Absolutely, we live in a democracy. These mechanisms exist precisely because we recognize that there can be tension and that a balance must be found between two legitimate values: transparency and security; transparency and government efficiency; transparency and diplomatic effectiveness; transparency and the protection of third parties. That's important.
At no point when I read Mr. Barrett's motion do I find that he acknowledges that this kind of tension can occur. At no point do I think he's looking to strike a balance; on the contrary. Excuse me for the terms I'm going to use. It's like an open bar, but we're not at that point. We're at the point of asking questions that need answers, which will help us verify whether the mechanisms in place were followed and whether the procedures were respected. However, the motion does not acknowledge it. It assumes that full disclosure is always the right answer. It's an assumption that I cannot accept 100%, because it's at odds with the reality of the balance we want to strike, not to mention the issue of resources.
I'd like to point out that we do have plenty of time today, which I really appreciate. We have until 1:47 a.m. for me to explain what I have to explain. I think I have enough time, and I have plenty of material to present to you.
We need to talk about resources. The last time I worked until 1:47 a.m. was in the private sector. I can tell you that the income was much higher, but it doesn't matter because, as I said, I'm happy to sit on this committee. It makes me happy because one of my goals is to have more transparency and more public trust.
However, a request of this magnitude requires considerable work from the teams at the Privy Council Office. It requires considerable work from the Prime Minister's Office. Obviously, it will also require work from the offices of the ministers who are affected. There are hundreds, maybe thousands of documents to gather, verify, translate and organize. Entire teams must be mobilized to accomplish these tasks. Meanwhile, these teams are not available to do the work for which they were mandated, namely serving Canadians, advising the government, and implementing public policies. That is important because we shouldn't forget that in Mr. Barrett's motion, it's recurring. It's the 15th day of each month, if I'm not mistaken. That means these documents, these resources, these thousands of hours will be an ongoing matter.
I'm not saying that just to dodge the question of oversight—far from it. I say this because we have a responsibility to Canadian taxpayers who fund these institutions and because it involves using government resources to produce a massive volume of documents, much of which will never be analyzed. Seriously, it's not transparency that I'm talking about here; it's about performance. It's efficiency and effectiveness. It would take hours to prepare all the documents requested in this motion. Moreover, it would take hours for us to read, analyze and really scrutinize them. We're not going to send that off to artificial intelligence, are we? It still requires some upfront work and, afterward, work to go through them in detail. That said, I don't mean to avoid the question of oversight at any time—far from it. Obviously, when it comes to using resources to produce a massive volume of documents, I will never agree with it. I am and always will be for performance, effectiveness and efficiency.
Mr. Chair, I will now broaden my thoughts. I talked, earlier, about the two items of the motion, but I will now broaden the matter.
The fundamental question I want to ask, and that we all need to ask ourselves, is the following: What is the objective of this motion? Mr. Barrett took the time to draft this motion. Knowing Mr. Barrett—I have been sitting on the committee with him since September 27—I found that these questions required thorough analysis. However, this motion is quite long, and I wonder what its objectives are. Are they related to the conflict of interest screen? Did he read the testimonies of Mr. Sabia and Mr. Blanchard? No, I don't think so.
Here is the fundamental question I ask myself: What is the objective of this motion? If it's to ensure that the conflict of interest screen is applied correctly, we already have the answer: the Ethics Commissioner has validated the system. Then what is the objective? Mr. Sabia testified before this committee with exemplary transparency. We had time to ask him all our questions, and he answered each one of them. He didn't dodge any questions. He was there and answered the Bloc Québécois questions that were asked byLuc Thériault. He also answered questions from the Conservatives, of course, as well as questions from the Liberals. He responded to all the parties. Mr. Sabia demonstrated exemplary transparency, Mr. Blanchard answered the questions of all committee members, and the data was provided afterward.
Now, if the objective of Mr. Barrett's motion is to ensure that the Prime Minister is not in a conflict of interest situation, we also have clear, precise and definite answers. The Ethics Commissioner confirmed that the Prime Minister divested himself of all his interests by placing them in a blind trust. The screen is in place and it is working. I repeat: The Prime Minister divested himself of all his interests by placing them in a blind trust. The screen is in place and it is working. The question that may be asked is legitimate, but we have the answer.
