Foreign Affairs Committee on March 29th, 2007

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

I call this meeting to order.

Good morning. This is meeting 47 of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development, Thursday, March 29, 2007.

I remind each one of our members that today's meeting is televised. In our first hour this morning we will again have an update on the situation in Afghanistan, and perhaps Canada's roles and responsibilities there.

We will also hear from Barnett Rubin from the Center on International Cooperation. He is no stranger to our committee. We had the opportunity to meet with Mr. Rubin in New York a couple of months ago. He is the director of studies and a senior fellow at the University of New York.

From the University of Victoria we have Mr. Gordon Smith, executive director of the centre for global studies and professor of political science. I'm not certain how many meetings of the foreign affairs committee Mr. Smith has attended--hundreds perhaps--as a former deputy minister of foreign affairs.

I also remind our committee that we will reserve a little time at the end of our meeting today for some committee business.

Before we begin, I want to encourage the members to review the public work on democratic promotion written by our committee's researcher, Gerry Schmitz. Angela, our clerk, has provided us with a synopsis and the links to this work that he wrote in 2004.

Mr. Rubin and Mr. Smith, welcome. Our committee format is such that we will give you each an opening time period of 10 to 15 minutes, and then we will move to questions. Each party will receive a time allocation of seven minutes on the first round and five minutes on the second.

Welcome, and we look forward to what you have for us.

Mr. Rubin.

[Dr. Barnett Rubin, Director of Studies and Senior Fellow, University of New York, Center on International Cooperation]

Thank you.

First, I want to thank the committee. It's good to meet again those of you I saw in New York and to have this chance to meet with you here.

I'm also very pleased to be here with Gordon Smith. I hope you've had the time to look at his paper, which has quite a few ideas that are worthy of consideration. I believe you also received copies of my recent article in Foreign Affairs.

I also would feel remiss if I did not thank Canada for the commitment it has made to Afghanistan and the sacrifices it has made. I might mention that I don't mean to say that the life of a senior diplomat is worth more than the life of a young soldier, but we did know Glyn Berry at the Center on International Cooperation. He worked with us on some projects when he was in New York at the permanent mission. I was staying with Chris Alexander, the former ambassador, now the deputy SRSG, at the time that he so unfortunately lost his life in Kandahar.

I regret that the role of Canada is not better understood in the United States, but I think it is understood in Afghanistan. I've met there with your military commanders, soldiers, diplomats, and aid workers, and they are performing very well.

Of course I'm speaking to you in my personal capacity, which is the only capacity I have, and though I'm a U.S. citizen, I'm not here to represent U.S. interests. I've been involved with Afghanistan since 1983. I've been there 29 times and visited all its neighbouring countries and also most of the countries that are now involved in Afghanistan in one way or the other. So I know something about it, the international order, and also about the mistakes that have been made by many people, including at times by me.

I thought I would say a few words about the fact that I understand, though I'm not extremely well informed about it--perhaps I'll learn more here--that there is some political controversy or debate about Canada's role in Afghanistan. I wanted to say a few words about that.

First, a word of understanding. Of course the United States dominates the mission there. It provides about half the economic assistance. And I don't know the exact proportion of troops, but I think something like 70% of the foreign troops in Afghanistan may be American, which means of course that the mission in Afghanistan is cooperating with the United States in what many people see as an American project. I understand that for many people it is very difficult to cooperate with the current administration in Washington. It's even difficult for some senior members of the President's own party in the Senate to do so.

I want to emphasize that Afghanistan should not be victimized because of our leadership. It's not just an American project.

Many governments in the world have some misgivings about various aspects of this operation, but there is no government in the world that officially opposes it. That includes Iran, which is actively contributing to the reconstruction of Afghanistan, and officially at least, Pakistan, which is doing likewise. We'll talk about Pakistan's role, which is more complex.

Most important, everything I've seen indicates to me that most Afghans want this effort to succeed. They want an accountable national government, though they might disagree and they do disagree about how it should be structured.

They want the education, health care, development, security, and rule of law that they expect this government with all its international backing to deliver, even if they disagree about many points, such as the precise role of Islam in the legal system, the relationship of Afghan laws to international laws and standards, and other matters.

