Yes, I did say that, and the question remains relevant. What we have done is, in the zone of uncertainty that we've sketched out, we've tried to balance the risks that inflation may prove to be too low, against the risk that in acting to reduce that risk, we would worsen household imbalances, which are elevated and at a state where we don't wish to worsen them. We decided that we're about right in balancing those risks.
What would change that would be, for example, if the export recovery that we talked about earlier did not turn out as we expected. Say, the U.S. economy doesn't quite get up as much speed as we think and our exports don't pick up, then we'd be looking at a longer period during which the economy would be below potential, and at a much higher probability that inflation would fall significantly below target for a long time.
Then we would need to re-evaluate that balance of risks with that new information. That's why I said at the time that if something like that transpired, then I can't be taking rate cuts off the table because I can't forecast everything.
If the reverse were true, then the reverse would be the reverse. You would have a different story altogether.
That balance of risk is not some knifepoint or razor's edge, but rather a zone in which we try to manage the risk that we're facing, including forecast risks.