What would this motion accomplish that the existing mechanisms—and I've mentioned plenty—do not already do? This is the question I'm asking Mr. Barrett. When a motion is submitted, there may be things that we haven't seen, haven't read, or have ignored. It's very important that I understand exactly what the objective behind this motion is. If the answer is honest, if there's nothing substantially different in substance, then we need to ask what the motion seeks to accomplish on another level. Could it be a political objective? If that's the case, it's not aligned with the objectives I have, personally, on this committee.
I now want to address an aspect that I consider quite important, namely the issue of procedural fairness. The committee on which I serve—I'm proud of it and I can't say it often enough—has significant and real powers, and they must be exercised in a serious manner. We were able to hear from quality witnesses, whether in person or by video conference, and I found the discussions quite interesting. However, at the same time, what was being asked, whether or not in public, was something very serious, and it must always be done within the institutional framework that Ms. Lapointe clearly explained and which is based on principles. One of these principles is that the committee's requests must be proportionate to the legitimate objectives it pursues.
I will repeat it, then I will explain it: One of the principles of the institutional framework is that the committee's requests be proportionate to the legitimate objectives it pursues. The motion proposes that the committee make certain requests, but are they proportionate to the legitimate objectives it pursues?
I have understood the objectives. I wondered if this was related to the conflict of interest screen and its effectiveness. We already have the answers. We are being asked to provide all internal communications related to a compliance process that has been validated by an independent person, as well as all travel itineraries of a head of government, without possible protection. This is not proportionate to the objective of targeted and effective oversight. In my view, this is a motion that encompasses everything, protects nothing and is based on the presumption that something is wrong—which brings us back to the first point I mentioned in my introduction, before delving into my in-depth analysis—without any specific, verifiable facts serving as a basis for this presumption.
Reading the motion, we wonder if Mr. Barrett knows something that we don't. That's the question. This way of working doesn't properly serve Parliament, the House of Commons or the people who elected us, namely, Canadians. When making such a request to a committee like this, we must consider the precedent it is likely to set. This motion calls for full, unfiltered and unprotected disclosure on a recurring basis and within extremely tight timelines. It would establish a standard requiring disclosure of information on the fifteenth day of each month. This standard would need to be applied consistently. If we apply it here, it must be applied elsewhere. Are opposition members prepared to apply this same standard to all past governments? Would it have been applicable? Will it always be applicable in the future?
Now, here is the real question: Is it truly applicable today, in this context of geopolitical uncertainty? That is the question we must ask ourselves. Would my colleagues be comfortable seeing this level of scrutiny applied to their own work as opposition members? Of course, that is what democracy is all about. Perhaps they will return to power one day. I ask this seriously, because I believe integrity demands consistency. If we truly want to talk about integrity, we must be consistent. If the answer is that this type of request would only be acceptable for our government, then we must be honest about what this motion is all about. Does it have a political dimension?
I was very impressed by one point in Mr. Sabia's testimony that deserves to be highlighted. He spoke to us about the culture of integrity and how strong democracies function. He reminded us that all Canadian public servants are subject to a rigorous code of values and ethics. This applies to the government and to all public servants. He then told us that the Conflict of Interest Act plays an important part in reinforcing this culture of integrity. I fully share this view. It is precisely for this reason that I am concerned about a motion that suggests the existing compliance framework is insufficient, flawed, ineffective and questionable, without providing concrete evidence that this framework has been violated, circumvented or disregarded—which is not the case. That is not what we have heard here.
A culture of integrity is not just a set of rules, Mr. Chair. It's also a way of working, of interacting with institutions and of trusting one another on both sides of the room when it comes to our respective roles. As I said earlier, I have great respect for the role of the opposition. Similarly, we must respect the role of the government, which is currently dealing with geopolitical uncertainty. That trust is built or destroyed by the way we, as members of Parliament, treat one another.
Now, I will move on to my personal analysis. That was just an introduction and now I'll get into the substance. I will begin analyzing the elements I want to focus on. My analysis will be a bit more structural because I think we don't talk enough about structural elements.