They also want a unified and multi-ethnic Afghanistan, although there is a serious issue, which is often not discussed that openly, that they do disagree with each other and with their neighbours on where the border of that unified Afghanistan should be and who exactly is an Afghan.

But that does not mean that they're happy with us, the international community, or with their government. They're not at all happy, and support for both the international presence and for the government has plummeted in the past year or so, although I hasten to add that the lack of support for the government does not by any means always translate directly into support for the insurgency, for the Taliban, or any of the other components of the insurgency. Sometimes it does, sometimes it does not.

But the main complaint is not that we, the west, or the international community is forcing on the Afghans something they don't want. There are some such complaints from people who are inclined to be more Islamic and also from many people, because among the things we have brought there are the unintended consequences of a large presence of foreigners with a lot of money, spending their money and living there, which has created, especially in Kabul, some severe social problems.

The main complaint I hear from Afghans is not that we are imposing something on them that they don't want, but that we haven't delivered what they think we promised, which are basically the things I mentioned above. Why haven't we? In part it's because it's extraordinarily difficult.

I just want to mention something I said when I met with some of you in New York. It's not often realized that Afghanistan is the poorest country in the world outside of sub-Saharan Africa, and it is poorer than almost every country in sub-Saharan Africa. Its GDP per capita is about half that of Haiti, and its indicators of education, health, longevity, and so on are similar to those of Burundi, Sierra Leone, and so on.

That also means it has one of the weakest governments in the world. The per-capita tax revenue of the Afghan government is $13 per year. Those are the entire resources of the Afghan government for security, education, health, and so on. You can imagine, even with aid, the amount of public services it manages to deliver. So the difficulties are great, and then we have the history of the past 30 years. I won't go through that.

It's also partly because of mistaken policies that were followed by the U.S. government, the Bush administration. From the beginning they tried to define the mission as minimally as possible in order to conserve their resources for other things they wanted to do, such as invade Iraq. I can understand the feelings some Canadians may have that they do not want their soldiers and civilians to be killed or wounded because of mistakes made by the United States.

We don't need to have a debate about whether or not Canada should be there--certainly you have the right to have that debate--but we need to have another debate. I would really ask Canada and Canadians to take part much more—and I believe this hearing is a sign of that—in debating what all of us who are in Afghanistan really should be doing, and try to change the approach where it should be changed.

It's very difficult for Canada to affect the policy of the United States, but I've visited most of the countries that are in Afghanistan—Norway, Germany, Spain, Italy, U.K., France--in the last few months, and I find there are many countries that are committed to Afghanistan one way or another, even whose governments have concerns about the policy. In each of those countries there are also opposition parties and independent intellectuals who have such concerns. I believe there was even a meeting--perhaps it was organized by Norway--about six months ago of some like-minded countries in Europe.

What I would really suggest is that Canada--the government, the Parliament, the opposition, and independent figures such as my colleague here--make an effort to collaborate with like-minded people in other middle powers that are engaged in Afghanistan to try to devise some common proposals.

I think you would also find a very willing ear in the United States for that, even perhaps in the government, because they did carry out a reassessment of their policy in the last six months. We see some results of that in the recent supplemental appropriation they have proposed that involves the doubling of reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan, and in their decision to increase the number of troops and put more into the security sector, policing, and so on. I'm constantly in touch with mainly the Democrats in the U.S. Congress, but also with some Republicans, who very much want to have that debate and hope we can do better than we have.

Where do we need to make these changes? I won't mention the proposals here because they are in my article that you have received, and I'm sure you'll want to ask questions about it.

Of course the key changes are the level and pace of economic support, especially employment generation, and the ways international assistance can actually diminish government capacity and legitimacy; the approach that the international community is taking to counter narcotics, which is quite damaging, and I commend what my colleague has said about that; regional questions, in particular the role of Pakistan and how to approach Pakistan in a unified way; and the need for an accelerated and coordinated approach to the domestic security sector, which is police, justice, and corrections.

My specific views are in the article, which you have received.

I thank you, and I await your questions.

Je vous écoute. Merci.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Mr. Rubin.

We'll go to Mr. Smith.

