opting of leading individuals and public figures to view the actions and goals of the CCP in a positive light and to advance pro-PRC positions within their spheres of influence. In some cases, these persons are bribed or blackmailed, but in most cases they are simply flattered, supported in their careers or befriended by CCP operatives or agents working on behalf of the United Front. Thus they become witting or unwitting agents of the CCP.

Targets for elite capture fall into three categories: those who are already friends, those who are neutral and could be positively predisposed towards the PRC, and enemies of the state. These would include people like Erin O'Toole and the suppression operation that was conducted against the Conservatives in the last election.

Former minister and ambassador to China John McCallum became a poster child for the regime—a dream politician who was successfully co-opted by the CCP. Like many, he fell victim to their special treatment and ultimately came to believe that he was a chosen emissary and only he could best relate the goals and objectives of the regime in diplomatic circles here in Canada. This was illustrated in Hidden Hand, which is published by Optimum.

If we cast our minds back to the 1980s, it is easy to see how western elites were taken in. Over two decades prior, U.S. President Richard Nixon famously visited China as part of an effort to engage the country and make it an ally. The west had a bigger enemy—the former Soviet Union. China was seen as both an economic and geopolitical opportunity. Western leaders either failed to see or wilfully ignored the fact that China had its own agenda, which it deployed not through military might, but through propaganda, economics and soft power.

Carolyn Bartholomew, the chair of the powerful U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission in D.C., said that they sold them on a win-win and many business and academic leaders believed that China would reform its treatment of religious and ethnic minorities, liberalize its country and embrace democracy. This was the prevailing academic theory. They believed—apparently naively—that the CCP would indeed reform and embrace the ideals of a progressive democracy. She expressed this publicly in a human rights panel that was hosted by MLI, Optimum and the CDF in 2021.

If elites were blind, intelligence agencies were not. Starting in the 1990s, CSIS had identified the threats, but the Americans began their own operational investigations, including Operation Dragon Lord, which was an American operation focused not only on the U.S. but on Canada and Australia. Operation Dragon Lord was a multi-faceted agency probe by the U.S. intelligence agencies in the late 1990s. These investigations were, in part, in response to the work being conducted by the RCMP and CSIS here in Canada.

Garry Clement, Brian McAdam and Michel Juneau-Katsuya, as well as countless other intelligence agents were investigating and writing countless reports on the nexus between organized crime, Chinese business tycoons and the PLA and MSS operations in Canada. The executive brief was obtained by Optimum authors Ina Mitchell and Scott McGregor from a former federal and provincial government lawyer. The U.S. was concerned about national security and the threat emanating directly from Canada. Much later, agencies in Canada identified these linkages and determined that Vancouver had become the North American headquarters for infiltration operations by the Chinese Communist Party.

As part of my testimony today, I've submitted the first page of the Operation Dragon Lord memo. It identifies FBI and NSA case numbers. They were investigating the relationship between the Canadian business leaders Paul Desmarais and Peter Munk, former prime minister Jean Chrétien, the Canada China Business Council, the China International Trust and Investment Corporation, known heroin kingpin Lo Hsing Han and arms dealer Robert Kuok.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Mr. Baxendale, we're over the five minutes.

I'm sure many of the issues you still had can get addressed during questions and answers.

[Dean Baxendale]

Perfect.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Mr. Juneau, I invite you to address the committee for five minutes, sir. Go ahead, please.

[Dr. Thomas Juneau, Associate Professor, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa, As an Individual]

Thank you.

This is the third time in the past month that I am appearing before a House committee to discuss foreign interference. In each case, I focused my remarks not on the threat but on possible solutions.

The first time I was at PROC, in May, I talked in general terms about how transparency in national security is—or should be—an essential part of our arsenal to counter foreign interference.

