Thank you.
This is the third time in the past month that I am appearing before a House committee to discuss foreign interference. In each case, I focused my remarks not on the threat but on possible solutions.
The first time I was at PROC, in May, I talked in general terms about how transparency in national security is—or should be—an essential part of our arsenal to counter foreign interference.
The second time I was at PROC, earlier this week, I proposed changes to the architecture and governance of national security in Canada to try to address the structural problems in the interface between intelligence and policy through, for example, the establishment of a national security committee of cabinet, a stronger role for the NSIA and specific measures to enhance policy literacy in the intelligence community and intelligence literacy in the policy and political worlds. I also recommended that the government launch a comprehensive public review of its national security policy.
Given the nature of the important work of this committee, I hope in my brief remarks to dig a bit deeper into some of the transparency issues surrounding national security. This is the focus of some of my academic work. I was also, from 2019 to 2022, the co-chair of the national security transparency advisory group, which is an independent body that advises the deputy minister of public safety and the broader intelligence community on how to enhance transparency. We produced three reports when I was there, and I think they can be relevant to some of your work.
My starting point, as it was at PROC three weeks ago, is that transparency is—or could be, if it were more properly leveraged—a crucial enabler of national security and one of our key assets in the fight against foreign interference. Let me focus quickly on three areas in which I think we could very specifically do better.
First, given the nature of this committee's work, Canada’s access to information system is broken and dysfunctional, and it fails to achieve its objectives. This has several negative implications broadly but also including on the national security front. It prevents more informed public debate, yet that would be essential to building national security literacy among Canadians, including parliamentarians. This is an essential component of the societal resilience that is our first line of defence against foreign interference and other threats. This dysfunctionality in the ATI system is a symptom. It is illustrative of how the government at the political and bureaucratic levels does not take transparency issues seriously enough.
Second, Canada performs very poorly at the level of declassification. That means declassification of historical records, many of which remain locked up for decades for no valid reason. More generally, as we discussed at PROC and elsewhere, we suffer from an epidemic of overclassification. Again, this acts as an important obstacle to raising awareness among Canadians, including parliamentarians, and an obstacle to better-informed public debate, both in terms of understanding the nature of the threats we face and also in terms of how to mitigate them. It is also, at a more operational level, a major problem inside government. It stymies and slows the flow of crucial information. Again, this amounts to shooting ourselves in the foot because of our inability to enact reforms.
Third, and last, there is a need to seriously rethink how the government communicates with Canadians through its public affairs apparatus. There is not enough of a culture of transparency in how this is done. The emphasis too often is on risk minimization. The result, more often than not, is meaningless speaking points, which often miss media deadlines. Again, this is a missed opportunity to better inform Canadians. It can even be counterproductive by feeding cynicism. This is a problem in general, but also from a national security perspective.
Often, the government communicates with Canadians directly, for example through social media, but very often the government reaches Canadians through the media, which then plays the role of a transmission belt. By failing to provide the media with as much information as possible—quality information and not boilerplate—in a timely manner, we again miss an opportunity to raise the level of national security literacy. Also, in trying to counter foreign interference, we should include much more and better engagement with local and ethnic media—and not just national media—to reach those vulnerable groups that are the targets of foreign interference.
We are far too shy in doing this. We should, for example, fight disinformation by flooding the marketplace of ideas with transparency. That is, again, our main advantage against autocracies, including China. Think about how the U.K. brilliantly used strategic disclosures of intelligence in the run-up to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This is a tool that we massively underuse.
I will conclude with two points. Transparency is hard. It takes time, human resources, money and effort, but if you think about it in pragmatic as opposed to abstract moral terms, it is an investment that pays off down the road, even if in the short term it is a burden. Second, change must come from the top. In the absence of political cover and political support, the bureaucracy ultimately is limited in what it can do.
Thank you very much.