I wouldn't conceptualize the problem as an imbalance, because you can always correct the imbalance by pulling out your troops. I think the problem is that Afghanistan needs more--and more effective--development assistance. Canada has actually been one of the best donors in terms of the way it gives assistance. It has supported the Afghanistan reconstruction trust fund and has even put a certain amount of money, $10 million--I'm not sure whose dollars, but somebody's dollars--directly into the treasury of Afghanistan as a sign of support for the reforms they have undertaken in the finance ministry. But if you can do more, that will certainly be welcome.
If I can just say a word about the exit strategy, there are different scenarios, as one can imagine. But there's a basic problem, which is that we have no reason at the moment to believe that the current territory of Afghanistan possesses enough economic resources to pay the cost of maintaining its own security. In fact, that territory became a state because it was a state subsidized by the British empire to protect the frontier of India, not to provide services to Afghans. That is why it has never developed the capacity to do so.
If Afghanistan is to be stable, either some kinds of continuing subsidies are needed or we have to somehow reconfigure the region so that there are a lot more regional resources and cooperation that enable Afghanistan to produce much more than it has in the past and support itself. Plus, we need to lower the costs of maintaining security by lowering the regional threat environment.
Those are the components of any exit strategy from Afghanistan. But it is very difficult to imagine a situation in which Afghanistan will not in some sense be subsidized by or dependent on the international community in the foreseeable future.