Information & Ethics Committee on April 16th, 2026

[Abdelhaq Sari, Liberal, Bourassa, QC]

I'm sorry to cut off your answer, which is very relevant, but I'm going to make the same request as Mr. Majumdar.

Could you send us the information in writing? It would make for some interesting reading.

Your report also covered a very important element related to coordination between the agencies responsible for public integrity.

What type of concrete mechanisms would you recommend today, be it training, information sharing or anything else?

[Pauline Bertrand]

It's true that Canada has a rather unique model that is not found in any of the other OECD countries. Canada's Parliament has appointed an officer who is responsible for the implementation of the Lobbying Act. None of the other OECD countries have that.

Generally, as in the case of France and Ireland, for example, an independent agency is responsible for public integrity and the implementation of lobbying legislation. Normally, such an agency, for example in France, has responsibilities that encompass the disclosure of interests and the declaration of assets, public officials and the framework on foreign influence and mobility between the public and private sectors. It's true, then, that the issue of coordination doesn't come up as much, simply because these agencies have a broader mission.

I'd like to point out that Canada's strong suit is independence. In many OECD member countries, agencies responsible for implementing the law are rarely independent, even though that's something we recommend.

With regard to coordination, I would point out that Canada's Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Act will soon come into force. You have an independent Commissioner of Lobbying, and I believe coordination between the lobbying commissioner and the foreign influence commissioner will be very relevant.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Thank you, Ms. Bertrand.

I have taken note of the requests for information from the members. The clerk will send you members' requests for information by email after the meeting.

Mr. Thériault, you have six more minutes for your questions.

[Luc Thériault, Bloc, Montcalm, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Ladies, welcome. Thank you for your enlightening remarks and testimony.

In 2021, the OECD signed a partnership agreement with Lobbyisme Québec. A report entitled “The Regulation of Lobbying in Quebec, Canada: Strengthening a Culture of Transparency and Integrity” was released in 2022.

You recommended a review of the concept of “significant part of duties” for legal persons. As part of this review, the Commissioner of Lobbying of Canada has recommended eliminating the “significant part of duties” threshold in the federal act and requiring registration by default.

First, I'd like to hear what you think about this recommendation to have registration by default.

Second, which OECD countries have a practice of registration by default?

[Pauline Bertrand]

Thank you very much for the question regarding the concept of thresholds.

There has been a great deal of discussion about that concept in OECD member countries because countries that apply the “significant part” threshold or other criteria may have some challenges. Indeed, these thresholds are always a matter of interpretation, and most importantly, they can be used to circumvent registration.

The feedback we've heard about these thresholds is that there's a big problem with implementation in countries that do use the thresholds. I can give you a few examples. France, for example, refers not to “significant part”, but to 10 lobbying activities for each lobbyist. As a result, to circumvent this requirement, all a given entity has to do is to assign nine or fewer lobbying activities to each lobbyist, to fall below the cut-off. In Germany, it's 30 lobbying activities, bearing in mind that sending a letter to 30 members of Parliament counts as 30 lobbying activities.

In terms of recent developments, what we've seen is that countries that have recently passed legislation don't have this concept of threshold. That means that the most recent laws—Portugal's being the latest, passed in January 2026—don't have this concept of threshold. Instead, they apply the concept of registration by default, unless there's an exemption. They have a list of specific exemptions in the legislation.

As such, our recommendation for Quebec was to clarify the concept of “significant part” or to remove it from the legislation, because it opens the door to interpretation and could encourage people to remain under the threshold on purpose.

[Luc Thériault, Bloc, Montcalm, QC]

My understanding is that you support that.

Is that correct?

[Pauline Bertrand]

Yes, but our country recommendations are made on a case-by-case basis. Legislation on lobbying and the contexts vary widely from one country to another. Our recommendations for Canada may be very different from our recommendations for other OECD countries on these specific issues.

Our recommendation for Quebec, which also makes sense for Canada, is to clarify and remove this notion of “significant part”.

[Luc Thériault, Bloc, Montcalm, QC]

In the same 2022 report, you recommended that Quebec amend its lobbying legislation to give the commissioner of lobbying the power to impose administrative monetary penalties. The Commissioner of Lobbying of Canada would like to have that power.

Why does the OECD consider it important to grant the power to impose penalties to the relevant lobbying authority? That's the first part of my question.

The second part is as follows: How many countries give that power to the lobbying authority in their lobbying regulation? Have you been able to see the effects of such powers?

[Pauline Bertrand]

With respect to the first part of your question, I would say that it's really a matter of encouraging compliance. Bearing in mind that in countries like Canada, which have only criminal penalties, if there is any suspicion that a lobbyist has committed an offence, the only recourse after investigation is to refer the case to the relevant judicial authority.

Giving the institution responsible for ensuring compliance with the law power to impose administrative penalties or to suspend a lobbyist from the registry temporarily does indeed encourage compliance and ensures penalties are proportionate to the seriousness of the offence. For instance, for minor offences, such as forgetting to update disclosures, which may not be done on purpose, it's appropriate to apply lower monetary penalties.

