Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
Thank you for inviting me to appear before the committee.
First, I would like to note that I am a professor of ethics at the University of Moncton. I worked on tax havens actively from 1999 to 2015. Since then, I have been conducting historiographical, ethical and conceptual research on tax havens and what I more broadly refer to as “sovereignties of convenience”.
I’d like to take a few minutes to focus on the social costs of the use of tax havens primarily by the wealthy and multinational corporations, and then I will address two topics, which we can discuss at your leisure.
I’ll start by looking at the costs of tax havens on the entire domestic and Canadian community. I would say that these costs can be summed up in six points and that an overall striking picture emerges when the issue of tax havens is addressed qualitatively and not just quantitatively.
The first cost is that obviously, tax havens represent a cost for the general public because public authorities cannot tax capital that is generated here, which ought to be taxed under the law. This represents a loss of revenue for the Treasury because huge sums of money—in the billions of dollars—elude taxation every year due to the accounting practices of major corporations.
The second cost is the issue of dumping between traditional states and tax havens. This cost stems from the fact that for 45 years, traditional states have been reducing corporate income tax rates to compete with tax havens. Thus, instead of fighting tax havens, they compete with them. However, to compete with tax havens, corporate tax rates are continually being lowered. This is the second loss of revenue for the public treasury since the remaining capital is taxed at a lower rate than before. This is true, by and large, in all countries in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the OECD.
The third cost is a truly scandalous issue relating to debt servicing. When the government fails to balance its budget by the end of the fiscal year, it resorts to borrowing from financial and industrial institutions—entities that it either no longer taxes or taxes insufficiently—in an effort to balance its budget. As a result, businesses no longer finance public institutions through taxation to ensure the existence of social programs and public infrastructure, and instead, citizens do so through debt servicing when they finance financial or industrial companies to help Canada balance its budget. This is the third major cost and it is almost exponential.
The fourth cost pertains to the tax rate for the middle class and small and medium-sized enterprises. I would add that it also pertains to taxes that impact the entire population, including the working class, thereby necessitating compensation. To achieve this, the burden shifts to captive taxpayers, who are primarily middle and working‑class individuals who contribute through consumption taxes and thus pay more tax.
The fifth cost concerns the disappearance of public services. This means that when the state cannot balance its budget, it makes cuts to services and the budget so that services that people have been entitled to for years are phased out. People seeking these services are forced to turn to the private sector.
The sixth cost concerns the pricing of services, meaning that the public has to pay for public services twice, once as taxpayers and once as users.
These six costs are colossal and literally immeasurable, which means that it is impossible to put a figure on them. What we can see is a strong trend, and if we want to imagine a world without tax havens, we would have to assume that multinational companies would pay their taxes where they generate revenue, where they do business and where they are active. They would do so at a high tax rate, which was close to 50% in Canada in 1980 if we include provincial corporate income tax. Public debt would be lower, taxes on the middle class would be lower and public services would be better and free. This is what we can already envisage.
Now, if we want—