Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Good afternoon, committee.
I worked at DFO in the international relations field for more than 23 years, 15 of which were at the senior executive level. I also spent more than three years in Brussels in the early 1990s as the Canadian fisheries counsellor to the European Union. I retired as director general of international affairs in mid-2002. I'm one of four retired DFO executives who tried to assist the government in its efforts to improve the NAFO Convention.
I've asked the clerk to circulate two documents to the committee for its consideration. One is a letter my colleagues and I sent to the Prime Minister on September 20, reinforcing Premier Williams' position in his September 11 letter to the Prime Minister raising Newfoundland and Labrador's concerns about the amendments to the NAFO Convention. Attached to our letter is a point-by-point commentary on the misleading press release issued by Minister Shea upon receipt of the Premier's letter to the Prime Minister. The second document is a copy of the text published as a letter, signed by the four of us, to the editor of the St. John's Telegram on October 24, 2009, responding to a second press release issued by the minister after appearance before the Standing Committee on Fisheries and Oceans.
In our letter to the Prime Minister, we explained that we had been drawn into a public debate with the government when we originally wished only to contribute privately to improving Canada's future position in conserving and ensuring sustainable use of the fisheries resources in the northwest Atlantic. We agree that the existing NAFO Convention is out of date and should be amended to strengthen its positions, to make the organization more effective in achieving its conservation objectives, and to reflect current international law. However, we believe the current amendments fall far short in that respect, while creating substantial new problems that will in fact weaken the organization and also undermine Canada's ability to maintain sole control over fisheries management in Canada's 200-mile zone.
Our comments have been misconstrued, perhaps purposely, by the former minister and continue to be minimized by the current minister. We wish to help set the record straight by commenting on the statement issued by Minister Shea, and we have done so in the attachment to our letter to the Prime Minister and our letter to The Telegram. I will be pleased to respond to any questions the committee may have in regard to these points.
Our bottom line is that the amendments are fatally flawed. Further, in the long run, they will not only weaken Canada's position in NAFO but more importantly Canada's position in any future arbitration or any future reference to the Law of the Sea tribunal. They must not be ratified.
Before I conclude, I want to comment on some of the oversimplified defences that have been presented to justify ratification of these amendments. One is the sort of statement that everybody is doing it, so why shouldn't we. Witnesses before Parliament have claimed that paragraph 10 of article VI of the NAFO amendments, which provides for possible NAFO management and control inside the Canadian zone, has been adopted elsewhere. Other coastal states have accepted them, so why shouldn't we? The evidence presented further referred to two regional fisheries management organizations where this has occurred.
The new NAFO clause comes from the revised Northeast Atlantic Fisheries Convention. This agreement involves only coastal states whose fish stocks are found in the Northeast Atlantic Fisheries Convention regulatory area. There are no distant water fishing states as there are in NAFO. Some of these stocks of the northeast Atlantic—herring, mackerel, blue whiting—migrate through the waters of several coastal states and the high seas. These coastal states—all of whom, by the way, are also members of NAFO—have determined that they require greater cooperation in the management of these complex, mixed, transboundary fish stocks. The dynamics of negotiations in NEAF are accordingly very different from those in NAFO.
In the NAFO context, the straddling stocks on the nose and tail of the Grand Banks only involve one coastal state: Canada. While it's accurate to say that the U.S., France for Saint-Pierre and Miquelon, and Denmark for Greenland are also coastal states in the NAFO Convention area, Canada has straddling stocks fished in the NAFO regulatory area on the nose and tail of the Grand Banks. Canada is the coastal state of NAFO and the current convention reflects that. The amended convention weakens this position.
The second treaty that such a clause was purported to be in is in the western and central Pacific. This convention regards highly migratory species—tunas—which under UNCLOS are treated with a distinctly different management regime than that approaching straddling stocks.
Why are we doomed to repeat our history? Why do we have this clause, and why is it so important to the European Union? One has to understand the mindset of the European Union and its history in the NAFO regulatory area. The European Union has long believed that Canada controls NAFO. It does not like losing votes. To some extent, their concerns were valid as the NAFO Convention was drafted to make it clear that Canada was the primary coastal state. Further, Canada was a prime mover in the adoption of the 1995 United Nations Fish Agreements, UNFA, which reinforced Canadian positions and strengthened international law in regard to enforcement on the high seas.
