Foreign Affairs Committee on June 13th, 2006

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

I call this meeting to order. This is the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development, meeting number 10.

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), this afternoon we are pleased to have a delegation from the Middle Powers Initiative. On behalf of my colleagues, I'd like to welcome all of you and thank you for being here.

This committee first met with a delegation from the Middle Powers Initiative in 1999, soon after it had completed a major report on Canada's policies on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Notwithstanding some differences of opinion, the goal of reducing the threat of nuclear weapons is one shared by all members. Major challenges remain in that regard. There has been progress in reducing the number of nuclear weapons in the world; however, the number of countries that have these weapons has increased. Moreover, the system designed to prevent more countries from obtaining them needs to be strengthened.

I know you have all testified before this committee before, and you bring a wide range of relevant experience, including senior political leadership, parliamentary experience, arms control diplomacy, and NGO engagement. We look forward to hearing a summary of your remarks and afterwards using the question time.

Among our guests today, we welcome back the Right Honourable Kim Campbell, former Prime Minister of Canada; the Honourable Doug Roche, chairman; Thomas Graham, ambassador and chairman, Bipartisan Security Group; and Jonathan Granoff, president, Global Security Institute. I want to welcome you. The time is yours. It's very good to have you folks with us today.

[The Rt. Hon. Kim Campbell, Former Prime Minister of Canada, Middle Powers Initiative]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and honourable members of the standing committee. It is a pleasure to be here again, addressing you on behalf of the Middle Powers Initiative.

I'll be very brief. We had an opportunity to speak to some of you last evening, but I also want to turn the microphone over to my colleagues, who represent great technical expertise in this area.

Very briefly, I think the important thing for us to understand is that for many of us, nuclear weapons are not a fact of the Cold War, something we thought was dealt with when the Berlin Wall came down. We now see that in the context of 21st century security issues, particularly the issues of international terrorism threats that come from non-state actors, nuclear weapons are, unfortunately, still at the centre of that particular security agenda. They're at the centre of that agenda because of the slow progress in dealing with the nuclear arsenals of the major nuclear powers, particularly the United States and the former Soviet Union, Russia, which of course became the inheritor of the nuclear arsenals of countries like Ukraine, which gave them up. We also see there is a challenge to the non-proliferation agenda, the non-proliferation architecture in the world. A lot of this comes from the failure of many people to understand the importance of dealing with nuclear weapons and the threat they still pose to us.

On the one hand one can argue that the nuclear non-proliferation treaty was a great success, because had it not been entered into, had it not been negotiated, we would probably have a world now with anywhere between 40 and 50 states having nuclear weapons. If you can imagine that situation in the context of today's world with failing states, non-state actors interested in getting hold of these weapons, and the kind of threat that would pose today, I think we can see that however difficult today's situation is, it would be a lot worse if we did not have this treaty.

The Middle Powers Initiative is here for two purposes. One is to make the point that this is still an issue that requires the attention of all legislators interested in security issues, and also to remind this committee--not that it needs to be reminded--in the most friendly and supportive way of the very important role Canada has played since the beginning of the non-proliferation regime in being a great supporter of it, of being an architect of it. Canada was probably the first country that voluntarily agreed to be a non-nuclear power when we were very capable of being a nuclear power, having been partners in the Manhattan Project after World War II. Canada has a very strong moral authority to advocate for this issue and we have done so very effectively over the years. The message we have is twofold: one, that it's still a very important issue, and second, that we help the Government of Canada and the legislators here who are the very important link to the public. We'll continue to advocate Canada's strong role in trying to make this regime effective in the coming years.

I'd now like to turn the floor over to my colleague, Thomas Graham. You have the bios. We're going to very brief and not repeat those.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Ms. Campbell, for your testimony.

I should just make reference to, and welcome, the Minister of Foreign Affairs this afternoon. He's sitting at the back. We always appreciate it when our minister drops in.

Sorry for that brief interruption, Ambassador Graham. The time is yours.

[Dr. Thomas Graham, Ambassador and Chairman, Bipartisan Security Group, Middle Powers Initiative]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I will also be brief so there will be ample time for questions and dialogue. Following on the former prime minister's statement, I just want to expand on what she said somewhat.

William Perry, former defense secretary of the United States, said recently that in his judgment there is a greater than 50% chance of a nuclear detonation on U.S. soil in the next ten years. That could just as easily be Canadian soil, because terrorists strike wherever they see opportunities. Senator Sam Nunn, former chairman of the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, wrote in 2004 that because long-range strategic nuclear missiles continue to be kept on hair-trigger alert 15 years after the end of the Cold War, in which they served absolutely no useful purpose except to threaten our continued joint existence, they are leading us into a situation where some day there could be—and these are his words—“an Armageddon of our own making”.

