Information & Ethics Committee on April 16th, 2026

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Good afternoon, everyone. I'm going to call this meeting to order.

Welcome to meeting number 36 of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics.

Pursuant to the order of reference of Thursday, February 12, 2026, section 14.1 of the Lobbying Act, and the motion adopted by the committee on Wednesday, September 17, 2025, the committee is resuming the statutory review of the Lobbying Act.

I'd like to welcome our witness for the first hour today, all the way from British Columbia: Michael Harvey is from the Office of the Registrar of Lobbyists for British Columbia. He is the commissioner and registrar.

Mr. Harvey, I welcome you to the committee. You have up to five minutes to address the committee. That will be followed by questions from members.

Go ahead, please.

[Michael Harvey, Registrar, Office of the Registrar of Lobbyists for British Columbia]

Thank you very much.

Good afternoon, Chair and members of the committee. Thank you for inviting me here today.

I'm pleased to assist the committee in its study by providing you some information about key aspects of British Columbia's Lobbyists Transparency Act, which I'll refer to as the LTA, and my office's role in administering it.

As the Information and Privacy Commissioner, I am designated the Registrar of Lobbyists for British Columbia. Importantly, my role as an officer of the Legislative Assembly is non-partisan and independent.

The overarching purpose of the Lobbyists Transparency Act is in the name itself: transparency. The LTA sets out to ensure there is transparency in who is paid to communicate with and attempt to influence the decisions of B.C. public office holders.

One of the strengths of B.C.'s LTA is that it is a relatively simple act. As a regulator, I can attest that there is a beauty in simplicity. Simplicity leads to understanding, which leads to compliance, which ultimately leads to transparency. In a recent appearance before our own statutory review committee, I reinforced this concept: Keep it simple, keep it simple, keep it simple.

I will focus my remarks this afternoon on three important sections of the statute that support transparency. First is the principle underlying what has been referred to at this committee as “registration by default”. Second is the requirement to file monthly lobbying activity reports for any lobbying communication with senior public office holders. Third is my office's authority to support compliance through education and, in significant cases, via administrative penalties.

I'll start with the registration threshold that has been in place since major amendments to the act came into force in 2020. The amendments harmonized the registration requirements for both consultant lobbyists and organizations, and removed a collective 100-hour threshold for in-house lobbyists over a 12-month period.

Prior to the 2020 amendments, this 100-hour threshold did not apply to consultant lobbyists. This created a two-tiered system whereby consultant lobbyists were subject to more stringent regulatory requirements than organizations, and it obscured transparency by allowing for considerable amounts of lobbying by organizations to go unreported. Now, under the LTA, all lobbyists are treated the same, providing the public with better transparency of the lobbying being conducted in this province.

The ORL saw an increase of over 100% in the number of registered organizations in the year following the removal of the 100-hour threshold. It is evident that significant lobbying efforts were previously unreported and inaccessible to public scrutiny.

Now, with that said, the LTA does exempt from the requirement to register organizations that have fewer than six employees and lobby for less than 50 hours over a 12-month period, unless the primary purpose of the organization is to represent the interests of its members or to promote or oppose issues. Some have characterized this as a small business exemption, but in fact, it also applies to small, service-oriented non-profits.

The next aspect of B.C.'s legislation that I would like to highlight for you today is the monthly return. Via the monthly return, lobbyists are required to submit details about any lobbying communications with senior public office holders that occurred in the month prior. Senior public office holders are a subset of the most high-ranking public office holders.

Monthly returns must include any communication directed at a senior public office holder, including meetings, correspondence, phone calls or social media posts directed at a senior public office holder. If it meets the definition of “lobby”, it must be reported in a monthly return.

The return includes details such as the date of the activity, the names of the lobbyists, the subject matter and intended outcome, and the names and titles of the senior public office holders. This requirement provides the public with timely, detailed information of lobbying activities directed at government and government-controlled entities.

Finally, I would like to conclude with the ability to levy administrative penalties. My office leads with education. We reserve investigations into matters of non-compliance for cases where contraventions are significant or repetitive. In these cases, I do have the authority under the LTA to issue administrative penalties on lobbyists found to have contravened the act.

As a regulator, I am most effective when I have a whole range of tools in my tool box to choose from. Penalties function as one of those tools, as a necessary incentive for lobbyists to meet their transparency obligations under the LTA. Penalties can be either monetary, up to $25,000, or a prohibition on lobbying for a period of up to two years. I note that since the amendments came into force six years ago, the ORL has conducted over 7,000 compliance reviews and published only 17 decisions regarding non-compliance and associated penalties. Monetary penalties administered in those decisions range from $650 to $8,000. To date, my office has not issued a penalty prohibiting lobbying.

