Evidence of meeting #13 for Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics in the 45th Parliament, 1st session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was quebec.

A video is available from Parliament.

On the agenda

Members speaking

Before the committee

Mignolet  Ethics commissioner of Québec, Commissaire à l’éthique et à la déontologie du Québec
Motherwell  Integrity Commissioner of Ontario, Office of the Integrity Commissioner of Ontario

12:20 p.m.

Ethics commissioner of Québec, Commissaire à l’éthique et à la déontologie du Québec

Ariane Mignolet

There are many aspects to your question.

First, with regard to differentiated application, I would say that we have different rules for MPs and ministers. Should there be different rules for the Prime Minister? I’m not sure. Ministers and the Prime Minister have executive functions. I do not think it is necessarily more difficult for members to apply the rules, whether they are the chief of staff or the secretary general, among others, even if they report to the government, as you mentioned. Everyone around the table has rules to follow. The chief of staff has rules that apply to him and that I myself am responsible for enforcing. In particular, he must act in a manner that does not favour any particular interests and he must maintain his independence of judgment. The other ministers around the table, who would be present when a prime minister recuses himself, also have an obligation not to favour any particular interests.

I start from the principle that everyone must comply with all the rules set out in the code. I cannot start from the premise that people are acting in bad faith, but rather from the premise that everyone is acting in good faith in applying the rules. However, I do not have to wait for a complaint to be filed. As I said earlier, I have the power to take the initiative. So, if I have information from any source that leads me to believe that there may be a problem with compliance with the measures that are in place, I have the power to act. For me, the powers given to me by the code allow me to ensure that the interests that are favoured in this decision-making framework are public interests.

Luc Thériault Bloc Montcalm, QC

What do you think about the fact that a public office holder is empowered to participate in decisions of general scope that may actually have a positive effect on his or her assets or on the assets of one of his or her former companies? Shouldn’t there be a higher degree of oversight? Earlier, you said you weren’t sure whether the rules should be different for the Prime Minister. Personally, I’m sure they should. So I’d like to be convinced that it’s not necessary. You’re hesitant, but I hope you’ll think about it some more and that we can discuss it again.

12:25 p.m.

Ethics commissioner of Québec, Commissaire à l’éthique et à la déontologie du Québec

Ariane Mignolet

I find it difficult to differentiate between the two. If I may comment on what you said, you refer to a large majority of persons of public interest. Here in Quebec, the wording is slightly different. I think what is important for us is to ensure that personal interest does not compromise independent judgment. In my opinion, that is what matters. The question is not whether a law or measure applies to a broad category of people, but rather whether the independent judgment of the person adopting it can be influenced. That is important. I think that ties in somewhat with your concerns.

Luc Thériault Bloc Montcalm, QC

Absolutely.

12:25 p.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative John Brassard

Thank you, Commissioner.

I don’t think we have any further questions.

Members of the committee, I have a couple of questions, and I hope you don't mind.

I'm going to start with you, Commissioner Motherwell.

Some witnesses have come to committee and have said effectively that blind trusts aren't really blind. As long as the designated public officer knows what's in those trusts, then obviously some of the decision-making can affect, especially on major policy announcements, the holdings within that blind trust. Some other witnesses have come before committee and have said that the only way to avoid a conflict or the perception of a conflict is complete divestment of the assets in advance of assuming office.

For the two commissioners, I'm curious about what your opinion is or would be of complete divestment as a means to gain public trust and public confidence that what is happening in some cases in the highest office of the land is not a conflict of interest based on those holdings. I'm curious about divestment, in your opinion.

12:25 p.m.

Integrity Commissioner of Ontario, Office of the Integrity Commissioner of Ontario

Cathryn Motherwell

As I indicated, we have [Technical difficulty—Editor] assets for ministers. One of the things that is not restricted for ministers is broad-based mutual funds. We have had circumstances where a minister has come in and said that they don't want to go through all the trouble, the hassle, the expense of a trust, that they don't want to put that on the public purse. What the individual has done is gone off and actually divested themselves and then put everything into broad-based mutual funds, which are then not a reportable asset.

Please correct me if I misunderstood the question. I think what you're asking about is whether it should be a requirement that someone who goes into elected office should have to sell their holdings in order to gain the public trust. Is that it?

12:25 p.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative John Brassard

Just to clarify, some of the witnesses have said that complete divestment of the assets while they're in public office, or before they enter public office, and then the assets can then be administered within what some people have said is a truly blind trust where they don't know where that money is actually being invested.... I hope I clarified that. I don't think I did, but I hope you have a better understanding of what I'm saying here.

12:30 p.m.

Integrity Commissioner of Ontario, Office of the Integrity Commissioner of Ontario

Cathryn Motherwell

I do, thank you. It's an interesting policy point and certainly one that would require a great deal of discussion, because I think you want to make this evidence based. What you need also is to be making that decision based not on just supposition or suspicion that things are happening that people don't know about, but with actual evidence that things have taken place, that the trusts don't work. I have not seen evidence within my experience thus far that indicates that a trust does not work.

I can tell you that, yes, the individual knows what's in the trust, and we're talking about trusts that are invested in investments as opposed to those that would involve a private business, for example. Obviously if you have a car dealership that goes into a trust, you know you always have the car dealership even though you are then separated from actually running those operations. If we're talking about those who have investments, they know what went in, but they don't know what happens. I see what happens and I can tell you that trustees and the investment advisers do buy and sell, they trade, so they will make changes to the holdings which the individual minister has no knowledge of.

I would look for evidence. In order to follow that policy option, I would look for obvious examples of where it is proven that the trust model, that trust framework, does not work.

12:30 p.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative John Brassard

I guess the rationale is that, as a public office holder divests, it is made liquid. It would then be up to the trustee at that point to determine where those investments go without the knowledge of the designated public officer. That's what we've been hearing from different witnesses.

Commissioner Mignolet, I'm curious about your opinion on the issue of divestment.

12:30 p.m.

Ethics commissioner of Québec, Commissaire à l’éthique et à la déontologie du Québec

Ariane Mignolet

Like Commissioner Motherwell, I believe we need to exercise some caution with regard to this proposal. I think these are considerations that could be taken into account. In Quebec, we can choose to sell everything instead of placing everything in a blind trust or mandate. I also have no information that would lead me to believe that blind trusts or mandates do not work. For me, this is a starting point. A blind trust or mandate is one of the measures that can be put in place to ensure that there will be no conflicts of interest or favouritism and that a function will be performed with complete independence of judgment. There are therefore many other measures that can be implemented in parallel. The Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct allows me, in addition to the trust, to implement or suggest other approaches, or to say that we must comply with such and such a request.

In Quebec, in my experience, I have not observed anything that would lead me to believe that this proposal is absolutely necessary. However, it is a discussion that could definitely take place. I don’t think it would be very simple, and I’m not sure what the consequences might be, but it would be good to think about it. So far, in Quebec, I haven’t seen any problems in this regard.

12:30 p.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative John Brassard

Thank you, Commissioner.

I understand that we don't have any further questions from the members of Parliament.

I want to thank you both for being here today. You provided the committee with valuable information for its deliberation on this issue. Thank you both for taking more than enough time with the committee. We really appreciate and value the work you're doing in Quebec and Ontario.

Not having any other business, I am going to adjourn the meeting.

Thank you, everyone.