Mr. Rubin, taking note on what you said in your testimony that the debate should not be on whether or not we're there but on what we're doing there and how we can change what we're doing, I think that segue fits very well into what Mr. Smith has written. He says:

It is easy to criticize what is happening in Afghanistan. It is a far more difficult task to recommend what should be done. In my long professional life I have not encountered a more difficult policy challenge. I am not sure we have all the right solutions. But I do know we in Canada urgently need a more informed debate on these issues. Much is at stake.

I think it very clearly reflects what Mr. Rubin has suggested, but we look forward to hearing from you, Mr. Smith.

[Prof. Gordon Smith, Executive Director, Centre for Global Studies and Adjunct Professor of Political Science, University of Victoria]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was just about to read those very sentences—and I really mean what I said in them.

I think it is very important that we get a better debate on these issues in Canada. To me, the debate is so much a polarized one between those on the one side who say we have our troops committed, they're losing their lives, there must be no question but that we are 100% behind our troops—that's the one side—and the other side that says it's impossible, we're losing too many people, and we should get out.

I think both are wrong. I think we need exactly the kind of analysis that Dr. Rubin has been giving. I'm really delighted that this committee is studying this question and I'm honoured that you've asked me for my views on it.

Let me be clear at the beginning that in my view the objectives that have been stated by the Canadian government for Afghanistan are entirely worthy. The question that I raise in this report is, are they achievable? Is it possible to do what that report asks--not wouldn't it be a good idea, but can we do it? Are the resources there?

I also want to make clear that in my view the performance of our military has been of a very high order and we all owe something to those who have lost or risked their lives there. I also have noticed and am impressed by the ways in which CIDA is really trying to change the way it does business, in a fundamental way, so that it can operate in the real world of Afghanistan.

But the question in my mind, which I hope Canadians will examine and certainly this committee will examine, is to whether overall we have anything like the resources that are necessary to achieve the stated objectives, which are, of course, to bring about democracy, a functioning market economy, and respect for human rights. I've been struck by the comparisons that have been made with levels of effort in the Balkans, particularly in the analysis that has been done by James Dobbins, who was, of course, the first U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan. He points out that depending on how you make the comparison, what is going into Afghanistan is 1/25 or 1/50 of what went into the Balkans.

I was just reading in an interesting article that I would commend to you, in the latest issue of Survival,—that's Spring 2007—General Richards, the British general, of course, stating just four months ago, “I haven’t got enough troops to win this.” I think that was a statement of candour.

So I think the first issue that has to be addressed is the number of troops involved, and also the levels of development assistance. I know those have gone up and are going up dramatically, coming from Canada, including those that are targeted in the Kandahar area.

I particularly want to underline, and this article by Seth Jones of the RAND Corporation does that, the critical role that is played by Pakistan. We all know this. The border is open. The Pashtun people live on either side. I haven't had anything like the travelling experience of Dr. Rubin, but I have been up into the tribal areas of northern Pakistan, and the government in Islamabad has never controlled those areas. But I think what is very important is what we now have, and again I will quote just one sentence from this Seth Jones article:

There is significant evidence that the Taliban, Hezb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG), al-Qaeda, and other insurgent groups use Pakistan as a sanctuary for recruitment and support. In addition, there is virtual unanimity that Pakistan’s Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has continued to provide assistance to Afghan insurgent groups.

I think those situations are becoming more and more difficult, making it complicated to deal with Afghanistan as a country on its own. This is not Haiti, which has water all around it and a relatively benign border. It's a much more complicated environment, and we can get into it in the question period if you would like, the issue of whether the Pakistani government is doing all that it can, but also, we should discuss not only Iran, as Dr. Rubin has suggested, but also the role that is played by India and the reaction of Pakistan to the role that is played by India in Afghanistan.

I also say in the report that I think it's important for us to not forget the original motivation for going to Afghanistan, and that was to deal with al-Qaeda. The al-Qaeda problem has not gone away. Indeed, from the information I'm able to obtain, al-Qaeda is on the increase in northern Pakistan.

In the report, we put forward the idea that, first of all, everything that can be done must be done, although maybe it's impossible to break al-Qaeda away from the Taliban. Secondly, try to bring more people who now associate themselves with the Taliban back into the political process.