Ambassador Paul Nitze, the architect of the U.S. nuclear weapons policy over many decades, wrote an article in 1999, towards the end of his life, in The New York Times in which he made it clear that the time had come when nuclear weapons were now a greater threat to us than anyone else, and that it was time for their complete elimination worldwide.

The centrepiece of world security in today's world, as Prime Minister Campbell has indicated, is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It prevented a situation where there could be as many as 40 nuclear-weapon states in the world today, meaning that every conflict would run the risk of going nuclear, and that it would be impossible to keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of terrorists, given that the weapons would be so widespread. The principal reason that didn't happen was the negotiation of this treaty and its entry into force in 1970, and its indefinite extension in 1995.

However, this treaty is based on a central bargain; we didn't get it for free. The central bargain is that the nuclear-weapons states—the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China—pledged to pursue disarmament measures aimed at the ultimate abolition of nuclear weapons. And it was made very clear in the negotiating record what those principal measures were deemed to be: a comprehensive test ban prohibiting all nuclear tests worldwide; drastic reductions in nuclear arsenals; a treaty prohibiting the further production of nuclear bomb material; and legal safeguards in which the nuclear-weapons states pledged they would never use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapons states parties to the NPT. That's the least that could be expected of treaty partners, one would think.

Thirty-six years later, none of those measures have been delivered. This part of the basic bargain remains unfulfilled. The other part on the nuclear-weapons-states' side was the sharing of peaceful nuclear technology. In exchange for that, the rest of the world—some 180-plus countries—pledged never to acquire nuclear weapons. But it was a bargain, and the nuclear-weapons states have not delivered on that bargain, and that delivery still remains uncertain, which is what our MPI brief is all about.

Now the other side of the bargain is beginning to fall apart, in part given the long neglect on one side. North Korea has withdrawn from the treaty and built, it is estimated, up to nine or ten nuclear weapons. And all of you know about the Iranian crisis, where Iran is believed to be pursuing nuclear weapons. These are not the only situations; there are also India, Pakistan, Brazil, Ukraine, and other countries that could be problems.

Further, we have a situation where the demands for power worldwide are growing exponentially, and this will require nuclear power to be used worldwide. But it can't be used at all effectively in the absence of a strong Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty regime providing the necessary safeguards.

Further, we now live in a world completely different from anything we've known in hundreds of years. For the first time since the Middle Ages almost, no major state threatens another major state; rather, the threat is deterioration in world order, with 50 to 70 failed or failing states and the rise of international terrorism. In this extremely dangerous situation in which we find ourselves, it is of the greatest importance that this treaty, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, be revived and strengthened and that the central bargain of the treaty be fully implemented.

Canada has long shown leadership on this subject and has made very important contributions in the past. I very much hope they will continue.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

To Mr. Granoff.

[Jonathan Granoff, President, Global Security Institute, Middle Powers Initiative]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. It's an honour to address you.

I want to just walk through the practical, threat-reducing, security-enhancing proposals that are contained in our brief. Each of them should be evaluated on their own merits. In other words, if they're not threat-reducing, if they're not security-enhancing, and they don't promote strengthening the treaty regime, they should fail. If on the other hand they do meet those criteria, I think they should be supported. Let's go through each one of them based on those criteria.

The first one is a fissile materials cut-off treaty. A fissile materials cut-off treaty was proposed by the United States at the conference on disarmament in May of this year. If we go to the history of the treaty, you'll note this was something that was called for at the very inception of the entire process, at the extension conference in 1995 , and then again reaffirmed at the 2000 review. All we're saying is that we need to cut off the production of weapons-grade, highly enriched uranium and plutonium and have a strengthened verification regime to make sure that it's done, to have it inventoried, and make sure that these materials do not get into the hands of sub-state actors and terrorists.

Can it be done? Well, the weapons of mass destruction commission headed by Hans Blix has concluded it can. The fissile material experts panel, headed by Frank von Hippel, who was the science adviser under the National Security Council of the United States, concludes that it can be done. Almost all of the experts conclude that it can be done.

Can it be 100% effective? We can never know, but certainly it's better to have some verification regime than none. We found that the inspection regime was effective in Iraq. It helped disarm Saddam Hussein, and it helps reinforce the norm that this material is unacceptable.

The second proposal goes right to the heart of the first: verification, strengthening the controls. There's a treaty between the United States and Russia called the Moscow Treaty, which calls for the reduction of nuclear weapons to around 2,200 in the year 2012. The inspection regime under the START treaty, which my colleague Ambassador Graham helped negotiate under George Bush Sr., ends in 2009. After that, there will be no verification of the cuts contemplated under the Moscow Treaty, also known as the SORT Treaty.

