Let me try to deal with the block transfer issue separately from these other transfers that I spoke about, which are grants and contributions that tend to have more conditions attached.
With regard to block transfers, from a provincial fiscal perspective, predictability and stability of the revenue source are very important. As I said in one of my previous answers, the Canada health transfer is a really interesting example of a case in which we have intergovernmental agreement on some of the basic principles and we have a very well-regulated, rigorous approach so that if there is a disagreement between the federal government and a provincial government over those outcomes—those strings, so to speak—there is a very good way to resolve that dispute.
With regard to the question of whether block transfers should have additional strings added to them, there have been discussions in this Parliament at times about imposing conditions on all block transfers, for example, including what used to be called the gas tax fund, in order to generate particular kinds of housing outcomes. It wasn't just permits but actual occupation levels.
I would caution that the approach of trying to buy policy change when the policy instrument is quite separate from the desired outcomes is likely to really fan the flames of federal-provincial friction.
The examples that you gave.... In our federation, there's a long history of provinces that rely on federal transfers always wishing that those transfers were larger, but I think we are now in a situation in which those transfers have at least attained a level of predictability. They are rising faster than the rate of inflation. As I said, there is an uneven capacity across the federation—I will give you that—but as a whole, the provincial order of government has fiscal capacity that is not insignificant.