The second time I was at PROC, earlier this week, I proposed changes to the architecture and governance of national security in Canada to try to address the structural problems in the interface between intelligence and policy through, for example, the establishment of a national security committee of cabinet, a stronger role for the NSIA and specific measures to enhance policy literacy in the intelligence community and intelligence literacy in the policy and political worlds. I also recommended that the government launch a comprehensive public review of its national security policy.

Given the nature of the important work of this committee, I hope in my brief remarks to dig a bit deeper into some of the transparency issues surrounding national security. This is the focus of some of my academic work. I was also, from 2019 to 2022, the co-chair of the national security transparency advisory group, which is an independent body that advises the deputy minister of public safety and the broader intelligence community on how to enhance transparency. We produced three reports when I was there, and I think they can be relevant to some of your work.

My starting point, as it was at PROC three weeks ago, is that transparency is—or could be, if it were more properly leveraged—a crucial enabler of national security and one of our key assets in the fight against foreign interference. Let me focus quickly on three areas in which I think we could very specifically do better.

First, given the nature of this committee's work, Canada’s access to information system is broken and dysfunctional, and it fails to achieve its objectives. This has several negative implications broadly but also including on the national security front. It prevents more informed public debate, yet that would be essential to building national security literacy among Canadians, including parliamentarians. This is an essential component of the societal resilience that is our first line of defence against foreign interference and other threats. This dysfunctionality in the ATI system is a symptom. It is illustrative of how the government at the political and bureaucratic levels does not take transparency issues seriously enough.

Second, Canada performs very poorly at the level of declassification. That means declassification of historical records, many of which remain locked up for decades for no valid reason. More generally, as we discussed at PROC and elsewhere, we suffer from an epidemic of overclassification. Again, this acts as an important obstacle to raising awareness among Canadians, including parliamentarians, and an obstacle to better-informed public debate, both in terms of understanding the nature of the threats we face and also in terms of how to mitigate them. It is also, at a more operational level, a major problem inside government. It stymies and slows the flow of crucial information. Again, this amounts to shooting ourselves in the foot because of our inability to enact reforms.

Third, and last, there is a need to seriously rethink how the government communicates with Canadians through its public affairs apparatus. There is not enough of a culture of transparency in how this is done. The emphasis too often is on risk minimization. The result, more often than not, is meaningless speaking points, which often miss media deadlines. Again, this is a missed opportunity to better inform Canadians. It can even be counterproductive by feeding cynicism. This is a problem in general, but also from a national security perspective.

Often, the government communicates with Canadians directly, for example through social media, but very often the government reaches Canadians through the media, which then plays the role of a transmission belt. By failing to provide the media with as much information as possible—quality information and not boilerplate—in a timely manner, we again miss an opportunity to raise the level of national security literacy. Also, in trying to counter foreign interference, we should include much more and better engagement with local and ethnic media—and not just national media—to reach those vulnerable groups that are the targets of foreign interference.

We are far too shy in doing this. We should, for example, fight disinformation by flooding the marketplace of ideas with transparency. That is, again, our main advantage against autocracies, including China. Think about how the U.K. brilliantly used strategic disclosures of intelligence in the run-up to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This is a tool that we massively underuse.

I will conclude with two points. Transparency is hard. It takes time, human resources, money and effort, but if you think about it in pragmatic as opposed to abstract moral terms, it is an investment that pays off down the road, even if in the short term it is a burden. Second, change must come from the top. In the absence of political cover and political support, the bureaucracy ultimately is limited in what it can do.

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Thank you, Mr. Juneau. That was right on time.

Next, we are going to Mr. Mitrovica.

You have five minutes, sir, to address the committee. Go ahead, please.

[Andrew Mitrovica, Investigative Reporter, As an Individual]

Thank you.

Good morning.

I have not agreed to appear here or at other committees to act as a proxy for any side in what has devolved into a rabid partisan fixation for or against a public inquiry. Instead, I am here to raise an alarm and say something that might help you and Canadians navigate reports about Chinese interference, a matter that I once spent a lot of time reporting about as an investigative journalist. I’m also doing this in the faint hope that a few of you will hear what I have to say and then do something about it.