I don't have the exact number of countries where the agency responsible for ensuring compliance with the legislation has that option. Our indicators don't cover that. However, we can send you examples.

Ireland's framework is actually one of the most relevant examples I mentioned. It could be an example of best practice for Canada. It's a very good example, because it provides the ability to impose administrative penalties.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

You have one minute, Mr. Thériault.

[Luc Thériault, Bloc, Montcalm, QC]

Thank you very much.

As I understand it, this reduces response time. In this case, it gives the lobbying authority the ability to intervene more effectively with lobbyists.

Is that correct?

[Pauline Bertrand]

Absolutely.

[Luc Thériault, Bloc, Montcalm, QC]

Okay.

Thank you. I don't have any other questions.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Okay.

[Luc Thériault, Bloc, Montcalm, QC]

I'll use my 30 seconds in the next round, Mr. Chair.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

That's fine. Thank you, Mr. Thériault.

We're going to start the second round.

Mr. Hardy, you have five minutes.

[Gabriel Hardy, Conservative, Montmorency—Charlevoix, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Ladies, thank you for joining us today.

Ms. Saula, you've not had a chance to answer questions since we started, so I'm going to give you an opportunity to share your views.

I'd like you to describe what you consider to be corruption across the world. I'm not looking for a far-fetched or rare example. I want an example of what you've seen in the 38 OECD countries.

The example of what you consider to be corruption would have to be something that occurs regularly.

[Nejla Saula, Head, Anti Corruption, Integrity and Open Government Division, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development]

Thank you very much.

I have to say that's not an easy question. I think it's an interesting question from a lobbying perspective, because obviously, lobbying is not defined as corruption, but rather, it's defined as influence that needs to be regulated through transparency.

The easiest approach to corruption and arguably the easiest to define in various OECD member systems is simply the payment to a public servant or a public official to advance a private interest. It means making a financial payment to influence a public servant's decision or doing that person a favour, to advance a private interest at the expense of the public interest and to alter the decision that the official ought to have made in the public interest.

That's the most common definition and the broadest one. When it's applied to more specific contexts, such as public procurement or securing licences or licensing agreements, it consists in paying a public servant to secure a licence that would otherwise not have been granted.

That's one of the most common examples.

[Gabriel Hardy, Conservative, Montmorency—Charlevoix, QC]

Thank you. I appreciate your answering the question. That seems pretty clear to me.

When it comes to lobbying, someone wields influence to receive a benefit that is not necessarily in the public interest and helps one side unilaterally.

What are the countries that have better success preventing this kind of action doing? What mechanisms have they put in place?

I'll give you an example. What are they doing to fight corruption effectively, whether through a parliamentary mechanism like ours or through an ethics commissioner or a commissioner of lobbying, as is the case here in Canada?

Here in Canada, we're fortunate to have a parliamentary system where the opposition puts questions to the government every day. If there is an actual or perceived ethical breach, people will be invited to appear before a non-partisan committee, and the committee will conduct an investigation.

Do you think this increases people's confidence in our system? Does it prevent corruption and conflict of interest?

[Nejla Saula]

Yes, and that's the point Ms. Bertrand and Ms. Pilichowski raised at the beginning. The issue of regulating influence activities falls within a broader ecosystem of public integrity. These activities are not necessarily problematic per se, as long as they are transparent. That's our approach. The question is how to foster a culture of integrity among the various stakeholders in the public space, and this obviously includes parliamentarians as well as the executive branch.

Influence activities are acceptable if they are conducted transparently. I have in mind Ms. Pilichowski's point about the culture of lobbying and what that means in a society. Based on our approach, lobbying should not necessarily come with stigma and be perceived as corruption per se. It just needs to be regulated properly to make it transparent, so that people are comfortable with it and stakeholders have more trust in institutions. I believe that's our approach. It's an ecosystem, and lobbying regulation is one piece of this ecosystem, but it's by no means the only component of a country's integrity system.

[Gabriel Hardy, Conservative, Montmorency—Charlevoix, QC]

Thank you very much.

By that, you're confirming that a standing committee that summons people because they have a potential conflict of interest or they may have been directly or indirectly lobbied is a mechanism to enhance transparency and public trust. Thank you for confirming that.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Your time is up, Mr. Hardy.

[Gabriel Hardy, Conservative, Montmorency—Charlevoix, QC]

Thank you. I was going to ask a very good question.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

You can ask it later.

I apologize to our witnesses. I was going to identify which parties the speakers were from. I did that at the beginning, but I haven't done it since.

Mr. Saini is from the Liberal Party of Canada.

You have five minutes, sir. Go ahead.

[Gurbux Saini, Liberal, Fleetwood—Port Kells, BC]

This question is for Elsa. The Canadian Lobbying Act is seen as being one of the best in the world, but since we are considering a statutory review of the legislation, what key elements or best practices would you recommend we consider?