In my opinion, having a legal instrument that's simply based on goodwill is not sufficient to give the international community the kind of security it deserves. I believe that every person on the planet has a right to know that these cuts are being made and that the superpowers are moving towards a safer world.

Where are we right now in the standoff between Russia and the United States? We still have over 3,000 weapons each, on hair-trigger, launch-on-warning, high-alert status, leaving an individual decision-maker with only a few minutes' critical time to decide the fate of all humanity for all time. I don't believe any human being should have to have that on their shoulders. In fact, in January of 1995 a weather satellite off the coast of Norway appeared to be a Trident launch and Boris Yeltsin had but a few minutes to decide whether to use those nuclear weapons that he had.

We're suggesting that the delivery vehicles and the weapons be decoupled, de-alerted: lower the status of these weapons. There's really no good reason for us to be living with this sword over our heads. Over 96% of the weapons are in the possession of these two countries.

Remember, most of these weapons have triggering devices the size of what was dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Their destructive capacity simply boggles the human imagination. Any use of these would tear at the fabric of civilization in psychological and physical ways that are unpredictable.

On the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, 176 countries, including Canada, have ratified that. One hundred and seventy-six countries is a serious weight of public opinion. The United States has signed it, but not ratified it, and neither have several other countries. We would urge that Canada, which has already made a strong commitment for this, push for full ratification of the treaty.

Why is this a security-enhancing measure? Because countries can't test, they can't miniaturize, they can't put their weapons on intercontinental ballistic missiles. Also, it sends a message that the political currency of these devices is diminished, and that's as important as anything.

The last proposal, but not the least, is negative security assurances. The equities of this are very obvious. In order to gain the indefinite extension of the treaty in 1995, countries without nuclear weapons were promised that if they would accede to the indefinite extension of the treaty, they would not be threatened with nuclear weapons. The other side of that is to say to somebody, you must agree never to have nuclear weapons, but you will still remain under the threat of nuclear weapons. The inequities of that are obvious.

The consequence of these kinds of blatant inequities is instability, and if there's anything that we need as we walk down the nuclear ladder, it's stability. The call for the elimination of nuclear weapons is a legal duty. It is a legal duty under the treaty, but it's going to be difficult to get there. I see it as a compass point. The compass point is where the compass needs to go, and the elements involved in that are lowering the political currency of the weapons. What we put forward is a map that helps us get there, and each step on this map helps strengthen the security of the world. Moreover, these are all positions that have been taken and supported by the Canadian government and by most governments in the world. They are very moderate, they are doable, and they are practical.

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Mr. Granoff.

Senator Roche.

[Douglas Roche, Chairman, Middle Powers Initiative]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'll be very brief, because I know we want to go to questions.

Mr. Chairman, when you opened the meeting you drew attention to the report that this committee did in 1999, and I'm so pleased to see your two able research staff still with you. That report, Mr. Chairman and members, was a landmark in the examination of the nuclear weapons policies. It had the effect of having Canada go into NATO and secure a review of NATO's nuclear weapons policies. So we consider your work very important.

We have been here now five times. This is the fifth visit since 1999. We pay our compliments to the Government of Canada because of the leadership this government has shown in the international community in working on the nuclear weapons file.

Mr. Chairman, we have to get right down to it. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Kofi Annan, said only a few days ago that the world is sleepwalking--and that's his word, “sleepwalking”--toward a possible nuclear catastrophe because of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the continued existence of nuclear weapons by those who have them. Thus, the Middle Powers Initiative makes an appeal once more to the Parliament of Canada, to this committee, to the Government of Canada, to speak out in the international community for a vigorous multilateral approach to resolving the nuclear weapons dilemma.

We're not suggesting that any one country could do all this alone. This is a very big and complex file. My colleague just referred to Hans Blix, the chief weapons inspector in Iraq, who later headed an international commission on weapons of mass destruction, whose report was published last week. He said, in responding to a television interview when they asked him which of his 60 recommendations was his most important, that the most important of all is to get a comprehensive test ban treaty to shut off the nuclear arms race development. Thus, that is one of our principal recommendations.

You will find in the brief we have prepared for you recommendations that are in harmony with Blix's. Ours is what you might call a stripped-down version, and we're applying it particularly to the Government of Canada to instruct your diplomats to work in a vigorous manner with like-minded states. There are about 25 states that the Middle Powers Initiative is working with that all want the same thing. They want the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. They want a fissile material cut-off treaty. They want de-alerting of nuclear weapons. They want verification. So this is a matter of states working together to advance an international agenda.

