Maybe I can try to do this at a level of principle that I hope gets us to the same place but doesn't cause me to get in trouble back at the office.
In terms of the confidentiality requirement and the black box, the point would be that Canada signed up to this institution, and we signed up under a set of rules. Within that institution, we have pushed, along with the British and others, to increase the transparency of the operation of the institution, and we have had some success. The two reports that are provided are the outer edge of transparency in terms of what the countries can report under the current initiatives, but that doesn't mean we can't push the institution to go forward. The plea I was making was that, were we to do this unilaterally by simply doing the equivalent of revealing cabinet confidences, we'd find ourselves outside cabinet pretty quickly, because we would have put the executive directors in an impossible position, in that they would be breaching their own rules.
We share the view that making the institution more transparent in how it operates is important, and over successive governments, continual efforts have been made to do that, most notably by the Minister of Finance at the recent Singapore meetings, in terms of an anti-corruption agenda that was designed to improve the transparency of the bank and the funds' operations in that area.
In terms of what Canada undertakes, there is a lot of scope to report on that, and you'll see that in the report. In terms of how we contribute to the IMF and the World Bank, if we provide special funding for initiatives like multilateral debt relief, we're very transparent about what that is, how we do that, and what's happening. There's scope for that because we're making a contribution into a very public initiative that's going forward.
The concern is around the discussions at the executive director level. Those discussions are the most confidential and the most protected. If a particular project is coming forward, that's the area where these confidentiality roles are extremely clear. As I indicated, we have pushed as far as we can on that, in the sense that every time we say no or we abstain, we are reporting in that report that we have said no or abstained on that project, with a very brief description. We have tried to disentangle the soup that is the fact that the Canadian representative isn't just the Canadian representative.
Going further and providing more detail, while I appreciate many would welcome that detail, would fundamentally change the nature of the institution, which we can't do unilaterally. The plea is really around that. If going as far as saying a summary of any representation made by a Canadian representative is an extremely detailed, deep obligation that potentially puts us in an impossible position, anything you could do in terms of an amendment that would allow our executive directors to continue to fulfill their legal obligations to the institution, but which would further improve on reporting—which we've pushed as far as we think we can take it—would be welcomed, of course.