The motion calls for monthly reports to be provided to the committee from the fifteenth day of each month and that each report include the assessments undertaken the previous month. It also calls for the first report to be provided by June 15, 2026 and for the report to include all assessments since the Prime Minister's conflict of interest screen came into effect. Let's think about what this means in practical terms for the Privy Council Office. If we make this request, what will actually happen?
The process would require assembling all records, starting from the beginning. Then all the related documents, including memos, minutes, emails and messages must be gathered and reviewed, organized and put into context. Then, they must be translated into both official languages, and I fully agree on this point. All of this must be done by June 15. That's about six weeks from today. I'm not saying the Privy Council Office can't do this or that it can't do an excellent job under pressure. Far from it. I have great respect for the work of the Privy Council Office. I have no doubt that it can work under pressure. However, what I'm saying is that putting entire teams under this pressure to produce documents whose necessity we have not established based on specific, concrete facts is misuse, inefficient use of our government's resources.
After that, what will happen? Every month, the same process will start over. It's a permanent, recurring, open-ended, unlimited obligation that will continuously tie up resources. The recurring nature of this means it's not really a project. It's something that will require person-years and will force the government to hire people solely to do this work.
Now, let's talk about the second part of Mr. Barrett's request, which concerns the Prime Minister's travel itineraries, in a bit more detail. The Prime Minister meets with foreign counterparts, heads of international organizations and representatives of governments with which Canada maintains diplomatic, economic and security relations that are sometimes complex. These meetings take place within a diplomatic context and are governed by diplomatic rules, such as conventions and, at times, expectations regarding confidentiality. When a prime minister meets with a counterpart, both parties implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, expect that their discussions will remain confidential until both parties decide to make them public and until the public interest becomes sufficient to justify disclosure.
Mr. Barrett's motion requires all these documents to be provided to the committee without redactions. This means that Canada's partners could see their discussions with the Canadian Prime Minister made public.
Have we considered the consequences of such a requirement? I am asking Mr. Barrett this question. Perhaps he knows more about it.
This is a serious question because I believe that Canada's foreign policy is not a subject that should be handled in a willy-nilly fashion. I can understand that Mr. Barrett wants to know who the Prime Minister has spoken with, and so on. That is legitimate. However, have we also considered Canada's foreign policy? This is not a subject that should be handled in a willy-nilly fashion in the context of a motion proposed in a committee. I have said this before, and I will say it again.
That said, we must be transparent. However, let's find a balance. That is important.
I will now address the overall logic of the entire motion. In certain parliamentary traditions, there is a practice of making broad, sometimes very broad, requests in the hope that something in the documents produced will feed into a political narrative and generate a clip for social media.
I don't believe this practice serves the House of Commons well. The practice does not serve taxpayers well, and it does not strengthen public confidence in our institutions. That is my view. I don't think this practice, if that is indeed Mr. Barrett's objective, is going to really help us.
I'm not imputing motives to my colleague Mr. Barrett, far from it. However, I must say that the wording of this motion, its scope and the timeline imposed for the first report give the impression of a request designed for effect rather than to enhance understanding. That is all. That is my view. I hope Mr. Barrett will take the floor to explain that I am wrong. However, that's my understanding from reading the motion. With the limited knowledge I have and the limited experience I have on this committee, that is what I have understood. That concerns me, because our role here is not for effect. Our role here is to do serious work. Our role here is not to generate sensational stories. Our role is much more important, more serious and, I would say, more interesting.
I'd like to get back to Mr. von Finckenstein's point. His competence, expertise and experience in this area were evident when he appeared before the committee. He raised a point that is central to my current thinking regarding the objective of Mr. Barrett's motion. He reminded us that the Federal Court of Appeal had confirmed that the conflict of interest screen is a reasonable compliance mechanism for public office holders.
The court stated—I am paraphrasing from memory—that the practice of publicly disclosing potential conflicts of interest before any problematic situation has occurred is an eminently reasonable way to ensure the furtherance of the act's purpose. In other words, the preventive logic of the screen—the idea of managing potential conflicts before they arise—has been validated at the highest level of Canadian administrative law below the Supreme Court.
