This is a real honour. This is my first time at the finance committee.
I want to say, Madam Chair, greetings to you. It's been quite some time since we've been able to work together, and I'm grateful for the opportunity.
I have to note that Mr. Lavoie has excellent sartorial choices, with his striped shirt and solid tie. I have the same choice today, whereas Mr. Leitão has chosen the inverse of a solid shirt and a striped tie, and I think that's excellent as well. I just wanted to compliment them on their spring decisions. That's something I struggle with generally, so it's nice to have it affirmed that sometimes I get things correct.
Now, I know that members around the table are not interested in a conversation about sartorial decisions. I respect that, and I do want to get into the substance of the subamendment, because I actually have a bit of a background in this. Before I came into political life, I spent time working at a consulting firm where investment, energy and technology were core parts of how I earned a living. Pension funds and how sovereign funds in other parts of the world manage investment is a fascinating conversation and is completely relevant to this committee.
The subamendment is actually something that I bring a particular amount of enthusiasm for, and I say so because, as you know, around the world, the pools of capital are actually fairly concentrated, whether that's in Toronto, New York, Scandinavia or the Gulf countries. In Asia, you have Singapore and massive family offices in places like India and elsewhere. The performance of these major funds is critical to international finance but, more importantly, to Canadian taxpayers when it comes to the Canadian pension plan.
For our great and honourable colleague from the Bloc, I am also an admirer of the Caisse de dépôt. How they work around the world is emblematic of a fund that thinks clearly and unambiguously about returns for shareholders. They have a strong risk-adjusted portfolio, which I think the Canadian pension plan sometimes follows into different markets. It has been good in many ways for Canadian investment partners in returns to our taxpayers for the sacred pensions that we must guard.
In the spirit of getting it right, a comparison with how other jurisdictions look at this is very germane to the committee and to the bill, and I think this amendment will be well received by the public when they view this testimony in the public record. I have five points that I'd like to make on this. I aim to be not necessarily repetitive, but I will be if I find that my points are not getting across clearly. They are distinct points, and I think they are ways to help us think about how comparing the CPP with the United States, Australia and Sweden can advance funding, reliance on investment income and long-term financing of promised benefits.
Let me get started.
The first would be that advance funding builds intergenerational equity and reduces future fiscal pressure. Benchmarking the CPP's partial advance-funding model, which I know came under reform in the mid-1990s, against Australia's fully prefunded mandatory superannuation systems shows how accumulating assets today insulates future retirees and taxpayers from demographic shocks. In contrast, the U.S. Social Security system's predominantly pay-as-you-go structure has produced large unfunded obligations and projected shortfalls, underscoring the value of prefunding and of honouring promises without abrupt tax hikes or benefits adjustments.
Demographic shocks are something that Canada will have to deal with after 10 years of terrible management when it comes to our population levels and how immigration has impacted the funding base for the CPP. Those public policy questions actually make it critical for us to compare with other jurisdictions to see how adjustments are made for the kind of mess and chaos that Liberal governance in this country has resulted in. The lax control over our immigration has created an obligation and a funding pool for the CPP that will have massive long-term consequences.
We must look at other jurisdictions to get a sense as to how they're dealing with demographic pressures, not just of population through immigration, but population through natural growth, and how that might have long-term impacts on how we think about our pension fund. The public disclosure and reporting of that comparison is something that is I think critical to the finances of our country, especially given how much of a share it has in our national life. I'll start with that first point.
The second point is that funding-level comparisons also provide objective sustainability benchmarks.
International data on assets-to-expenditure ratios, buffer funds, as you would see in Sweden, and fully funded individual accounts, as you would see in Australia, allow rigorous assessment of the CPP's long-standing and currently strongly funded position and the chief actuary's 75-year sustainability findings. This helps the committee distinguish between systems that have built credible reserves and those facing growing actuarial deficits, informing evidence-based calibration of contribution rates and benefit promises.
It might sound like accounting gobbledygook but, at the end of the day, really being able to understand how to establish a sustainable pension fund and comparing the performance of our pension fund are critical.
You may have discovered, Madam Chair, that whenever members of Parliament, through OPQs, Order Paper questions, or through other means, try to get some transparency on these types of questions on the sustainability of pensions, we never get any answers. They stand apart from government. Parliament does not have the ability to draw from the pensions the kind of transparency that Canadians demand on key decisions on the long-term sustainability of it.
We're talking about 75-year benchmark bandwidths. Pensions around the world that are obligatory for populations have similar actuarial disclosures. Being able to really get into the guts of understanding how the pension plan safeguards the long-term interests of Canadians, mom-and-pop people who need to make sure that they can plan their retirement comfortably, including with inflation and currency changes, is something that I think the public would benefit from. The subamendment speaks to that through the proposal to have that comparison disclosed.
My third point is that reliance on professional investment returns enhances resilience. Contrasting the CPP investment board's diversified global portfolio and growing contribution of investment income, which I believe is projected to represent a rising share of revenues, with Australia's privately managed superannuation funds' and the U.S. trust funds' more constrained returns demonstrates how well-governed investment strategies can meaningfully supplement contributions, lowering long-term dependence on payroll taxes while managing market risk through independent professional oversight.
One key part of professional benchmarking with these funds is really critical to the future of these funds. You hear rumours in different jurisdictions about the government, maybe even Liberals, looking at cordoning off or mandating by law a portion of CPP to be invested into Canadian projects versus international projects, and about how the mix of global and domestic investment structures would be managed. There's a reason there's a separation between that, between partisan interest and political interest and thinking of long-term sustainability.
One of the successes of the Canadian pension fund, even if their returns, compared to massive major indices, are not entirely that different, is that it has largely been devoid of the kind of corruption you might imagine happening in other jurisdictions. Safeguarding against that by making sure that professional investment returns are scrutinized appropriately, in a way that safeguards against the political interests of the party of the day, is a critical issue to examine when we look at other jurisdictions.
My fourth point is that long-term financing lessons protect promised benefits from political and demographic risks. Comparisons reveal how Sweden's notionally defined contribution framework, with automatic balancing framework mechanisms and buffer funds, alongside Australia's explicitly funded accounts, provide clearer pathways to sustainable financing than pure pay-as-you-go models that risk sudden adjustments. As you see from U.S. benefits, upon trust fund depletion, this equips the committee to evaluate whether CPP enhancements maintain the plan's ability to deliver promised benefits across generations under realistic economic and demographic scenarios.
Political and demographic risks are the chief risks that the pension funds in Canada have to guard against. It's a point that I raised a little earlier. I mentioned that I didn't want to be redundant, but they do string together. When the political class decides to get engaged with macrofinance and says that it's going to get involved with pension plans and major investment institutions, when the Prime Minister shows up and acts in foreign jurisdictions as though he is somehow the vanguard, the chairman of the board, for Canadian pension investment, and he can control investment....
He's having a major investment conference this fall. Invitations have gone out to major investors, but none of the investors understand what the objective of the meeting is.
The Prime Minister is acting as though the pension funds are investment funds he can commandeer for his own interest. Objectively, that's the type of political interference that cannot be trusted. Even trying to paint a debt fund as a sovereign debt fund—borrowing money, with billions of dollars in interest accrued for it—