Information & Ethics Committee on Nov. 3rd, 2025

[Gabriel Hardy, Conservative, Montmorency—Charlevoix, QC]

I'm glad to see that this is something that's happening everywhere. It's definitely a hot topic right now. Most people tell us that they have a little less confidence in our institutions. They wonder why the rules aren't clearer, or at least they want the people in office to understand the importance of being transparent. To achieve this goal, I believe that people like you two need to have access to as much information as possible so that you can identify potential problems.

Earlier, Ms. Mignolet, you said that information does not necessarily have to be shared with everyone and that the general public does not need to know, for example, what is in a blind trust. However, wouldn't it be normal for the Ethics Commissioner, someone who is completely independent of the people involved in this trust, to have all the information in order to be able to judge whether the decisions being made could pose a problem?

[Ariane Mignolet]

It seems to me that this is the very principle of the trusts or mandates without right of inspection that we administer. We know what is in them and, for our part, in Quebec, we receive the relevant information from the person who manages the mandate or trust to ensure that the rules are being followed. Every year, we receive information, which is obviously not passed on to the trustee or mandatary, to check whether there are any problems and, if so, to raise them. As Ms. Motherwell said, there is also no direct contact between the trustee or mandatary and the person who created the trust or mandate.

[Gabriel Hardy, Conservative, Montmorency—Charlevoix, QC]

The notion that the people who manage the trust without the elected official’s oversight, that those who are responsible for warning him when he is about to make a decision that could cause problems, are his direct employees therefore makes no sense, because these people would then have no interest in bringing such situations to light, especially if their boss disagrees. They would risk losing their jobs. There should therefore be a completely independent person who has the right to look into this and report conflicts.

[Ariane Mignolet]

What I understand is that if there are any issues with the trust when it is created, there is a list. For my part, if I saw that there were risks, I would recommend putting measures in place. Even if it is not a public conflict of interest filter, I would recommend that measures be put in place and that there be, for example, people responsible for telling you that you must recuse yourself. It is therefore up to the person in charge, the clerk of the executive council, to tell the person.

As Ms. Motherwell said, if you are a member of cabinet, you need to have a blank page in front of you because you can’t discuss a given topic and you can’t even know what it’s about. I don’t think someone from the commissioner’s office should be called upon every time.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Thank you, Commissioner.

I'm literally all over the place on time today. We've had some great questions asked, with even greater responses, so that's why I've allowed it to go on.

Mr. Saini, you have five minutes, maybe more, maybe less. It depends on where we go. Away you go.

[Gurbux Saini, Liberal, Fleetwood—Port Kells, BC]

Thank you.

Thank you, commissioners.

My question is for Ariane Mignolet.

You mentioned that trusts and screens are essential tools for the politicians to do their job. Do they apply to your cabinet ministers and the premier, and how do they work?

[Ariane Mignolet]

If I understand your question correctly, in Quebec, ministers, including the premier, must place certain interests, such as interests in publicly traded companies or similar entities, in a blind trust or mandate. However, not all interests must be placed in the trust. Certain interests in companies that are not publicly traded may be retained, but not if they are companies that have contracts with the government. In this context, a blind trust or mandate is not even possible, and the minister must divest himself of these interests.

[Gurbux Saini, Liberal, Fleetwood—Port Kells, BC]

Madam Motherwell, I have a question for you.

One thing that came up quite a few times was that the Prime Minister's chief of staff, or the person who is responsible for the Privy Council, should not be managing the screen or the blind trust. Can you give your opinion on that? You mentioned that you don't see any problem, but this is a constant question that comes up here, so I would like to hear your professional viewpoint on that matter.

[Cathryn Motherwell]

Certainly. What I'm able to do is provide you with a description of what happens in Ontario, which is that it's not administered by...and to understand here that we're talking about two different things, as I understand it, within the federal environment. We have a trust, and then there are companion ethics screens that are implemented. The question is about the implementation of those screens.

In Ontario, as I indicated, there are eight ministers with trusts. They do not have companion screens. Screens, for us, are generally employed for personal matters that would be separate from the trust.

The trust itself deals with the conflict that is identified through the Members' Integrity Act on what are restricted assets. If a minister has those restricted assets, they go into the trust, and that effectively deals with the conflict. It takes it away by restricting the individual's access to and knowledge about what is contained in that trust.

