Thank you very much.
I feel a little bit odd because I'm actually coming from an industry that's in reasonably good shape and in a strong position to face the future. We're not without our warts, mind you, and I'll talk about some of those, but we seem to have done more right than wrong.
First of all, when you talk about automotive, you have to look at the vehicle assemblers very differently from the automotive parts and tool sectors tied to automotive. They are very different. They're very global in nature, certainly on the assembly side; the automotive parts sector is much more North American.
We talk about three very distinct errors in automotive. I won't get into detail on any of them, but that first error occurred when Henry Ford came across the Detroit River and set up a plant in Walkerville. We ended up with about 60 or 65 years in the automotive sector in Canada that turned out to be incredibly inefficient, with high tariffs and no rationalization of our production base. It ended up in a royal commission in 1963, the Bladen commission, which identified all these issues and proposed a series of policies that, through a circuitous route, you might say, ended up as the Auto Pact.
That started our second error, an error through which the auto sector was very successful.
I think it's important to understand that the Auto Pact was a duty-free agreement, but far--very far--from a free trade agreement. The Auto Pact had significant safeguards embedded into it--production sales ratios and value-added safeguards--that highly protected the industry in its development stage. If there is a flaw in the Auto Pact, because of the nature of these safeguards, it forced the industry.... The ones that benefited from the Auto Pact were only the North American players--GM, Ford, and Chrysler--but it was a highly protected industry, and I think you need to understand that.
Coming out of the Auto Pact, it's also important to understand that the auto parts sector was decimated. A lot of people talk about the auto parts sector being in trouble today. The auto parts sector has gone through these regenerations. The Auto Pact eliminated well over half of the companies and about two-thirds of the jobs in the auto parts sector, but it did get down to a core strength, and this framework that the Auto Pact provided, starting in 1965, allowed the auto parts sector to grow, and grow very successfully. Our most successful company today actually started in the year of the Auto Pact, 1965; that's Magna International.
It did promote some very successful companies, but the auto sector changed. What happened in the auto sector very explicitly was globalization. The Auto Pact was good as long as we had a North American-based industry, because it was the North American companies that benefited, but it didn't have provisions to handle the globalization of the industry. Our industry became more and more and more global. We can see that every day; just walk down the road and look at the number of import nameplate products on the road. Consumers in Canada last year bought 55% import nameplate vehicles and only 45% GM, Ford, and Chrysler vehicles.
The Auto Pact wasn't the right policy to go forward. It ended up being phased out through free trade agreements and NAFTA agreements; ultimately the WTO challenge in 1999 killed the Auto Pact.
This has started the third era, the era our auto sector is in at this point. It is an era in which we are doing reasonably well. On the assembly side of our sector, we have virtually entirely reinvested in our assembly plants. We've attracted about $1.5 billion of innovation money into the automotive assembly sector, with substantial investments by Chrysler, Ford, and General Motors on innovation fronts with R and D facilities. Honda and Toyota are less focused on that; nonetheless, they also have R and D investments in Canada that are extremely successful. We're operating from a strong base.
Contrary to what you might read in The Globe and Mail in the morning, production of vehicles in Canada last year was up, not down; employment in the automotive assembly sector last year was up, not down. We do have this problem in the auto sector in that elements of the sector have deteriorated, and deteriorated quite radically. The traditional North American companies have lost about four million units of production. They are gone, never to return; the factories have been closed, and they're not coming back. But in their place we've ended up attracting five global investments. Four are open and operating vehicle facilities today, and another one is coming on late this year or early next year with the second Toyota plant. Every single job lost by GM, Ford, and Chrysler on the assembly side has been replaced by one of these other global players.
We've done quite well through that, going beyond just assembly investments, into innovation investments and investing in our people; it's amazing the amount of dollars dedicated to upgrading the skill set of the vehicle assembly sector. So we're very well positioned on that.
If anything, in the assembly sector, we have a crisis of confidence, in that when we look at the next go-round of investments, as typical Canadians, we say, “Oh, how are we going to get this? We don't have an Auto Pact, and we don't have this or that tool available to us any more.” Some of us have more confidence in the strength of Canada, knowing that what we have going on in Canada will help us along those lines. It doesn't guarantee it; we may just have to work harder.
