Information & Ethics Committee on April 16th, 2026

[Shuv Majumdar, Conservative, Calgary Heritage, AB]

Thank you for your contribution, Ms. Pilichowski.

Thank you so much for testifying before this committee.

You mentioned something pretty stunning at the conclusion of your presentation, when you said that half of the Canadian people question the lobbying regime in the country. There might be reasons for that.

The OECD has examined conflicts involving family members of public office holders. In light of Canadian cases linking ministers' spouses or partners to large infrastructure projects and procurement files, what disclosure and safeguard rules would you recommend could be drawn from best practices elsewhere?

[Elsa Pilichowski]

That's a question for Pauline.

[Pauline Bertrand, Policy Analyst, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development]

Thank you, Elsa.

Good afternoon, Chair and members of the committee.

I think this is quite a broad question. As you said, and as was repeated by the federal Commissioner of Lobbying and the commissioner for British Columbia, ultimately, the goal of lobbying regulation is to provide transparency and increase public trust.

In terms of what could be improved in a Canadian lobbying register, as Elsa mentioned, it's already a comprehensive law. One of the key findings from our work in recent years that is emphasized in our report, “Lobbying in the 21st Century: Transparency, Integrity and Access”, is that lobbying is no longer limited to written or oral communication. There is a case for looking into how public policies and laws can be influenced through more indirect forms of lobbying or grassroots....

The second pillar of our work, and the key message of our recommendation, is that in order to prevent undue influence, it's not just about having a lobbying register in place; it's really to build a coherent ecosystem of safeguards, which can include lobbying laws and lobbying registers. Issues related to managing conflict of interest, gifts and hospitalities, foreign influence and pre and post public employment are really about building a coherent ecosystem.

This ecosystem allows citizens to understand who is influencing the law, how and on what issues. It also allows them to understand the kinds of integrity safeguards that are in place beyond the transparency of lobbying activities and the lobbying register, and how this can be associated within a broader ecosystem of safeguards.

[Shuv Majumdar, Conservative, Calgary Heritage, AB]

Thank you very much.

As this committee reviews the Conflict of Interest Act, the OECD has flagged limits in self-reported ethics screens here in Canada.

Drawing on international best practices, how can Canada strengthen independent oversight of disclosures and recusals up to the point of ensuring divestment in advance of being in a position to make big decisions?

[Pauline Bertrand]

On the issue of conflict of interest and lobbying, I think Canada already has a strong framework in place in the sense that there is independent oversight of lobbying—the lobbying commissioner is an independent agent of Parliament—similar to the oversight of conflict of interest. This is already a point on which Canada is strong. If we look at public integrity indicators as well, Canada is above the OECD average on conflict of interest.

We could get back to you with further points on the conflict of interest regime in Canada. We focused our analysis on the lobbying framework, but we're happy to provide some elements on the conflict of interest framework as well.

On the independence of oversight, this is something on which Canada performs very well in our work and in our public integrity indicators.

[Shuv Majumdar, Conservative, Calgary Heritage, AB]

Thank you. We'd appreciate it if you could provide that in writing to the committee.

Canada has faced criticism over ATIP delays in access to information, with heavy redactions and proposed access to information challenges. Many are months behind schedule and are providing significant barriers to the transparency we expect of our government. What OECD-recommended reforms to lobbying and beneficial ownership disclosure—

[Linda Lapointe, Liberal, Rivière-des-Mille-Îles, QC]

I have a point of order, Mr. Chair.

We're talking about lobbying here today, but that's not at all what my colleague is talking about.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Yes, but Mr. Majumdar was talking about lobbying when he asked his question.

[Linda Lapointe, Liberal, Rivière-des-Mille-Îles, QC]

Yes, but he didn't talk about lobbying in that particular question.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

That's what I heard.

[Linda Lapointe, Liberal, Rivière-des-Mille-Îles, QC]

Did you hear the word “lobbying”?

[Shuv Majumdar, Conservative, Calgary Heritage, AB]

I was about to ask when you interrupted me.

[Linda Lapointe, Liberal, Rivière-des-Mille-Îles, QC]

Sorry, I was perhaps too premature with my point of order.

[Shuv Majumdar, Conservative, Calgary Heritage, AB]

The question I have—

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Hang on. I've stopped your time. I've already made my ruling. You mentioned the word “lobbying” in your question.

[Shuv Majumdar, Conservative, Calgary Heritage, AB]

I was about to finish the question, Chair.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Yes.