With that, Chair, I am happy to answer questions from you and members of the committee.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Thank you, Mr. Harvey.

We're now going to go to Mr. Hardy.

Mr. Hardy will have six minutes to ask questions.

Mr. Harvey, if you need interpretation, make sure you use the earpiece. Wait until the interpretation is over, and then you can respond to Mr. Hardy. It just makes it easier from a back-and-forth standpoint. At least, that's my experience.

We're going to start now.

You have the floor, Mr. Hardy.

[Gabriel Hardy, Conservative, Montmorency—Charlevoix, QC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Thank you for joining us today, Mr. Harvey.

My understanding is that in 2020, there was a legislative change pertaining to lobbying in British Columbia. You made it mandatory to report all lobbying activities for anyone with an influence on a public office holder. The person has to make a public report, so that you can see what is going on. You spoke about a 100% increase in registration thereafter. Ultimately, more people reported they were lobbyists.

Did this increase the administrative burden significantly?

Did you notice an increase in the number of lobbyists? Was it always the same people? With the system being more structured, did it provide for better oversight?

How did you manage the 100% increase in registrations with existing staff and the structure that was introduced thereafter?

[Michael Harvey]

Thank you, Mr. Hardy, for that question. It touches on a number of elements, so I'll address each one of them.

First, as I mentioned in my speech, we did see, after those amendments came in, a year-to-year 100% increase in the number of lobbyists who are entering their registration into the registry. It's important to clarify who needs to provide information on what in the registry. Anyone who lobbies any public official in a provincial entity needs to register as a lobbyist. If they're trying to influence any public office holders as part of their jobs, that is something they need to register.

The monthly returns need to be filed for lobbying activities with only senior public office holders, so only the most important. That way, we, on the one hand, get maximum transparency on lobbying across the board of both senior and junior officials. The more detailed information in the registry and available for scrutiny is for the lobbying of the most senior public office holders. It's important to clarify the two types of information.

[Gabriel Hardy, Conservative, Montmorency—Charlevoix, QC]

In Canada, there is a distinction between applying for grants and lobbying to be awarded a contract. If a person tries to get a contract, it would appear that does not qualify as lobbying. However, if the person lobbies to secure a grant, they are required to register.

Is it the same in British Columbia? Does a direct request to a decision-maker to be awarded a contract also count as lobbying?

[Michael Harvey]

That's a very important question. It's an important difference between our acts, and it's very important and insightful to shine a light on it.

In British Columbia, the purpose of the act is to make sure that there is a transparency function, so the public is able to see what's going on. The general principle at work here is that if the public is able to see something through a means that is already public, and there's already a transparency function, it does not necessarily need to be duplicated.

With respect to, let's say, the procurement process, there is transparency reaching through the procurement regime, and the transparency function is achieved there. If someone is following the procurement process that is governed by that legislation, the lobbying activity in trying to get a government contract is not required. If a lobbyist steps outside of that and tries to influence that outside of the formal procurement process, that influence becomes lobbying. The key is the concept of influence, where someone is trying to influence decisions as opposed to participating in an established process.

The same would apply to grants. Let's say a non-profit organization is participating in a grant project. Of course, non-profits do a lot.... That's a big part of the business for non-profits. If it's putting 30 hours of work into preparing a grant application, that work does not count towards lobbying. If it gets a meeting with a senior public office holder, and it tries to influence the awarding of that grant outside of the grant application process, that is lobbying. That's a key difference between the provincial and federal acts, and it's insightful of you to put your finger on it.

[Gabriel Hardy, Conservative, Montmorency—Charlevoix, QC]

Ninety-nine per cent of businesses in my riding of Montmorency—Charlevoix, and in Quebec in general, are small or medium-sized enterprises, or SMEs. In Canada, 98% of businesses are SMEs.

People often tell me that the perception they have is that large businesses have the resources to pay lobbying firms to lobby the government, whereas SMEs don't have the time to do that. They have to focus on their businesses to try to turn a profit at the end of the month.

Have you introduced any measures to make things easier for SMEs and to ensure that businesses have quick access to the government, so they can make suggestions and have some influence over decision-makers, so they have a bit more clout?

Ultimately, will large lobbying companies continue to take up the most space when it comes to lobbying decision-makers?