I have been a reporter and writer for almost 40 years. For much of that time, I was an investigative reporter at CTV, CBC, The Globe and Mail and The Walrus magazine. I have written a lot about intelligence services. That work led to a book called Covert Entry: Spies, Lies and Crimes Inside Canada’s Secret Service. It is one of only two books of any consequence written about CSIS. My book exposed CSIS for its systemic laziness, nepotism, corruption, racism, lying and law-breaking that you and other Canadians haven’t heard or read much about lately.

I am familiar with China's covert influence campaigns. I wrote a series of front-page stories about Chinese influence efforts throughout Canadian society while I was at The Globe and Mail in the late 1990s and early 2000s. It’s an old story. That reporting culminated in a story about a joint RCMP-CSIS probe called Project Sidewinder.

Sidewinder was intriguing for several reasons. Its central finding, that the PRC was working with triads to infiltrate almost every aspect of Canadian life, was so controversial that then CSIS director Ward Elcock publicly dismissed the probe as, in effect, crap. A senior CSIS officer ordered all copies of the report destroyed. A surviving copy of the report made its way to me and subsequently onto The Globe’s front page.

Here is where my reporting and much of the recent reporting about Chinese influence differ. Sidewinder included the names of a slew of well-known companies, organizations and high-profile figures that the RCMP and CSIS believed had been compromised by the PRC. At the time, my editors and I agreed that it would be irresponsible to publish their identities when relying solely on a 23-page report, even if it was marked top secret.

Here is the other reason I have agreed to appear. A kind of witch hunt-like hysteria is being ginned up by scoop-thirsty journalists and what is likely a handful of members of Canada’s vast and largely unaccountable security intelligence structure. It’s dangerous. People’s reputations and livelihoods have been damaged. Loyal Canadians of Chinese descent, including one of your colleagues, are being tarred as disloyal to the maple leaf.

The special rapporteur found that Global TV’s egregious allegation about Mr. Han Dong was categorically false, but Mr. Dong, unfortunately, is not alone. CSIS officers have even accused veteran police officers, who have risked their lives to protect the communities and the country they have served honourably for decades, of being compromised by the PRC. It is shameful, and this and every other committee examining this matter are duty-bound by decency and fairness to finally hold CSIS officers to account for smearing Canadians because of their phantom ties to China.

I have provided this committee with a copy of a just-published 1,800-word column I wrote that exposes the horror that two brave police officers and proud Canadians have had to endure at the inept hands of CSIS for the past three years. I urge you to read it. If you do, you will understand the deep damage CSIS has done to Paul McNamara, an ex-Vancouver police undercover officer, and Peter Merrifield, a serving RCMP officer, and their families. It smacks of guilt by association that makes the innocent appear guilty.

What happened to Paul McNamara and Peter Merrifield is evidence that, first, as a Federal Court judge ruled in 2020, CSIS has “a degree of institutional disregard for—or, at the very least, a cavalier institutional approach to—the duty of candour and, regrettably, the rule of law.” In other words, CSIS lies and breaks the law. Second, in February of this year, NSIRA issued a report that found that CSIS fails to consider the damage it routinely does to the lives of the Canadians it targets and their families.

That’s why I am urging this committee and every other committee examining this matter to invite Mr. McNamara and Mr. Merrifield to be witnesses, so they can tell you directly about the profound human consequences when CSIS gets it so wrong. If you won’t listen to me, then listen to these two wronged police officers, who deserve to be heard.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Thank you, Mr. Mitrovica.

Thank you, all, for your opening statements.

We are going to go to our questioning now, our six-minute round. For the benefit of the witnesses, members of the committee have a finite amount of time and lots of questions to be asked about this issue, so if you can keep your answers succinct, we can get more questions and more answers in. If they do cut you off, it's not that they're rude; they're just aware of that time.