I do not subscribe to the theory or the statement that's sometimes made that nothing's happening in this field or it's all too difficult. Not at all. We are in an historical momentum toward closing the net on nuclear weapons starting with the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995, the International Court of Justice saying in 1996 that all states had an obligation to conclude negotiations toward the elimination of nuclear weapons, and all states of the NPT in 2000 making an unequivocal undertaking on 13 practical steps.

So the chart has been laid. We're not wandering at midnight without a compass. We know exactly what needs to be done. What we need is the political will of states that will work together to ensure that the essential points that are made in this brief are carried out. That's the work of the Middle Powers Initiative.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for receiving us. We thank you again for the work that Canada has done, and we're ready to respond to your questions.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you to the delegation. I know especially Mr. Granoff referenced a number of times the political collateral or the political value of doing this.

Mr. Patry was one of those who were here in 1999. As I look around, he may have been the only one. He's been here quite a while.

The title of the report then was Canada and the Nuclear Challenge: Reducing the Political Value of Nuclear Weapons for the Twenty-First Century. So it is still very pertinent.

We'll go to the opposition first, to Mr. Wilfert, please.

[Bryon Wilfert, Liberal, Richmond Hill, ON]

Thank you very much, and I thank our witnesses for coming today.

Sometimes I wonder whether we've come very far from the vision that Senator Hubert Humphrey, one of the architects of the non-proliferation treaty, had in 1963 when he presented the treaty before the Senate. It was signed in 1963.

You mentioned a number of areas. The first thing I would certainly agree with is the issue of having the government commit itself to the multilateral diplomacy approach. That is extremely important. It's something we have been known for and we certainly need to continue.

There are a couple of areas I'd like to go through briefly.

First, on the fissile material cut-off treaty, there is a stalemate, as you know, that has existed for a decade. The question is, how do we break that stalemate? We obviously have certain expertise that we can bring to the table, but the United States, among others, certainly has been unwilling, or has refused, I guess, the whole issue of linkage with every issue, whether it's nuclear disarmament or weaponization of space, for example. Are there some creative approaches we can take with like-minded states to try to break that logjam?

The issue of non-state actors is obviously very important in this international climate in terms of the selling of technology and components for nuclear weapons. I read your brief, but I don't know that you necessarily addressed in any detail, but maybe you could for the committee, how we might approach that issue of the role of non-state actors in the international community.

On the whole comprehensive treaty issue with North Korea and Iran, we know, as was mentioned, North Korea has probably up to nine weapons, and yet the six-power talks are going nowhere there. The North Koreans are clearly a bully on the block who no one wants to take on directly, and there doesn't seem to be much encouragement for the North Koreans or the Iranians, given the activities of those who already have weapons. If they're not prepared to follow certain rules, obviously their view is, “Why should we?” Could you address that?

In the international community, we often talk about countries signing onto the non-proliferation treaty for the purpose of getting nuclear expertise. They can withdraw from that at any time and then revert to nuclear weaponry. We have certainly seen that in the past. Could you address that a little more?

And finally, as parliamentarians, we always want to talk about empowerment of parliamentarians--and I congratulate the government on the fact that they're going to help organize the MPI article Vl forum here in September. You may want to indicate to the committee how we, as parliamentarians or the committee, might play a role, because I strongly believe, regardless of party, that we should in fact be playing a role as parliamentarians in that regard.

Sorry, Mr. Chairman, but I had to get them out.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Mr. Wilfert. With those six questions, you have left a minute and ten seconds for our friends to answer. And I'll give Ms. Lalonde exactly the same amount of time I give you.

So could we have our guests answer?

[Dr. Thomas Graham]

I will answer in a minute and ten seconds.

First, with respect to fissile material cut-off, the United States has never really been on board with that in recent years. It's been called for over the past 36 years, explicitly for the last ten. I think the best course of action in the immediate future is to work with other like-minded states and to also talk with the Americans. They've tabled a treaty that has no verification provisions in it. We need to try to encourage them that this is in fact a verifiable exercise and they should reconsider their position.

Second, with respect to non-state actors, it's a very serious threat. That's what struggling against nuclear terrorism and WMD terrorism is all about. There is a major worldwide effort going on, involving many countries. Canada is involved, and we're doing the best we can. But in today's world of failed and failing states, and so forth, it's a very difficult task.

I believe there is a solution in North Korea. Even though the talks have gone nowhere, the principal problem is that they've dragged on so long. Now that the DPRK has these ten weapons, the question is on whether they're ever going to be willing to give them up. It remains to be seen.