[Michael Harvey]

The exception that I referenced in the registration-by-default approach does essentially allow for lobbying by small businesses if that is not their primary purpose. If their primary purpose is running a hardware store, for example, they have fewer than six employees and they do less than 50 hours of cumulative lobbying over the course of the year, then they are exempted from the act. They, as well as, let's say, a small.... A swim team, for example, is also exempted from the act.

The LTA isn't able to level every playing field, but we are cognizant of that issue.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Thank you, sir.

Ms. Lapointe, you have the floor for six minutes.

[Linda Lapointe, Liberal, Rivière-des-Mille-Îles, QC]

Thank you very much.

Good afternoon, Mr. Harvey. Welcome.

That is very interesting. We have heard a lot about British Columbia's lobbying act. The Commissioner of Lobbying of Canada spoke about it here and had a lot of good things to say about it.

Can you give us an overview of the bill that amended the act?

Can you also talk about some of the main changes that were made, and explain why the changes were necessary and how they have improved the regime?

[Michael Harvey]

Certainly.

The first thing I should mention is.... I understand that you have, later today, representatives from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development coming to talk to you, and I think that's excellent. When Commissioner Bélanger and I and our colleagues from Quebec, who I understand are appearing next week, were recently in Paris at OECD meetings where they have created a network of lobbyists, it was very apparent at that meeting that Canada has long been seen as a leader in oversight and that, among those, B.C. and the LTA are recognized as a leading example. Canada was essentially the first country to introduce a lobbying regime.

Lobbying oversight is one of the least developed forms of integrity regulation in the world. However, it's growing, and Canada is seen to be a leader. This is a real opportunity for Canada to take the next step in leadership, and I think the OECD will be able to provide you with information on really what the next best practices are. It does excellent work, and we rely on its recommendations quite a lot.

Certainly, the recommendation that we rely on a lot.... One of the three that I characterized is registration by default, which has the benefit of a broad approach. This is consistent with OECD recommendations to be broad and inclusive. The OECD is of the view—and we agree at the ORL in British Columbia—that a lobbying regime should be all-inclusive and that people should have the ability to see the full scope of what is being recommended or who is trying to influence public office holders.

There are two aspects of this, if you'll permit me to explain why. The first is value neutrality. It's very important that the act not be seen to be embedded with values about what are good organizations and what are not good organizations. I think we all need to be honest. There's no question that the word “lobbying” comes with some stigma. I begin all of my speaking remarks by saying that lobbying is an important function in our democracy. It is how our public office holders come to learn about what the different organizations in our jurisdictions want and need from their government and government-controlled entities.

Lobbying, if it is transparent, is an important part of democracy. It's the transparency and the historical attitude towards this idea that lobbying takes place in the shadows that really are the basis for the stigma. There's no question that the stigma associated with lobbying is part of the concern for carve-outs and for groups to not want to be seen to be lobbyists. Even some public officials, senior public office holders, don't want to be seen to be lobbyists. However, lobbying is an important part of our democracy. I think it's best that we shine a light and address the stigma that's associated with it and, through that, build transparency.

Regulation by default is an important way to say that this act is value-neutral. It doesn't pick good and bad organizations and say that some are covered and some are not. Everybody is covered.

The other aspect is a little bit counterintuitive. Having everybody in the registry, whether they're pursuing corporate interests or not-for-profit interests or whether they're charitable organizations—as long as you're influencing, you're in—does allow the public to look in the registry and see who is getting more access to government officials and who is doing what type of lobbying. If, indeed, the playing field is uneven and if, indeed, as Mr. Hardy mentioned, the big businesses are the ones with the specialized access, then people can see the full suite of who is influencing and make those judgments for themselves. That's how we build trust.

[Linda Lapointe, Liberal, Rivière-des-Mille-Îles, QC]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

You have 50 seconds.

[Linda Lapointe, Liberal, Rivière-des-Mille-Îles, QC]

Okay.

In your opinion, how can the statutory review of Canada's Lobbying Act take those changes into account, particularly with respect to the recommendations made by our own Commissioner of Lobbying?

[Michael Harvey]

I talked about simplicity. One other aspect of simplicity is simplicity across this country.

I started my career years ago in the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, in intergovernmental affairs. I've worked in many different intergovernmental sectors with governments across this country for many years. I can say that it's a dream in every sector to have our laws aligned so that when we have organizations working across jurisdictions, they don't suffer challenges with having to comply with the varying regimes. Everybody dreams of this, but, of course, we also live in a federation and want to respect the wishes of the people of each of our jurisdictions. That's part of our Constitution.

I'm here to talk about British Columbia. I wouldn't presume to tell the federal Parliament exactly what policy choices to make, but I would encourage simplicity through harmonization. There's a real opportunity here.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Thank you, Mr. Harvey.

