Foreign Affairs Committee on March 29th, 2007

[Prof. Gordon Smith]

There have been periods of peace in Afghanistan. To say there's continuous conflict I think is a distortion of history. For the last quarter of a century there's a been a lot of warfare, there's no question about that, but if you look back further, there have been periods of peace. These two books that I mentioned both talk of children growing up in a peaceful period and the coming of conflict.

I do think, Madame Lalonde, that one does need to think about what we are doing to try to help the Afghan people and why that is important. As I say, I think we lose sight of the fact that the original reason we went there was after the attacks of 9/11 and the threat of al-Qaeda. And it's a very real one, which we haven't really talked about this morning, but all the evidence I see points to al-Qaeda rebuilding.

I would add to what Mr. Rubin said in the previous question. I worry, with the U.S. defeat, because that's how it will be perceived in Iraq, that this will encourage people to go the al-Qaeda route. It will have a variety of effects, but on the whole, it will be a cause of celebration among the extremist Islamic jihadist community in the world.

[Dr. Barnett Rubin]

It was not said, however, that troops must remain in Iraq, but that is a result that we can no longer avoid.

With respect to the wars in Afghanistan in the last few decades, I would say that they were not caused by the alleged "war-like" nature of the Afghans. They were the result of certain political phenomena that may be transitory or more or less permanent in nature, and that depends on our actions and those of Afghanistan's neighbours.

I have noticed that it is difficult to stabilize this country, but it is not impossible. The people who live there have had decades of peace, for example during the cold war period. The stability resulted from a sort of consensus among the great powers and Afghanistan's neighbours about the country's political regime.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Madame Lalonde.

[Francine Lalonde, Bloc, La Pointe-de-l'Île, QC]

I know this is a long question that calls for a long answer. What would be the geo-strategic effects of abandoning Afghanistan? You mentioned Iraq, but what about Afghanistan?

[Gordon Smith]

First of all, I would say that this would be a total disaster for NATO. This would be a failure for NATO.

In our report, we described a few scenarios that could happen. There could be a civil war, or the country could be occupied by Pakistan, on one side, and by the Northern Alliance, on the other, which would result in a partition of the country. There are a number of possibilities.

In my opinion, the consequences of a quick withdrawal from Afghanistan would be very difficult. That is why I said it was not an option. We need a different strategy to get out of the country, not a quick, full withdrawal.

[Dr. Barnett Rubin]

First, al-Qaida would definitely establish a broader base in Afghanistan very quickly. In addition, I do not know whether the Taliban could take over power in Kabul, because even if the west were to abandon Afghanistan, Iran and Russia would not abandon it. So there would be potential for another civil war.

However, there is no doubt that the impact on Pakistan would be very serious, because the Taliban and al-Qaida are now established in that country. They're not established just tribally, they are starting to extend their influence into administrative spheres, and thus, they could regain power. And since that would be seen as a victory in Afghanistan, it would be very difficult to manage for the Government of Pakistan.

[Francine Lalonde, Bloc, La Pointe-de-l'Île, QC]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Dr. Rubin.

Mr. Khan.

[Wajid Khan, Conservative, Mississauga—Streetsville, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

One of my questions was answered. I was wondering what will happen to NATO in order to survive.

Going back to my other question, Afghanistan has just formed an Afghan grand jirga on their side, and I met with their foreign relations committee. On the Pakistan side they have two governors for Baluchistan and Northwest Frontier, along with three senior cabinet ministers.

On the success of the jirga progress, I'd like to hear your comments. Some people argue that the solution to Afghanistan also rests in Pakistan and settling the FATA and border settlement areas.

Perhaps you could comment on those two issues.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Mr. Khan.

Dr. Rubin.

[Dr. Barnett Rubin]

The jirga proposal you referred to was one that I believe originally came from President Karzai. He envisaged having meetings of Pashtun tribes on both sides of the Durand Line--he wouldn't say the border--to try to maintain security in the area. Of course, neither the non-Pashtuns in Afghanistan nor the Pakistani government accepted that proposal, so they are now working on something different.

But there's a fundamental problem. Jirga is used as a national institution in Afghanistan, but it's not used as a national institution in Pakistan, so there's no symmetry between the two sides. They're having a great deal of difficulty figuring out how to actually do it, and I don't know if they'll succeed.

On the second point, I think it's absolutely true that this is not just an Afghan problem; it is a regional problem. The border between Afghanistan and Pakistan is not just a question of recognizing a line, because the border is more complex, as you mentioned. They refer to it as the three-tiered frontier because the British drew it so there's a line between the administered territories of Pakistan and the tribal agencies that are not administered.

By the way, the Afghan government has certain rights in those tribal agencies. They used to recruit soldiers from there, and they have relations with the tribes. The tribes send messages to President Karzai telling him what they want him to do. These are people on the Pakistan side of the border, and they fight in Afghanistan on both sides.