The political dimension of this, both with Pakistan and the internal political dimension in Afghanistan, is key. I say that without having any illusions about how difficult this is to do.

There should be no question that we are more than pulling our weight. I came back from a meeting in Brussels just two weeks ago, one the former chairman of this committee, Mr. Graham, was at. One has to be struck by the fact that in Europe, there is not nearly the same sense that there is here or in Britain—if I exclude Britain from Europe for this purpose—that this is their war. They see it as the Americans' war and the war of the friends of the Americans. This is seen in the kinds of national restrictions that I think are intolerably—that's a strong word—imposed on the commitments coming from our European allies.

The final thing I would mention is the area of poppy production, to which Dr. Rubin has alluded. We can talk about it more if it's an area of interest to you, but to put it simply, let me just say that poppy eradication is not working and is causing quite severe political problems flowing from the economic consequences of that. Some means must be found, whether it is through the buying and marketing of opium for drug purposes or in some other way, to change the incentive structure. It isn't simply a matter of destroying the poppy crops. That is one of the critical elements in assuring the support of the Afghan people for the efforts that we and other NATO countries and friends of NATO are making in Afghanistan.

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Mr. Smith.

We will go to the first round of questions, beginning with Mr. Patry.

[Bernard Patry, Liberal, Pierrefonds—Dollard, QC]

Thank you.

I'll share my time with Mr. Martin, if he's coming back, but he needs to be in the House for twelve o'clock.

Merci, both of you. I think it's fabulous to see Mr. Rubin back here.

It's very difficult to understand all the players involved in Afghanistan. The perception here in Canada—my perception, in a sense, and that of my constituents—is that it's a U.S. war, and not even a NATO involvement, even if 36 countries are involved in Afghanistan.

We're reading that any solution will pass with the cooperation of Pakistan, and that the Pakistanis are not doing enough. I have two questions concerning that area.

In Pakistan, what is the exact role of ISI, the Pakistani intelligence? It seems ISI very strongly supports the Taliban, and the solution will pass with them in a sense.

My other question concerns India. With the long conflict between India and Pakistan, I feel it's still very present in this Afghanistan war against the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Do you think India should play a larger role, in a sense, or that NATO and the U.S. will let India play a larger role in Afghanistan? Will that bring Islamabad to be more cooperative with the NATO countries?

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Mr. Patry.

Mr. Rubin.

[Dr. Barnett Rubin]

Thank you.

First, on Pakistan, I can't say exactly what the role of the ISI is, because it's a secret intelligence agency.

Of course, the official policy of the Government of Pakistan is that they support the international effort, but they think it has been excessively military, not sufficiently political. They argue for a political approach to the Taliban, and also to the tribal areas.

There certainly is, in Pakistan, obvious infrastructure of support for the insurgency, both in the tribal agencies and also in parts of Baluchistan, which includes madrassas, training camps, recruitment, videos and DVDs that are sold openly, and so on.

It's not that I see intelligence reports, but people do tell me about them. If they're telling me the truth, there are persistent intelligence reports that working-level ISI officers have been involved in supporting the Taliban, and before that they were supporting the mujahedeen for many decades. They continue to provide some kind of assistance, though it's not in the open and official way that it was done earlier. I might add, though, that Pakistan also denied it was supporting the Taliban throughout the period, when it was in fact supporting the Taliban, as Pakistan has now admitted.

As far as India is concerned, I don't think Pakistan will respond positively by increasing its perception of being threatened by India in Afghanistan. In fact, most of the uncooperative things Pakistan does with regard to Afghanistan are motivated by its fear of an Indian presence in Afghanistan.

Pakistan should not have a veto power over Afghanistan's relations with India. The two countries can have a very mutually beneficial relationship. But the United States, Canada, and others that are there should try to do what they can to assure that India's role is not threatening to Pakistan. There are certain specific issues that Pakistan has raised, like Indian consulates, and Pakistan has tried to at least induce some confidence-building measures and transparency between the two countries regarding their activities in Afghanistan.

[Prof. Gordon Smith]

I don't have much to add. I agree with everything Dr. Rubin has said. All I would add, though, is that if you look at the ISI, there are degrees of difference. The ISI is part of the Pakistani military, but as much as one can tell, it seems to have considerable autonomy. There are also former members of the ISI who are used by those who are currently in the ISI.