As I understand it, within the federal context, the question is who should be effectively managing the screens that are in place. As I said, within the Ontario context, the management of that is up to career public servants who are working in the cabinet office.

[Gurbux Saini, Liberal, Fleetwood—Port Kells, BC]

Who appoints career public servants?

[Cathryn Motherwell]

The government does, but they are the most senior officials in the cabinet office who are overseeing the screens.

[Gurbux Saini, Liberal, Fleetwood—Port Kells, BC]

It will be the premier, you say, the most senior guys, who will be appointing those people.

[Cathryn Motherwell]

No, it's within the public service. It's the secretary of the cabinet and people who serve her.

[Gurbux Saini, Liberal, Fleetwood—Port Kells, BC]

Thank you.

Ms. Motherwell, you also mentioned that the screens in Ontario—and I could be wrong; I just want clarity—could be managed by the friends and family members.

[Cathryn Motherwell]

No, they could be about a friend or family member.

For example, if you have a close family member who runs a business and that business is a significant stakeholder of the government, a screen could be put in place so that the individual member has absolutely no role and no knowledge of any government business that takes place with that business of the family member.

[Gurbux Saini, Liberal, Fleetwood—Port Kells, BC]

We have heard from witnesses in the past that the Canadian ethics laws are one of the gold standards in the world, but there's always need for improvement.

Can you suggest anything we could take from Ontario legislation that would help to improve them? I'll ask Ms. Mignolet from Quebec the same question.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

The time is at five minutes and 30 seconds right now, so if you can each give me a 30-second response, that would take us to another minute, which would give us almost seven minutes.

Ms. Mignolet, can you please respond in 30 seconds?

[Ariane Mignolet]

I’m not sure I understand the whole question.

I think the last part of the question concerns what might be applicable in Ontario or Quebec legislation. I believe I already answered that earlier. I will leave it to Ms. Motherwell to talk about the values and ethical principles that I find very important in our country.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Commissioner Motherwell, you have 30 seconds for a response to that.

[Cathryn Motherwell]

Start your stopwatch.

Quite simply, one of the strong features of the Ontario regime is the fact that every member must meet with the commissioner. These are one-hour, in-person meetings. They're great because they establish a relationship. You have an opportunity to get to know each other. Therefore, you end up with trust developed. It means that they will ask questions when they see a situation, and they're also alert to when to ask the question.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

That's wonderful. Thank you. It was 29 seconds. Good job.

Mr. Cooper, go ahead for five minutes.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Sturgeon River, AB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I want to ask some questions about sanctions, so I'll begin with Ms. Mignolet.

You referenced that you have the power to recommend eight potential sanctions. What are they? Can you elaborate on the range of sanctions that you can recommend, having regard for the gravity of the breach?

[Ariane Mignolet]

The sanctions I can recommend are as follows: a reprimand; a penalty; a return to donors or the state or reimbursement of a donation, hospitality or benefit received; the repayment of illicit profits; the repayment of allowances, benefits or other sums received as a member of Parliament or member of the executive council for the duration of the breach; suspension of the right to sit in the National Assembly, accompanied by the suspension of any indemnity or allowance until the person concerned complies with a condition imposed by the commissioner; loss of the member’s seat; or loss of membership in the executive council.

These eight sanctions that I can recommend are listed in the Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct for Members of the National Assembly. Obviously, my goal is not always to recommend a sanction, and it all depends on the situation. I have recommended reprimands on a few occasions, which have sometimes been adopted and sometimes not. I have imposed one penalty. It really depends on each case. We also have to consider whether this is a first offence or if there have been several previous offences, and take that into account. All kinds of considerations come into play. In ethics, the purpose of the sanction is obviously not to punish.

Have I answered your question?

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Sturgeon River, AB]

[Technical difficulty—Editor] that you have a fairly robust range of sanctions that you can recommend. I would note that this is in contrast to our Conflict of Interest Act.

With respect to financial penalties, what sorts of penalties could you recommend? What would be the range?

[Ariane Mignolet]

I may have a fairly significant power of recommendation regarding breaches of the code, but I do not have the power to impose penalties, particularly for minor breaches relating to the non-production of—