The automotive parts sector is a little different story in this third era we talk about. Most of the parts sector we lost.... First of all, I'll go back. The auto parts sector was overwhelmingly successful once it got through the restructuring of the Auto Pact. We started at about 25,000 workers, and we got down, literally, to about 10,000 workers in the parts sector. That grew from the early 1970s, through to the beginning of this decade, to 100,000 workers in the automotive parts sector—a tenfold growth in this quasi-free-trade environment. As I said, it's duty-free trade, but protected by safeguards.
Since the restructuring at GM, Ford, and Chrysler, we've lost about 10,000 of those jobs, and that is where a lot of concern in the industry starts to come forward: “Oh my God, what are we going to do about that?” When you take a look at the jobs that have been lost, they fall into some very classic categories. First of all, virtually every single job lost—though I can't prove this—was in a company tied to GM, Ford, and Chrysler but was unable to go through the restructuring process that GM, Ford, and Chrysler did. So as they lost four million units in selling to those companies, they weren't able to participate in the four million units replaced by the global players, the Hondas and Toyotas of the world. That's point number one.
Number two, I've been in at least half or maybe two-thirds of the parts companies that have closed, and they're a throwback to another era. You go to these facilities and see that they didn't invest; they didn't innovate and they didn't invest in their human resources. I read in The Globe and Mail in the mornings about yet another one of these small plants closing, and I think, wow, why didn't that happen last year, or the year before, or the year before that? It's almost as if they deserve what they got, you might say—in most cases, but not all. This net, unfortunately, gets cast very widely, and some companies get caught up in it.
We're down about 10,000 workers, but we've done really well in Canada in the parts sector to offset some of that, going out internationally and attracting over 150 global players on the parts side of the business into this country, with the latest manufacturing technologies, the latest product technologies, and the latest human resource issues. They have replaced a lot of the auto parts sector that has disappeared. We're still net negative by about 10%, but we've transitioned our industry, or are in the midst of transitioning our industry, from being one that was highly protected from non-tariff barriers and focused, slowly, on three customers, to an industry now that is becoming very global.
The rules for engagement for automotive policy I think need to be set. Many of our policies in the past had a corporate tag on them. The Auto Pact, for instance, was solely beneficial to GM, Ford, and Chrysler—no one else could benefit but them. In this industry going forward, we have to be cautious as policy-makers to have complete neutrality between corporate players.
Just because one of the Japanese companies is ultrasuccessful today doesn't necessarily mean it will be ultrasuccessful tomorrow. Just as GM, Ford, and Chrysler may have issues today, it doesn't necessarily mean they won't solve those issues. These are big resource-intensive companies; they can solve their problems and become successful in the future. So keep absolute neutrality between our corporate players and get rid of these corporate-specific policies that have been put in place.
The second is that our industry, at least on the assembly side, has become very global and on the parts sector side is increasingly becoming global. So take a global approach to development at all levels in the industry, particularly investment promotion. Make sure you are pounding the back pavements in Europe, Japan, Korea, and China for the best of the best and convincing them to come into Canada. Don't just rely on your existing players in Canada to do it.
We have a running joke in the automotive sector that we don't need to take off any more than one glove, and we certainly don't need to take our shoes and socks off, to count the number of very successful Canadian-owned parts suppliers. Once you get beyond Magna, Linamar, Westcast, and Martinrea, you kind of ask who's number five. You might be able to come up with a fifth, and if you're generous, you might be able to come up with a sixth or a seventh, but that's about it.
So we have a relatively weak and small-success Canadian base, but we have these other 150 to 200 global companies that have come in and are doing quite well. So let's have more of that global approach; we can't be afraid of that.
Any success has to be pinned on understanding that we surround the lowest-cost jurisdiction.
I'll finish with this point: we've got to promote efficiency. That's the automotive industry. In a global industry like automotive, promoting efficiency is absolutely critical--investment promotion to get the best infrastructure development and tax regulatory policy for efficiency and human resource policies. And that's the secret to success with automotive going forward.
Thank you.