Afghanistan was under British suzerainty, and the outer border of Afghanistan with Russia and Iran was considered the security border of the British Empire. It's now more or less considered the security border of Pakistan as well. That's what the doctrine of strategic depth is about.

So there's a whole set of issues involving the internal structure of Pakistan, the relations of Pakistan to Afghanistan, and the way Afghanistan is settled in the region, which need to be revisited. It's currently run under a colonial agreement from 1905 between Britain and Russia. It's a good time to revisit this whole set of agreements, because the international community is there and can help with the confidence-building measures and particularly investment in the development of that frontier area, which would provide the people there with livelihoods other than smuggling and warfare.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Dr. Rubin.

Mr. Smith.

[Prof. Gordon Smith]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I won't add to that, but I do have the information on salary support, if I may reply to that question, thanks to Ellen Wright of CIDA.

This fiscal year, 2006-07, CIDA provided $18 million to the Afghanistan reconstruction trust fund, and a portion of this provided salary support to 270,000 civil servants in a variety of different government departments.

That's an overall figure, and I'm sure more detail can be provided to the committee if you wish.

[Wajid Khan, Conservative, Mississauga—Streetsville, ON]

Do I have another 30 seconds?

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Yes, go ahead.

[Wajid Khan, Conservative, Mississauga—Streetsville, ON]

They are, as a matter of fact, talking that the Government of Pakistan is probably going to be announcing something this month or early next month about the investments. What they're looking at is putting in schools, hospitals, all those kinds of things. Do you think that's fruitful?

[Dr. Barnett Rubin]

Yes, I do.

I actually wrote a report with a colleague from Waziristan on the whole border issue, including this. I would note that in the recent supplemental request from the administration there is a request for $750 million over five years to assist Pakistan with the development of the tribal agencies.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you.

Madam McDonough.

[Alexa McDonough, NDP, Halifax, NS]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Rubin, I believe you suggested in your earlier comments that in your assessment, the Taliban are relatively united behind Mullah Omar. Yet I know both of you have indicated that you recognize the need to try to find ways to engage not just with the Taliban but other insurgents as well. I know you underscored that point.

Can either or both of you point to any examples of where there have been some successes with the engagement of the Taliban or other insurgents, perhaps in some of the other provinces? Helmand is one where I think there has been a bit of reporting about that. And are there are some lessons we can learn from strategies that have been attempted elsewhere, if it is in fact the case that the Taliban are relatively united behind Mullah Omar? It seems like a good theory, and we keep advocating it, but where is there some indication that there have been some successes, either by other NATO allies or more indigenous kinds of initiatives?

[Dr. Barnett Rubin]

Well, of course people don't surrender when they think they're winning. There haven't been a lot of outstanding successes recently. There are some high-profile individuals who were formerly in the Taliban who are now more or less with the government, or at least are in Afghanistan and not with the Taliban.

Certainly the communist regime of Najibullah, or I should say the post-communist regime of Najibullah, had some success, actually, in stabilizing parts of the country through agreements such as you spoke about, agreements with elders that allowed fighters to keep their weapons as long as they didn't attack the government, things like that, at least as a temporary measure. But it was never possible for him to stabilize the country, because the mujahedeen continued to receive support through Pakistan.

As long as there is, from their point of view, a part of Afghanistan that is not under the control of the Government of Afghanistan because it's in the tribal agencies and in Pakistan, and as long as that area is also not really controlled by Pakistan and Pakistan does not do more to effectively shut down that recruitment centre, then there is a vast reserve that they have that makes it very difficult to create conditions for that kind of political discussion, although it can be done on a local basis within Afghanistan.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Mr. Smith.

[Prof. Gordon Smith]

I have nothing to add to that.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Madam McDonough, you do have some more time.

[Alexa McDonough, NDP, Halifax, NS]

I have one further question. Going back to the conundrum of salary support, which may help to create somewhat more favourable conditions in people's lives but also is anti-corruption protection, and there are obvious benefits of that, the other side of that is really an unsustainable situation relative to the ability of the Afghani economy to actually maintain that. What is the answer to that? It's clearly a conundrum. Do you have any wise thoughts on how this problem can be addressed?

[Prof. Gordon Smith]

I think they're pretty obvious thoughts, at least on my part. As Dr. Rubin has said, if we're serious, we'd better be serious, because we're there for a long time.

First of all, there's one thing we haven't talked about, but I'm sure all committee members know this. Afghanistan has never had a strong centralized government--far from it. Kabul has had varying degrees of control, but it's a country in which a lot of power is in the regions, and that's not going to easily change.

We haven't really talked about the Afghan national police, the Afghan national army, which is a separate issue, and the Afghan national security agency. The salary discrepancy is also a very important issue. I guess it's not corruption, but people can end up being trained for the army, and they will then take off to join the Taliban, or people can be trained for the police, and who knows where they've come from. They're attached to some warlord somewhere and go back to work with him.

I think a lot depends on salaries. It's not really corruption. It's simply switching sides and opportunism. A great deal depends on salary support, but I can't see any alternative to the reality that we're going to be there for a very long time.