As Dr. Rubin said, the ISI has had a long period of involvement in Afghanistan. That's not going to change. One of the things that I think the ISI brings is a geostrategic view to Pakistan in that corner of the world, Pakistan seeing itself now with India. Their relationship may be a little bit better, but it still is far from a secure relationship. With Iran, there is the whole nuclear weapons question. With Afghanistan and with foreign troops, I think the ISI is constantly looking at and thinking about Pakistan's long-term geostrategic interests.

Otherwise, I would agree with everything Dr. Rubin has said.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Mr. Wilfert, did you have a very quick question?

[Bryon Wilfert, Liberal, Richmond Hill, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

One of the things I'm struck with has two parts. One, the Pakistanis have continued to say, as late as three weeks ago, when I was there, that they have 80,000 troops on the border, and if we push them too hard, the alternative to Musharraf is complete and utter chaos. I would like you to comment on that.

Secondly, there is the issue of negotiating. The Taliban is not a monolithic organization. The question becomes whether or not you can split elements of the Taliban in order to negotiate and isolate the more radical elements.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Mr. Wilfert.

Mr. Smith, Mr. Rubin?

[Prof. Gordon Smith]

I'll go first.

There's a debate out there among experts on Pakistan as to whether or not Musharraf is doing all he possibly can. Musharraf has his own problems now, after having dismissed the chief justice. Musharraf is very much a preacher of the military. If he is pushed out, my guess is that he will probably be replaced by some other general.

My own feeling at this point, which is stronger than when I actually wrote this report, is that it's time to put more pressure on Musharraf. That has to be done not by us, but by the Americans and the British.

With respect to the Taliban and whether it can be split, that's exactly what we suggest in this report. Again, it's controversial. Some people think it's possible to try to exclude some of the more extreme elements and to try to bring people who are associated with the Taliban into the political process in Kabul. That will, among other things, end up giving the Pashtun people a greater degree of power in the overall governance of the country.

[Dr. Barnett Rubin]

First, Pakistan does have those troops on the border, and has been quite active in pursuing al-Qaeda. Of course, al-Qaeda members are not Afghan or Pakistani, by and large; they are Arab, and from other countries. Pakistan does not have any interest in attacking the World Trade Center or the Pentagon. In fact, that created a lot of problems for them, in that Taliban would still be in power otherwise, which is what they would prefer.

So they are willing to do that, but they have not used those troops against the Taliban. Until Vice-President Cheney's recent visit, they had never arrested a senior Taliban official on Pakistani soil. They actually denied that there were any such people. President Musharraf personally denied to me, at a Council on Foreign Relations meeting, that there were any Taliban leaders in Quetta. Then they arrested a former defence minister of the Taliban in Quetta. So that calls into question the good faith of their effort.

The military in Pakistan always says that the alternative to military rule is chaos. However, I find that there are very few Pakistanis who believe that. I might add also that the civilian leaders in Pakistan tell U.S. diplomats, “We have to do what they want, or they'll be replaced by some radical Islamists, maybe by the Taliban or something”, which also doesn't appear to be true, from my observation of Pakistan.

I think the military can find another general. The Pakistani political system is mature enough that, despite all of its problems, you can actually have an elected civilian government in Pakistan. It's pretty clear that this is what Pakistanis would want.

I should add, and this is more controversial, that in my view, civilian rule in Pakistan would be more favourable--or at least potentially could be more favourable--to what we are trying to accomplish in Afghanistan, because the military in Pakistan is not just the military, it's actually the ruling party. It has political alliances, and those political alliances are with the Islamist parties. Musharraf's party is in coalition with the pro-Taliban party in the Balochistan provincial government. The Pashtun parties that are opposed to the Taliban actually are in opposition to the military, and would be likely to have more influence if there were an elected civilian government. Of course there would be some problems, but I don't think the blackmail the Pashtun military uses with foreign guests is credible.

Just on the Taliban, I prefer to speak about the insurgency rather than the Taliban, because the Taliban as an organization is only part of the insurgency. There are many people fighting for a variety of reasons. Certainly there are people who can be neutralized or incorporated into the government one way or the other. I think it is much more questionable whether it's possible to create a political or factional split within the structure of the Taliban, which appears to be relatively united under the leadership of Mullah Omar.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Dr. Rubin.