I think there have been favourable developments in Iran. The United States has agreed to join the negotiations. We have all of the P-5 in the negotiations, plus Germany. I think they're going in the right direction. Iran has indicated at least some interest. I think the situation looks more positive than it has in recent months.

Countries joining the treaty and gaining expertise in withdrawing has really only happened once, with North Korea. North Korea is a strange country; even Billy Graham says that. I don't think I would universalize that particular issue.

On the article VI forum, I'll turn it over to Ambassador Roche.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

We need a very brief answer.

[Jonathan Granoff]

There was a question about withdrawal. There were some proposals along these lines at the last review conference. If a country withdraws from the treaty, the privileges they gained pursuant to article IV allowing for peaceful uses would have to be forfeited. It would thereby prevent the situation of a country utilizing article IV privileges to develop the wherewithal to have a nuclear arsenal and then withdraw.

I think the failure of the review conference to even get to the substance of reviewing that was shameful. I echo the Secretary General's statement that it was shameful that no final statement was made there or at the summit, which could have addressed this issue.

There is a practical way to address this, and that has been put on the table by major middle power states.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Mr. Granoff.

Ms. Lalonde, for six minutes, please.

[Francine Lalonde, Bloc, La Pointe-de-l'Île, QC]

Thank you very much for being here.

Could you explain to us why it is not utopian to think that in 2010, all countries in the world might accept to get the means to eliminate what Hand Blix has called terror weapons, that is to say nuclear weapons. Why is it not utopian to think that we might have an efficient treaty?

[The Rt. Hon. Kim Campbell]

I don't think it is utopian. I think what is interesting is there are many challenges facing the world today that are very scary, such as global warming, climate change, and those kinds of things.

The resolution of the nuclear issue is actually within our capabilities. Nuclear materials are verifiable and traceable. If the political will is there, we could actually deal with this particular threat to our security. One of our goals is to put this back in the centre to be taken seriously, because if it's not dealt with, it's a great threat. We in fact have the capacity to deal with this; it is not something beyond our capacity.

I don't think it's utopian, but I think it requires political will and it also requires a reminder to people that it still matters. Sometimes those of us who have lived through a period of time forget that new people and younger people who didn't live through those old issues don't necessarily recognize that they're important. We have to keep restating it, and that's why the Middle Powers Initiative comes back every year. People, particularly parliamentarians, have many issues on their minds. It's to remind people that we can deal with it, but only if we focus our attention on it.

[Dr. Thomas Graham]

I strongly agree with the Prime Minister that it is not utopian and it is possible. I believe serious efforts will be made to accomplish that in the not too distant future.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Ms. Lalonde.

[Francine Lalonde, Bloc, La Pointe-de-l'Île, QC]

I thought that you would give us a longer answer. I wanted to spur you a little bit. Personally, this is something I really believe in.

I shall ask you my second question. As long as the United States will not accept to make efforts in that direction, do you believe that we will be able to prevent Iran, North Korea and all other countries, for instance Israel, from hiding or making weapons?

[Jonathan Granoff]

The Nobel Peace laureate has addressed this very squarely. The Nobel Peace laureate said:

For some to say that nuclear weapons are good for them but not for others is simply not sustainable. The failure of the nuclear weapons states to abide by their legal pledge to negotiate the elimination of nuclear weapons, contained in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, is the greatest stimulus to their proliferation.

Hans Blix described it recently at the National Constitution Center in the United States when he presented the Blix commission report. He said that it's not practical for parents to have cigars in their mouths when telling their children not to smoke.

In other words, as long as the P-5 continue to say that they need nuclear weapons or as long as NATO, the most powerful military force in the history of the world, continues to say that these devices, of which one represents more firepower than all of the weapons ever used in the history of humanity.... People forget what we're talking about. We're talking about weapons of massive human annihilation on a catastrophic scale. If they are needed for the security of states with these huge conventional forces, what does it tell other states that will increasingly be able to obtain them at a lower and lower cost?

For that reason, we say it is legally required and it is practical to walk down the ladder. Can it be done in a utopian fashion overnight? Of course not. It's why we're saying that on the pathway toward a more secure world, each step of that pathway makes us more secure. It's not utopian; it's very hard-nosed and realistic.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Mr. Granoff.

Is there anyone else?

[Francine Lalonde, Bloc, La Pointe-de-l'Île, QC]

Have I used all my time?

[Le président, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

You have another 30 seconds.

[Francine Lalonde, Bloc, La Pointe-de-l'Île, QC]

Do you have some advice to give the Government of Canada for the use of CANDU reactors? Canada can sell CANDU reactors for civilian uses, but they might be used for other purposes.