Nevertheless, here is a motion calling for the documentation and public disclosure of every instance in which this mechanism has been applied, including all internal conversations, discussions and communications. In doing so, we risk turning a preventive tool into a tool for retrospective oversight. In my remarks today, I spoke at length about being proactive. However, what we are seeking here is much more of a retroactive mechanism. We are going backwards. What is being asked for is retrospective oversight.
What we know at this point is that experts say we are exercising proactive oversight.
What the motion is asking us to do is to review what has been done on the fifteenth day of each month. Is it better to have a system that sets limits and ensures oversight in a proactive manner, from the outset and which everyone in an independent position deems truly effective, functional, structured and transparent? However, what those of the old school of thought want is for us to have a “rearview mirror” perspective and always keep looking back. That is what has been done. Excuse me for saying so, but I don't subscribe to this model of governance either. I disagree with it.
As I said, we're in the process of changing a preventive oversight tool, which, paradoxically, could make the system less efficient and less effective. If the people responsible for applying the screen know that each of their analyses will be made public in the coming weeks, they might be inclined to document things differently, communicate differently and work differently. This question was raised here in the committee.
It's not because they have anything to hide—far from it—but because public exposure of each step in a compliance process changes the very nature of that process. If we have confidence in the procedures and processes in place, I don't think we will question each of the steps. We're not in an operational workflow or on a production line, but rather within the public system. Responsible officials have demonstrated that this procedure was followed. They asked whether the screen should be applied to 13 situations, and it did not apply to seven of the cases, and we have seen results for six cases.
Allow me now to discuss what the committee could do differently. I'm not claiming the status quo is perfect—far from it. When we asked questions, whether at the international or provincial level, everyone clearly told us we have one of the best systems in the world. That said, is the status quo what we want? Is it perfect? The answer is no. I agree that nothing is perfect. Should we keep things as they are or improve them? The answer is yes. In fact, that is why we're here. I am not claiming that the committee should not be interested in how the conflict of interest screen works—on the contrary.
We agreed that Mr. Sabia and Mr. Blanchard should come to testify before the committee. We all asked them questions. One way to make improvements is by asking questions about the conflict of interest screen. In fact, there were questions that Mr. Sabia was unable to answer, but he sent us a response afterward. There are ways to carry out this work that are both rigorous and respectful of the institutional framework. I have questions that have not yet been addressed. So far, Mr. Barrett has not given me a clear answer regarding the intended objective, the objective behind the motion.
However, he may still have questions to ask. In that case, we could invite the Ethics Commissioner back to provide regular updates on how the system is functioning. For example, he could testify every six or twelve months, or at any other interval deemed appropriate. We could periodically review how the system is functioning.
I repeat: Nothing is perfect, and there is always room for improvement. We could request an anonymous statistical report on the number and nature of the assessments conducted. We have already received a response on this matter; I believe you have received it, Mr. Chair.
We know the number and nature of the assessments conducted. We could ask specific questions about cases that were not assessed and inquire why they were not assessed. We have the right to ask these questions.
However, they are asking that the reports, documents and correspondence be provided to us every month. There is a Quebec expression I love: Enough, already. Mr. Barrett's motion in its current form is not a proposal for targeted oversight of an element we have contested and wish to correct—far from it. Rather, it's a request for mass disclosure.
Requests for mass disclosure are generally triggered by something factual, such as, for example, where someone is found to have failed to comply with procedures. In this case, we are far from that.
The request from Mr. Barrett is indiscriminate and lacks prioritization. His request—and I think I've explained this clearly—also shows no regard for the consequences it may have on the workload of public servants, on transparency, or even on Canadians' trust in institutions.
I'll begin to wrap up my remarks. After presenting my perspective and that of the experts, I'll now conclude my thoughts—not my intervention.
I agree with Mr. Hardy when he says that we live in an era when trust in institutions is fragile. On that point, I agree with him. It's a reality we see in many democracies. I have also observed it among young people. This phenomenon is sometimes self-evident regarding institutions, municipalities, boroughs, police services and tax authorities.
Canadians are increasingly skeptical of many institutions, political parties and sometimes even governments. Part of this skepticism is fuelled by the feeling—and I do mean the feeling, the perception—that the rules of the game are not applied fairly, that institutions serve certain interests and so forth.