Ms. Lalonde, you have seven minutes.

[Francine Lalonde, Bloc, La Pointe-de-l'Île, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I will be sharing my time with Ms. Barbot.

I would like to thank both of you. I would like to say at the outset that the party of which I am a member is the Bloc Québécois, which has the majority of the seats in Quebec, and the majority of people in this province are opposed to our participation in the war in Afghanistan. My party has defended this position from the beginning. However, we have to rebalance humanitarian aid as compared to our military presence. That is absolutely essential. We must also deal with the poppy issue. At the moment, the drug is devastating the entire Afghan society.

The testimony we have heard at the committee suggests that the type of war being waged in Afghanistan is incompatible with humanitarian aid and with gaining the support of the people. There is no doubt that what we need is the support of the people.

I would like to hear what you have to say about this.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Madame Lalonde.

Dr. Rubin.

[Dr. Barnett Rubin]

I could ask some questions, but I prefer to make some comments.

I certainly agree that we must increase both our humanitarian aid and also our economic assistance. From the beginning, everything I have said has supported this view. We must remember particularly that everything the international community does in Afghanistan must be done in cooperation with the Afghans in order to build a responsible state that can offer the people the services they need and have been waiting for so long. If Canada can do something along these lines, I would support that.

In addition, I very much agree with Mr. Smith about eradicating poppy production. I think this is a serious mistake. This year and last poppy production was reduced in a number of provinces. In neither case was this reduction a result of poppy eradication. It had more to do with security considerations, the political action of the government and economic development.

However, there is a contradiction here. We want the support of the peasants, but the elimination of poppies conveys the opposite impression, because growing poppies is the way they earn their living. As to the way operations are being conducted, I think Mr. Smith made some remarks about this in his presentation. He said that the fact that we do not have enough troops on the ground meant that we turned to the air force, which is very harmful, because it results in civilian deaths.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Mr. Smith.

[Gordon Smith]

I am just going to add a few words about something I find particularly striking.

I'm looking at my notes here. The most recent estimates of the value of poppy production at the farm gate, as it leaves the producer, is $37 million for all of Afghanistan in a year. When processed and exported, it translates into $3 billion on the streets.

If we're dealing with something for which the farmers who are there only get $37 million, it's possible to find some other way or some other incentive so that they can end up better off. It's a question of how one structures it.

I might add that although this report has nothing to do with the International Development Research Centre, of which I chair the board, the IDRC along with some government agencies, and certainly including CIDA, are now looking at novel ways to provide incentives to deal with this problem, but eradication is simply not it.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you.

Madame Barbot, a very quick question.

[Vivian Barbot, Bloc, Papineau, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

You spoke about the possibility of a debate within our society about Canada's role in Afghanistan. Mr. Rubin, you said that Canada could play a role with countries that want to change the mission in Afghanistan.

Could you please give us some more details about this? How would Canada go about this?

[Dr. Barnett Rubin]

Thank you.

Let us take the example of poppy production, which we were just talking about. I have discovered that even within the American Congress and among Republicans in the Senate, some people realize that the current policy is not working. It actually runs counter to our interests.

There is a sort of debate about this—and the Senlis Council has done some work on this—but it is rather underground. As far as I know, no official authority has proposed an alternative policy. There is no serious debate about this. The Senlis Council has a few ideas on this. If it is legally possible to purchase poppies and to use opium for medical purposes, we must study the impact of that on agriculture, the economy, and so on. This study must be done carefully and must set out both the expected and unexpected consequences of this.

The Senlis Council has tried to do this, but the initiative must be much stronger and more credible in my opinion. In other countries, including the United States, members of committees like yours are sharing their concerns, but for the moment, they have not been developed.

[Gordon Smith]

I would like to suggest another solution. We could use the fact that we are members of NATO. There is also the Council of NATO. I was the ambassador to NATO. With our allies and friends in NATO, it would be quite possible to have a debate about all the aspects of our strategy, including this important problem.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Mr. Smith.

We'll go to Mr. Obhrai from the government side, for seven minutes.