You were a little quick on the point of order.

I think so.

[Linda Lapointe, Liberal, Rivière-des-Mille-Îles, QC]

Okay.

[Michael Barrett, Conservative, Leeds—Grenville—Thousand Islands—Rideau Lakes, ON]

It's unnecessarily disruptive. It's rude.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Go ahead, Mr. Majumdar.

[Shuv Majumdar, Conservative, Calgary Heritage, AB]

Thank you for the opportunity, with apologies for that display to the people testifying.

The question I had was this: What OECD-recommended reforms to lobbying and beneficial ownership disclosure would improve transparency while respecting privacy?

[Pauline Bertrand]

This is an important point. Actually, in our public integrity indicators on lobbying, the disclosure of beneficial ownership is part of the criteria we look into and part of the quality of the lobbying framework, which, again, Canada fulfills. As you mentioned, ultimately, when it's about understanding lobbying, it's important also that citizens can understand who is the ultimate beneficiary of the lobbying activities.

There was a recommendation from the lobbying commissioner to disclose all entities that control and have a direct interest in the outcome of the lobbying. This would indeed be aligned with good international practices. If you would like an international example, Germany has some extensive disclosures, for example, on who funds lobbying activities and whether there is external funding provided to support the lobbying activities.

Perhaps I can mention as well that this is something that is de facto transparent in foreign influence registries. In these registries, those who register are typically those who conduct lobbying influence activities on behalf of or under the control of a foreign interest. This can actually be mirrored in lobbying registries in requiring those who register to disclose whether there is an entity that controls or directs some of the lobbying.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Thank you, Ms. Bertrand.

Just for the benefit of the witnesses, I am keeping time. We went a bit over there. There are lots of great questions being asked, and I want to make sure we respect the time of members.

Mr. Sari, you have the floor for six minutes.

[Abdelhaq Sari, Liberal, Bourassa, QC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much to the witnesses for being here today.

Based on your statements and responses to questions so far, you've given us a lot of valuable and relevant information.

Ms. Pilichowski, I'd like to get back to something you said in your opening remarks. In terms of Canada's performance, you said that, based on your study, Canada met 80% of the criteria for regulation and 89% for practice.

You also said that Canada scored very well and was among the strongest performers. You used those terms. That's excellent. This committee strives for ongoing improvement to enhance performance all the time, as you said.

Are there other OECD countries that use regulatory compliance tools that yield better results?

Obviously, if you have any, you can give us examples of stronger administrative monetary penalties or disclosure requirements that would enhance compliance practices.

[Pauline Bertrand]

Thank you very much for that question.

Based on the OECD indicators and Canada's 80% score, it should be noted that our indicators, including indicators on regulatory quality, don't go into details about the quality of definitions and anything that is covered, for example, with respect to institutions and public responsibilities.

We look at the existence of a regulatory lobbying framework, penalties, rules on post public employment and, as I said, information on transparency about ultimate beneficiaries. That's why Canada scored 80%. The only criterion that was not validated for Canada pertained to rules on pre public employment, for example, in relation to guardrails in place on that front.

That's why I wanted to stress that point. Our indicators are there to give countries a general idea of areas that require key changes, bearing in mind that our indicators cover the entire integrity system. As such, we don't go into detail on very specific aspects of legislation. We do that when we work jointly with countries to undertake a comprehensive review of their lobbying regulations and make targeted recommendations.

Best practices on administrative penalties in countries without administrative penalties, including Canada, have been viewed as an element that could pose a challenge or be the subject of reform. With regard to best international practices, there are countries that levy administrative penalties. For example, Ireland established the Standards in Public Office Commission, which can levy administrative penalties and has a system that includes automatic penalties for lobbyists who file returns late. Some OECD member countries have these types of penalties.

France has also introduced a formal notice mechanism that requires lobbyists to comply with their obligations. These formal notices may be made public. As such, there is also a “name and shame” practice that could motivate lobbyists to comply with their obligations. That is also a recommendation in our legal instrument, in which we recommend that countries have a graduated system of penalties, which promotes compliance among lobbyists.

I want to talk about the quality of disclosures very briefly. In most countries, disclosure normally applies to written and oral communications. In Canada, the Commissioner of Lobbying of Canada has recommended that the information disclosed in monthly returns be expanded slightly to include pre-arranged oral communications as well as written communications, as is the case in British Columbia. That measure is standard practice in OECD member countries, including France, Germany, Lithuania and Ireland.