Is it up to us to sow the seeds of this kind of thinking, by questioning things without factual evidence, without facts on which to base our arguments? I don't think that's the best idea.
There are two ways of looking at things. Canadians listening to us see it that way too. We have two options and I think that, time and again, Canadians have seen these two options. In fact, the last three by-elections have shown what Canadians prefer.
The first option is to work in earnest to strengthen transparency mechanisms. As I said, even though they are considered excellent by external people and international organizations, they are not perfect. There's no such thing as perfection. We must strengthen existing transparency mechanisms, ensure they work and ensure we have the mechanisms to improve them. There are, of course, gaps. Admittedly, this work may seem thankless and time-consuming, but it produces lasting results.
The second option involves clips, sensationalism and the need to seek the limelight by making multiple demands for mass disclosure as if there were some underlying doubt. It involves creating processes that give the impression of transparency without actual substance. It involves using the work of parliamentary committees as a tool for pressure—political pressure—rather than as a tool for governance.
I strongly believe in the first option—and that is why I stand with the government—even if it may seem thankless, difficult and slow. I strongly believe that the first option serves Canadians. That is why I cannot support the motion in its current form.
I would also like to highlight a paradox that I find striking. This motion has been introduced by colleagues who, at other times and in other contexts, have defended the importance of safeguarding the government's internal decision-making process. They have rightly argued that certain information must remain confidential to protect the integrity of the political process.
However, today, they are calling for full disclosure of internal communications related to an independently validated compliance process. There is a tension here that I find difficult to reconcile. I believe we must all be prepared to apply these principles consistently, regardless of the political stripes of the government in power.
I can see that I've taken a lot of time to make my statement. In fact, I don't know exactly how much time. That said, I want to give the floor to my colleagues so they can continue to respond.
I'm making a point. I took a lot of time, but I had concerns. I spent the entire weekend reflecting. I tried to understand, because I know that Mr. Barrett is, after all, one of the most experienced members in this room and that he is a conscientious person. I asked him questions. In my remarks, I've not claimed to be better than Mr. Barrett. On the contrary, I disagree with Mr. Barrett. I have outlined my concerns. I believe the motion before us warrants I raise these concerns. It demands much more serious consideration, given all its implications regarding efficiency, workload and so on.
I want to be clear about what I'm advocating here. I'm advocating for a system of accountability that is both rigorous and smart. Rigorous because it asks real questions about real issues, and smart because it complies with the mechanisms that have been put in place to safeguard the integrity of the government process.
I'm not advocating for opacity—far from it. I always for advocate transparency. I support transparency, but I appreciate clarity. I want clarity in requests—not massive requests or vague ones. This is not a rejection of oversight, but a rejection of oversight that lacks clarity and will drown us in volume, rather than focusing on what matters.
Deep down, I think Canadians understand this distinction. They are not asking us to accumulate thousands and thousands of pages and documents. They are asking us to ask the right questions. As a wise person once so aptly put it, if you want the right answer, ask the right question. We must ask the right questions to get the right answers.
In closing, for all the reasons I have outlined, the scope of this motion is disproportionate to the request. The risks it poses to the quality of internal advice, its implications for Canadian diplomacy, its impact on institutional resources and its risk of undermining a compliance system that works and has been independently validated make it very difficult for me to support the motion by my colleague Mr. Barrett, even though, I reiterate, he is an experienced, respectful and respected member of Parliament. I'm open to discussion. I'm open to hearing his responses on how we can improve oversight of the conflict of interest screen. I remain open to more targeted, better managed and proportionate proposals that allow the committee to carry out its mandate without creating the risks I have described in my remarks today. However, Mr. Barrett's motion goes too far. It was rushed through. There are no factual justifications to explain it. In other words, the justifications are far from sufficient.
Thank you very much for your attention.
I've asked the opposition a great deal of questions. I also gave my colleagues a short break. I've also asked Mr. Barrett many questions and repeatedly expressed my respect for him.
I'm raising my hand now to indicate that I would like another opportunity to make another statement in which I hope to receive some good answers from a good member of Parliament such as Mr. Barrett.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.