Thank you, Ms. Lapointe.

Mr. Thériault, you have the floor for six minutes.

[Luc Thériault, Bloc, Montcalm, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Commissioner Harvey, welcome.

As Ms. Lapointe said, the Commissioner of Lobbying made 21 recommendations, including 15 that are modelled on your Lobbyists Transparency Act. My questions reflect a concern about comparisons between the two acts.

I'd like to talk about prohibitions. In recommendation 15, which relates to the five-year restriction on lobbying in Canada, the commissioner recommends the following:

Amend the Act to harmonize the five-year restriction on lobbying so that all former designated public office holders are prohibited from engaging in any lobbying activities for the duration of their five-year restriction on lobbying, regardless of whether they work as a consultant or for an organization or corporation. Currently, former designated public office holders who are employed by a corporation may lobby up to a significant part of their own work.

Your Lobbyists Transparency Act includes a two-year lobbying prohibition for former public office holders. As I said, Canada's Lobbying Act sets out a five-year prohibition.

What do you think of a five-year prohibition?

Do you think it's too long?

Why did British Columbia decide on a two-year prohibition?

Are there any exemptions in the enforcement of the two-year prohibition in British Columbia? If so, under what criteria?

[Michael Harvey]

I should immediately contradict myself—what I've just said about the opportunity to harmonize—but this is another example of where some variation across the jurisdictions may be justified.

As you point out, in British Columbia there is a two-year cooling-off period for former public office holders. As for why that number is different from the five-year period at the federal level, I'm not sure that I can answer that question. I think these are policy choices that are made by different jurisdictions. I think that the labour markets and the political ecosystems at the provincial level and at the federal level are likely to be a bit different. I think there may be some scope for variation in the amount of time.

As for the exceptions, yes, there is an exception provision for former public office holders to be able to lobby. We have just a handful of examples of where that exemption has been sought and granted. In my instance, it's based on public interest, which is a complex topic.

This was not a feature of the recommendations I made before my statutory review committee, but if I were to focus on this, I would probably recommend to my own committee that the scope of decision-making be that the federal commissioner have in their act to consider a range of different issues, because of the complexity of defining this public interest and having that principle embedded in the act. That's because it appears in there in the act but not in other places.

This is in the public domain. My predecessors have provided exemptions to, for example, former public officer holders who wanted to work for BC Ferries, which is identified as an entity. It's not considered a government-controlled entity in British Columbia. If someone wants to work there and influence government, then that would be defined as lobbying, but the submissions to my office and to me were that being able to do that was in the public interest, and we ultimately agreed. That's an example of where an exemption was granted, but, as I say, since this has been in effect over the past six years, there have been only three or four examples of exemptions being sought and granted.

[Luc Thériault, Bloc, Montcalm, QC]

You said that the cooling-off period was a policy decision. The fact is that lobbying firms often seek out public office holders who used to be ministers or who held senior positions in the public service.

Do you think a two-year cooling-off period is sufficient, given that these people have built up networks in the course of their duties?

In your opinion, this is a policy decision, but I'd like to hear the opinion of British Columbia's lobbying commissioner.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

I will need a short answer from you, Mr. Harvey, if you don't mind. I know it was a long question, but we're already 15 seconds over.

[Michael Harvey]

I understand.

What I will say is that we have seen operationally no problems with this policy choice. What I will further say is that this policy choice needs to make sure that this cooling-off period doesn't serve as a disincentive for people to enter political life. That is an important balance that policy-makers need to take into consideration.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

I do appreciate that. Thank you.

This is now the second round.

Mr. Barrett, you have five minutes. Go ahead, please.

[Michael Barrett, Conservative, Leeds—Grenville—Thousand Islands—Rideau Lakes, ON]

What is the right balance between the transparency Canadians look to have, or should have, and the ability for people to be able to transition to new opportunities with a cooling-off period? People who are looking to enter the private sector after leaving time in service to the public, whatever that role might be, would probably be anxious for the period to be shortened, but we can understand on balance why there needs to be that cooling-off period. What's the sweet spot?

[Michael Harvey]

I can't really say. Now, I would be a former public office holder myself. I'm not covered by the LTA in British Columbia, but I was a government executive before I was appointed as commissioner. I was an ADM in Newfoundland and Labrador, but if I had been an ADM in British Columbia, I would have been a public office holder. Yes, that would have affected my employment prospects, so I certainly have some personal understanding of that concept.

I'm not sure I can say what the right number is. I don't think it's really the position of a regulator to say, with that level of precision, what the right number is.