The EU resisted several of the key clauses of UNFA that Canada had fought to adopt. In order to appease European stakeholders, the EU developed a strategy to implement UNFA in line with its original objectives. This can be clearly seen in a report submitted to the European Parliament fisheries committee on April 26, 1996. I don't think many people in DFO know anything about what happened back then. The chair of that committee, Miguel Arias, made the following comment on the effects of UNFA in NAFO:
Another ambiguity within the agreement which could affect NAFO is the one concerning the principle of biological unity which the agreement advocates as a main basis. Thus the agreement establishes the requirement for any given population to be regarded as one throughout the zone in which it is found, with no distinction made between the EEZ and adjacent waters. It also establishes the requirement to cooperate for the purposes of stock conservation. From this we may conclude that countries which fish in open waters should be involved in fisheries and conservation management not just outside the EEZs of the coastal states but also within those waters, since the cooperation requirement expressly imposed by the agreement would be meaningless if countries fishing in open waters could only participate in the allocation and distribution of TACs relating solely to open waters.
In the negotiation of the new NAFO amendments, the EU has succeeded in helping to clarify his ambiguity to Canada's detriment.
This is not what UNFA says, nor does it reflect customary international law and UNCLOS. Coastal state sovereignty provides for the state's exclusive use in management of the stocks within its 200-mile zone. Why is Canada choosing to water down this right in the NAFO amendments? By linking the language of ecosystem approach to the modified language in other amendments and this sovereignty clause, the EU can claim that by its ratification, NAFO members accept that the new convention reflects the view that distant water fishing states now have an almost shared responsibility for the management of straddling stocks. In fact, the EU would claim that Canada must now act consistently with NAFO decisions and that Canada no longer controls NAFO.
Is this not custodial management inside 200 miles? By accepting these amendments, Canada might also fetter its rights before any future international tribunal.
Why is a crucial aspect of UNFA also ignored? Virtually all the UNFA enforcement provisions are in NAFO, except for one. Canada succeeded in achieving major concessions at the conclusion of the UNFA meetings. Why is the government now watering down these successes and refusing to implement the control provisions of UNFA? If Canada was serious about updating NAFO to reflect UNFA, why is this government ignoring one of the most significant aspects of UNFA? UNFA enforcement provisions allow Canada to order to port a vessel found to have committed a serious infringement if the flag state fails to respond adequately.
The EU is likely to argue that since the NAFO amendments were agreed post-UNFA and were intended to implement that agreement, they replace the UNFA provisions pertaining to high seas seizure and detention and it would therefore not be possible to implement them in UNFA. These amendments are just giving away what was so hard won over many years.
This is also reflected in the 1996 report. It called on the European Commission to review its political action in order to secure “lasting support from other countries...and draw up...a joint strategy within NAFO”. These NAFO amendments reflect that strategy.
Finally, one other quote from the European Parliament report may throw a little more light on the current situation. When the NAFO Convention was finalized, Spain did not join, as it “considered that the new agreement gave Canada preeminence over the other fisheries”. These clauses in the NAFO Convention, which so concerned Spain, have now been watered down in the amendments. No wonder the EU is so pleased with the amendments.
If I can make just one last point, Mr. Chair, some have claimed that it would be too embarrassing or too costly for us not to ratify this agreement and to go back and reopen negotiations. I ask why it is so embarrassing. What is the purpose of a ratification process? Why does that step exist in a negotiation of an agreement? It's simply to provide the government with the opportunity to carefully weigh the pros and cons of an agreement and to decide, in the end, how it wishes to proceed.
In the past, states have sought to return to the table following this secondary review. On fisheries issues, for example, the EU sought changes in at least two fisheries agreements with Canada during the ratification process after its internal consultations led to a desire for changes. The U.S., on several occasions, has gone back to the negotiation table after Congress has indicated that it would not concur with the results of the proposed agreement. Parties have returned to the table and agreements have subsequently been finalized. This is not earth-shattering. There is no need for Canada to feel in any way embarrassed or constrained to not ratify this agreement.
Finally, other NAFO-contracting parties, I think, wouldn't be surprised if Canada didn't ratify and it objected on the grounds of the current language of the convention. Some even wonder why we didn't act earlier.
Thank you.