Mr. Barrett, you have six minutes. Go ahead, please.

[Michael Barrett, Conservative, Leeds—Grenville—Thousand Islands and Rideau Lakes, ON]

Thanks, Chair.

Mr. Baxendale, you've published several books about Beijing's connections to organized crime and influence operations here in Canada. Have there been repercussions for you personally, or for the company, for publishing these books?

[Dean Baxendale]

Absolutely. I've been targeted by the MSS since I started on this journey a number of years ago. There are absolutely articles and editorials directed at both me and my authors.

Of course, I work with some of the most prominent people in the world, from Benedict Rogers to Dolkun Isa. Obviously, there's Sam Cooper, who was just discredited by the last witness. There are many others who have deep knowledge and understanding of what has been going on here in Canada. Yes, I've been a target, and all of my authors are.

[Michael Barrett, Conservative, Leeds—Grenville—Thousand Islands and Rideau Lakes, ON]

We've heard shocking testimony at this committee about Beijing's treatment of diaspora communities here in Canada. Are you able to offer any context based on your experience of that?

[Dean Baxendale]

Absolutely. I work very closely with the Chinese diaspora communities, with the Uyghurs and Tibetans, here in Canada and around the world. I know their stories. I've met with them. I've heard about the horrors of deaths inside Xinjiang. I've heard of the disappearances of friends and family members in Hong Kong.

Members of the Chinese diaspora community, who are loyal to democracy and freedom, are sick and tired of listening to politicians and others espouse the virtues of our great relationship with China, and that we should continue on based on the economic opportunities with China. They're very upset, and they expressed that to me. They are voices in my upcoming book as well.

[Michael Barrett, Conservative, Leeds—Grenville—Thousand Islands and Rideau Lakes, ON]

Have you read the Johnston report?

[Dean Baxendale]

I've read parts of the Johnston report. I find it interesting, but I do think that both the PMO and the CSIS brass did not provide the actual readout from the meeting with Han Dong.

[Michael Barrett, Conservative, Leeds—Grenville—Thousand Islands and Rideau Lakes, ON]

Does it amount to a whitewash?

[Dean Baxendale]

I can't say that. I think Mr. Johnston is working in the best interests of trying to bring transparency and process to a very complex issue.

Do I think that he, as a rapporteur, is in a strong position to speak objectively on the issues and arbitrate? The answer is that I believe it's difficult, given his ties to China.

[Michael Barrett, Conservative, Leeds—Grenville—Thousand Islands and Rideau Lakes, ON]

Based on his ties to China, do you think that Mr. Johnston has been the subject of elite capture?

[Dean Baxendale]

I think Mr. Johnston, over his 40-year career, has had a positive predisposition to China and the PRC in hopes that we could establish economic opportunities and gains for all Canadians—which I believe they fully subscribed to and believed. We have seen that this kind of approach has been certainly naive and countered with countless reports in the United States, the U.K. and even here in Canada.

[Michael Barrett, Conservative, Leeds—Grenville—Thousand Islands and Rideau Lakes, ON]

Based on your reading of the Johnston report, the research that you've done and the folks, as you've mentioned, in the diaspora community with whom you've met, before the report and up to this point, do you think there should be a full public inquiry?

[Dean Baxendale]

Absolutely. Our national security and the future of democracy are at stake. We need to really investigate and understand this from all different levels.

Absolutely, a full inquiry should be called.

[Michael Barrett, Conservative, Leeds—Grenville—Thousand Islands and Rideau Lakes, ON]

Are you familiar with the remarks and the question of privilege that Erin O'Toole raised in Parliament a few days ago?

[Dean Baxendale]

Yes.

[Michael Barrett, Conservative, Leeds—Grenville—Thousand Islands and Rideau Lakes, ON]

Does what he describes sound consistent with how the United Front Work Department operates?

[Dean Baxendale]

I have countless cases and documents with declassified information reports that would support Mr. O'Toole's view 100%.